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In the face of challenges of energy security, decarbonization, resilience, and the 
replacement of aging infrastructure systems, federal, state, and local actors are facilitating 
the development of smart electricity networks to transition towards a more sustainable 
electricity system. In the United States, development of “smart grids” is being pursued as 
a national policy mandate and goal, promising that the deployment of smart grid technol-
ogies – referring in general to digital information and communication technologies that 
sense, monitor, control and manage the electric grid – will make electricity systems more 
environmentally sustainable and reliable, and at the same time, provide opportunities for 
growth and innovation.   
This dissertation examines and analyzes three interconnected issues relating to 
these sociotechnical changes in electricity infrastructure: the material and discursive con-
struction of the smart grid, urban smart grid experimentation, and the mobility of smart 
grid models and knowledge. A conceptual framework is proposed for investigating soci-
otechnical transitions that accounts for dimensions of power and politics that are com-
monly overlooked in conventional analysis, and highlights how governance regimes 
shape and are shaped by sociotechnical change. Utilizing Foucauldian discourse analysis 
and relational comparative case study methodology, this dissertation analyzes the devel-
opment of the smart grid as a governmental program highlighting its rationalities, tech-
niques, and imagined subjects.  
The findings of these analyses suggest that the transition to a smarter grid in-
volves much more than top-down policy mandates; significant urban experimentation is 
 ii 
involved, as well as inter-city learning that is shaped by local political economy and 
broader political rationalities. This dissertation also argues for a synthesis between policy 
mobilities and sociotechnical transitions theory, highlighting through case studies how 
urban smart grid experiments are influenced by experiences and knowledge generated 
from “vanguard” cities. The conclusion of this dissertation is that the creation of the 
smart grid is far from a purely technical infrastructural intervention, and instead, requires 
significant changes in the everyday social practices and conduct of energy consumers, 
while also reconfiguring the city, engaging in a material politics in order to govern ener-
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation investigates how the smart grid has emerged as a solution to a number 
of energy related problems. In this historical process, the technological transition to a 
smart grid has disrupted an industry characterized by lock-in and path dependency, not 
only in technology, but also organizational structure. This process of sociotechnical 
change, however, is piecemeal and experimental. The context of smart grid development 
and experimentation shapes and is shaped by exisiting sociotechnical systems and soci-
otechnical regimes. In addition, these forms of experimentation suggest new opportuni-
ties for testing and learning, providing lessons and best practices that influence broader 
implementation.  Furthermore, with the transition towards a smart grid, assumptions 
about how to best govern electricity generation and consumption privilege particular 
forms of knowledge about technology, energy consumption, and policy.  
In this dissertation, I critically analyze the material and discursive construction of 
the smart grid, the implementation of urban smart grid experiments, and the mobility of 
knowledge, models, and best practices pertaining to the smart grid.  To do this, I build on 
and synthesize existing literature on sociotechnical systems, the social construction of 
technological systems, urban experimentation, and policy mobilities in a conceptual 
framework that helps addresses many limitations through an analysis of governmentality. 
This addresses important limitations in our understanding of crucial questions relating to 
how regimes of power and governance shape and are shaped by sociotechnical systems 
and sociotechnical change.  
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1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
The United States’ electrical grid is characterized as the “largest machine on 
earth.” The grid enables electricity generated in distant (or near) places to be delivered to 
our homes, businesses and industries for various uses. Electricity is of vital importance to 
nearly every aspect of modern life. In the face of significant environmental, technical, 
and political challenges, however, the electricity system needs upgrading, maintenance, 
and retrofitting. The grid is failing and fragile. It’s an aging infrastructure that relies on 
century-old technology limiting the ability for interconnecting renewable energy, control-
ling electricity flows, and managing the system. Each of these challenges have been met 
with an optimism of how the smart grid will address them, transforming our electricity 
system resulting in multiple economic and environmental benefits.   
The grid is an incredibly complex system of interlinked generation facilities, 
transmission and distribution networks, transformers and substations, and a variety of 
end-uses. Generation facilities convert chemical or potential energy into mechanical en-
ergy to create electrical energy through in an electrical generator. The resulting electricity 
(usually in alternating current, but also in direct current from solar panels and wind tur-
bines) is carried at high voltage through the transmission system to load centers where a 
distribution system then delivers the electricity at a lower voltage to homes and business-
es where electricity is ultimately consumed in a variety of applications. The grid is all of 
these things. When one part of the system changes, the rest of the system has to adapt and 
change as well, and quickly, as grid operators have to balance supply and demand at eve-
ry instant to ensure voltage, frequency, and current are at optimal and safe levels. 
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The electrical grid began not as one (or three as in the US today) interconnected 
regional systems, but multiple, local grids in urban areas. Nye (1992) explains that the 
early grid systems were local, utilizing direct current dynamos or alternating current al-
ternators for generation, and often had multiple utilities with their own sets of wires and 
customers in one given territory or city. For example, in Muncie, Indiana, during the ear-
ly 1900s, what Nye (1992, 17) calls a “microcosm of the US” at that time, three utilities 
served the city: one public for street lighting, one private for the streetcar system, and one 
private for other uses.  
Electricity transformed Muncie’s industries, effectively deskilling labor or reduc-
ing need for it altogether, and at the same time created new electricity dependent indus-
tries. While commercial uses of electricity were large in the 1900s, few residential homes 
were electrified. However, by 1930, national home electrification grew to 70 percent, 
mostly in urban areas as electricity networks had not been built into rural areas (Nye 
1992). Trends of increasing demand due to growth in industry and electrification of the 
home, incorporating new appliances and lighting, coupled with the centralization of own-
ership of generation facilities and distribution networks fueled by economies of scale and 
scope, transformed the system of small scale, local generation, into large scale, intercon-
nected systems under vertically integrated companies, and eventually regulated monopo-
lies.   
All of these developments were thoroughly social and technical. As Nye (1992, 
27) explains, “technological developments are too often understood as irresistible, when 
in fact people shape the form of the electrical system as they incorporate it into everyday 
life.” The sociotechnical nature of electricity networks is essential to understanding how 
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and why and if these sociotechnical systems change. As Nye notes, the electricity grid 
shaped and was shaped by the cultural, economic, and political context in which it was 
developed. Its technical changes were outcomes of cultural changes, and vice-versa.  
Similarly, with the development of the “smart grid” today, electricity systems are 
being reimagined, reshaped, and reconfigured to respond to pressures to act on climate 
change, resource constraints, and overconsumption, signaling a renewed importance and 
attention to the ways in which the electricity systems are integrated into everyday urban 
life.  
1.1.1 The smart grid  
The smart grid means numerous things to different audiences. It’s a blanket term that 
envelops a whole host of technologies, business models, and visions.  The US Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) (2016) describes the smart grid as a necessary technological pro-
gression in electricity generation, transmission, and distribution:  
"The grid," refers to the electric grid, a network of transmission lines, sub-
stations, transformers and more that deliver electricity from the power 
plant to your home or business. It’s what you plug into when you flip on 
your light switch or power up your computer. Our current electric grid was 
built in the 1890s and improved upon as technology advanced through 
each decade. Today, it consists of more than 9,200 electric generating 
units with more than 1 million megawatts of generating capacity connect-
ed to more than 300,000 miles of transmission lines. Although the electric 
grid is considered an engineering marvel, we are stretching its patchwork 
nature to its capacity. To move forward, we need a new kind of electric 
grid, one that is built from the bottom up to handle the groundswell of dig-
ital and computerized equipment and technology dependent on it—and 
one that can automate and manage the increasing complexity and needs of 
electricity in the 21st Century. In short, the digital technology that allows 
for two-way communication between the utility and its customers, and the 
sensing along the transmission lines is what makes the grid smart. Like the 
Internet, the Smart Grid will consist of controls, computers, automation, 
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and new technologies and equipment working together, but in this case, 
these technologies will work with the electrical grid to respond digitally to 
our quickly changing electric demand. 
The smart grid, for the DOE, is a “new kind of electric grid” that enables an “energy in-
ternet” (The Economist 2004) to handle the growing demands placed on the grid utilizing 
digital technologies.   
Smart grid technologies include generation, transmission, distribution, and end-
use applications. In the current system, generation is centralized in large-scale power 
plants that produce alternating current (AC) electricity, transmission transports high volt-
age electricity from power plants to substations closer to consumers, distribution trans-
ports low voltage electricity from substations to households and other buildings; and end-
uses are as varied as appliances and consumer devices to pumps and lights for industrial 
uses.  In this “legacy” systems model, electricity moves in a single direction, flowing 
down to areas of lower voltage like water down a hill, from generation to consumption 
(Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Legacy electric grid. Source: 
http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/power_grid.cfm 
In the smart grid, all elements of this legacy system are changed or transformed in some 
way.  As the US Department of Energy’s definition above details, the smart grid entails 
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the use of digital technologies, sensors, actuators, and other ICTs that are integrated into 
the existing electric grid, “modernizing” it to enable a variety of new capacities (see Ste-
phens, Wilson, and Peterson 2015; Carvallo and Cooper 2015; Farhangi 2010; Fox-
Penner 2014).  
On the generation side, grid tie-inverters allow integration of renewable energy 
sources such as PV, which generate direct current (DC) electricity. Transmission system 
technologies include synchrophasors used to collect data on grid functions, power trans-
mission analysis software to study, model, or control transmission systems, and smart 
inverters and rectifiers for conversion between alternating and direct current. On the dis-
tribution side, substation automation technologies, application of new relays and breakers 
to direct electricity flows, fault locator systems, advanced metering infrastructures and 
software, and distribution automation and software that enable identification of outages 
or system inefficiencies more quickly. On the end-use side, consumer applications in-
clude smart meters and information management software (both utility and consumer), 
load control systems such as programmable thermostats, and all manner of energy man-
agement systems and smart appliances. Smart grids technologies also include a variety of 
energy storage technologies including pumped hydro, compressed air storage, batteries 
and flywheels. Electrified transport is also included in smart grid technologies because of 
the possibility of using, for example, electric vehicle batteries for storing energy.  
These technologies are associated with a range of promises, visions, and imagi-
naries of the smart grid. These include: climate change mitigation and adaptation through 
integrating clean renewable energy and creating microgrids that operate independently in 
case of extreme events; the creation of new jobs in renewable and smart energy industries 
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boosting a so-called “clean energy economy”; energy security and independence at the 
national level through increases in efficiency and renewables and electrification of 
transport; and “empowering” consumers to save money through better energy consump-
tion choices.  
1.1.2 Existing social science literature on smart grids (Empirical Gap) 
While changes in sociotechnical systems associated with the US smart grid have 
been studied by social scientists, the work has produced more descriptive treatments to 
identify key issues for development and policy, and as such, has received less considera-
tion of power dynamics and politics (Stephens, Wilson, and Peterson 2015; Langheim et 
al. 2014; Stephens et al. 2013; Slayton 2013).  The framework of sociotechnical systems 
analysis, and in particular attention to sociotechnical regimes, provides a starting point 
for analyzing the politics and governance of the smart grid. However, its limitations in 
terms of analyzing power, discussed above, point to a need for further theoretical devel-
opment. This is all the more important considering the co-constitution of energy systems, 
culture, and everyday life (Nye 1992; Shove and Walker 2014; Hughes 1983; M. T. 
Huber 2013).  
With all of the technological changes and promises of the smart grid, however, the 
majority of attention in public discourse is on consumer, or end-use technologies, espe-
cially the smart meter (Langheim et al. 2014). This is for good reason: most installations 
of smart grid technologies have included smart metering infrastructure, and meters or 
electric bills are the traditional points of contact for consumers’ interaction with utilities. 
Attention to the consumer, to economic concerns, and to environmental benefits all focus 
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attention on the notion that the smart grid is far from purely technological, but also social 
and cultural.  
Numerous recent social science approaches have addressed many social changes 
and concerns arising with the smart grid.  Many studies have considered the visions, 
promises, and imaginaries around the smart grid (Tricoire 2015; Stephens, Wilson, and 
Peterson 2015; Ballo 2015; Engels and Münch 2015; Vesnic-Alujevic, Breitegger, and 
Pereira 2016; Groves et al. 2016), although primarily in a European context. These stud-
ies aim to uncover the visions of technological progress that undergird the transition to a 
smart grid while also thinking through the implications for policy and technical imple-
mentation.  
Some critical studies explicitly engage with the notion of users of the smart grid 
(Goulden et al. 2014; Nyborg 2015; Verbong, Beemsterboer, and Sengers 2013), whereas 
studies on  technology acceptance and behavior changes to time of use pricing schemes 
enabled by smart meters tends to focus on “consumers” more narrowly defined (e.g. Abi 
Ghanem and Mander 2014; Gangale, Mengolini, and Onyeji 2013; Casey and Jones 
2013; Torriti 2012). Industry related discussions also involve considerable work on “de-
mand-side management” and “demand response” (Gellings 1985; López et al. 2015; 
Loughran and Kulick 2004) which has received considerable attention as smart grid tech-
nologies enable new programs to be devised for controlling demand. And as the US De-
partment of Energy definition above explains, a huge part of the smart grid requires a 
rethinking of the relationships between supply and demand.  
Electric demand has always fluctuated with the rhythms and practices of industry, 
commerce, and everyday life, but the smart grid promises a way to handle and manage 
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this dynamism. Managing demand, making it flexible and responsive, is a key driver for 
smart grid implementation (see for example Rahimi and Ipakchi 2010; Abi Ghanem and 
Mander 2014; Biegel et al. 2014). Yet, demand is highly variable and difficult to manage. 
As social practice scholars have been keen to point out, energy is consumed through ha-
bitual social practices unlikely to be heavily influenced by pricing schemes (Shove and 
Walker 2014; Strengers 2013; Gram-Hanssen 2008; Hargreaves 2011). The impacts of 
this scholarship suggest that radical re-thinking of smart grid technologies and policies 
are necessary to realize sustainability promises.   
While there has been considerable recent attention to “social” issues in the smart 
grid, including attention to policy, economic incentives, and technological visions, less 
attention has been paid to understanding the smart grid as a governmental program, a way 
of governing energy systems change, energy consumption, and everyday life (see 
Bulkeley, Powells, and Bell 2016; Powells et al. 2014; Bulkeley, McGuirk, and Dowling 
2016).  In addition, urban studies literature has not attended to the context of smart grid 
implementation in cities across the US (see McLean, Bulkeley, and Crang 2015; Luque 
2014), nor the way that smart grid experiments foster learning between cities attempting 
to implement the smart grid to realize its numerous promises.   
1.1.3 Understanding the smart grid through sociotechnical transitions theory  
The smart grid promises sweeping social and technical change in a large techno-
logical system (LTS). Hughes (1983) coined the term “large technological systems” in 
his study of the development of electricity networks, the seminal work, Networks of Pow-
er, to understand the process of innovation, focusing on “system builders” and “socially 
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useful technical systems” (Hughes and Coutard 1996).  Hughes was interested in the 
“heterogeneous engineering” that “system builders” performed in order to develop elec-
tricity systems, often partaking in raising funds, circulating publicity, dealing with legal 
issues and constraints and founding organizations (Hughes 1983). This work was essen-
tial not so much for understanding how technical systems work, but how they were made 
to be socially useful.  
Hughes’ sociotechnical approach to studying the evolution of large technological 
lays a foundation for this dissertation, and for scholars in science and technology studies 
(STS) and urban studies. In essence his work demonstrated how technological change 
both shapes and is shaped by social, political, cultural, and economic change; and how 
LTS have an endurance, or “momentum,” that “stems from their embeddedness in social 
values and from their materiality” (Hecht and Allen 2001, 2). Hughes’ work lays a foun-
dation for understanding the connections and mutual shaping of technology, power, and 
authority.  
Building on the LTS approach, scholars in STS and innovation studies have tried 
to understand how sociotechnical systems change over time, or how they “transition” 
(Geels 2004; Geels 2002; Geels 2005). The general principle is that if there is a better 
understanding of processes of technological change and innovation, it may help direct 
change towards more sustainable outcomes.  The dominant perspective and analytical 
framework on sociotechnical transitions is the multi-level perspective, or MLP. This was 
developed at the intersection of evolutionary economics and technology studies, building 
largely on Hughes’ work and his understanding of sociotechnical systems, and Rip and 
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Kemp’s (1998) understanding of the multi-level framework of technological change (see 
Rip and Kemp 1998; Kemp 1994; Kemp, Schot, and Hoogma 1998).  
The MLP provides a ‘heuristic’ framework for thinking through sociotechnical 
transitions, providing a basis for understanding how transitions come about and through 
what processes (A. Smith, Voß, and Grin 2010; Elzen, Geels, and Green 2004).  Techno-
logical change does not come easily, though; different social, cultural, economic, and 
political forces create resistance to change. Geels (2002, 1259-60) explains that this “sta-
bility of established sociotechnical configurations” is a result of “the linkages between 
heterogeneous elements” which are coordinated and configured by “sociotechnical re-
gimes.” Geels sociotechnical regime concept builds on Rip and Kemp’s (1998, 340, em-
phasis added) definition: “A technological regime is the rule-set or grammar embedded 
in a complex of engineering practices, production process technologies, product charac-
teristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of 
defining problems; all of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures.”  Important 
here is the complex interactions not only of engineers working on technical systems, but 
a variety of social groups that influence technological trajectories (policy makers, civil 
society groups, corporations and suppliers, scientists, financial institutions, etc.).     
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Figure 2: Dynamics in the MLP. Source: Geels (2005, p. 452) 
 
The MLP includes consideration of both macro-scale or “landscape” factors that 
create strong forms of structuration and are very resistant to change, and “niches” which 
are micro-scale processes that produce radical innovations (Geels 2004).  Whereas re-
gimes may produce incremental innovations, niches develop radical innovations that may 
challenge existing regimes (see Figure 2). Niches are typically “protected” from market 
processes and serve as spaces for innovations to be cultured, spaces of learning by doing, 
using, and interacting, and spaces to build the social networks and capacities required to 
reconfigure regimes (Geels 2002; Kemp, Schot, and Hoogma 1998; Geels and Raven 
2006; Hommels, Peters, and Bijker 2007). Regimes may be challenged by niches, but 
they always exist within a largely “exogenous” landscape of political, economic, and en-
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vironmental factors slow to change, such as “cultural changes, demographic trends, and 
broad political changes” (Geels 2002, 1262).  
In summary, the MLP provides an understanding of technological change as an 
evolutionary process through which sociotechnical regimes are reconfigured as radical 
innovations break through from technological niches.  The promises of the smart grid 
include a variety of sociotechnical changes that would seemingly result in sweeping tech-
nological transitions in electricity systems (for example, from fossil-fuel based, central-
ized generation to distributed, renewable-based generation) and reconfigurations of soci-
otechnical regimes (for example, consumers becoming producers). However, there are 
many limitations to the sociotechnical systems approach that need to be addressed before 
it can be applied to study the smart grid.  
1.1.4 The limitations of sociotechnical transitions theory (Theory Gap) 
While the MLP provides a valuable framework for understanding sustainability, low-
carbon, and energy transitions (see Markard, Raven, and Truffer 2012; Bulkeley, Broto, 
and Maassen 2014; Araújo 2014), it has faced several criticisms relevant to this study of 
the US smart grid and its urban implementation.  
First, while Geels (2002) suggests that regimes fulfill socially valued functions, he 
also argues that they constitute them, wherein new technologies and innovation co-evolve 
with their social functions. As Smith et al (2005, 1493) explain, “regimes therefore em-
body strongly held convictions and interests concerning technological practices and the 
best ways in which these might be improved.” This suggests the MLP would consider 
how these socially desirable functions come to be, how they are reproduced by regimes, 
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and how certain technologies are made to serve these functions. The lack of attention to 
these considerations suggests a need for a better understanding of the ways in which so-
ciotechnical regimes interact with and shape user practices, and develop rationales for the 
development of certain forms of technology and governance.  
Second, and relatedly, the theories of sociotechnical transitions has been criticized 
for its lack of attention to power and politics (Meadowcroft 2009; Meadowcroft 2011; 
Lawhon and Murphy 2012; Shove and Walker 2007; Shove and Walker 2008; Walker 
and Shove 2007; Lovell 2007).  Of special concern to many critical scholars is the ap-
proach of “transition management” that applies the MLP to advocate for shaping and 
governing long-term sociotechnical change (Kemp, Loorbach, and Rotmans 2007; 
Loorbach 2010). Meadowcroft (2009), for example, has highlighted the complexity of 
doing any sort of “management” stemming from the multiple visions, goals, values, and 
directives guiding such management, the decentralized nature of innovations, the tenden-
cy for systems to ‘lock-in’, and the centrality of politics in all of these issues. Similarly, 
Shove and Walker (2007, 764) caution against approaches to “manage” system change, 
citing the political issues of authority, legitimacy, and democratic choice, before ques-
tioning if it is even possible to manage transitions at all given the context of a “world 
dominated by hegemonic ideologies of neoliberal capitalism, global finance and com-
modity flows.”  
This attention to issues of power and politics in sociotechnical transitions compli-
cates the applicability of the MLP framework (Genus and Coles 2008). Lawhon and 
Murphy (2012, 366) suggest that too much focus on technological artifacts and transition 
management has created a void in attention to power, and therefore,  “reconsidering how 
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a problem is defined by looking at the broader context expands the type and level of in-
tervention, inducing a movement away from material factors and artifacts and towards 
social explanations of and responses to the rules governing a particular regime.” These 
considerations would help to address how and why particular regimes are reconfigured 
and how and why sociotechnical transitions occur.   
Moreover, while sociotechnical regimes have been described as “relatively stable 
configurations of institutions, techniques and artifacts, as well as rules, practices and 
networks that determine the ‘normal’ development and use of technologies” (Smith, 
Stirling, and Berkhout 2005, 1493, emphasis added), there is surprisingly little analysis of 
what and how technologies comes to be “normal.”  This is of particular importance to 
questions of power and politics because regimes not only include technologies, but “user 
practices and application domains (markets), symbolic meaning of technology, infrastruc-
ture, industry structure, policy and techno-scientific knowledge” (Geels, 2002, 1262). As 
Geels (ibid.) suggests, “users also have to integrate new technologies in their practices, 
organisations and routines, something which involves learning, adjustments and domesti-
cation.” The process by which this occurs, however, is not straightforward, and instead 
arises from social and cultural processes of which power, knowledge, and discourse are 
key.  
One promising approach to address these limitations suggests that a Foucauldian-
inspired analysis of governmentality provides theoretical resources to address the interac-
tion between specific socio-technical systems and broader power regimes (Tyfield 2014). 
Furthermore, Tyfield (2014, 593) explains, “the focus on power relations mediated via 
knowledge and measurement technologies also alerts us to the possibility that the key 
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technological issue for a [sociotechnical] transition may well not be in the technologies 
(i.e. machines) per se, but rather in how these interact and coordinate amongst themselves 
and the power-knowledge technologies they must integrate for this to be possible.” I take 
these criticisms into account in my analysis of “governance regimes” in the conceptual 
framework for this dissertation (see Figure 3), utilizing Foucault’s “analytics of govern-
mentality” to focus on governmental rationales, techniques, and subjectivities.   
A third criticism of the MLP approach to sociotechnical transitions relates to the 
lack of consideration of important factors of space, place and scale (Lawhon and Murphy 
2012; Coenen and Truffer 2012; Murphy 2015; Coenen, Benneworth, and Truffer 2012; 
Hansen and Coenen 2015; Truffer, Murphy, and Raven 2015). Three elements of this 
critique are relevant to this dissertation. First, the under-theorized role of the city in pro-
cesses of transitions has caused concern for urban studies scholars interested in infra-
structure and change (Hodson and Marvin 2009d; Hodson and Marvin 2010a; Hodson 
and Marvin 2012; Monstadt 2007; Moss 2014). Their work highlights the need to consid-
er the city itself as a sociotechnical process (Graham and Marvin 2001) through which 
transition processes are mediated. They place specific attention on the urban as an im-
portant scale and place for the energy and sustainability transitions because of the in-
creasing devolution of responsibilities for key aspects of technology, innovation, and 
competitiveness have been moved from the nation-state to the city/region.   
Second, cities are characterized as sites of experimentation, where transition pro-
cesses may be ignited. As more responsibilities for acting on climate change and sustain-
ability transitions are place on cities, they have responded with experimental projects and 
programs (Harriet Bulkeley, Castán Broto, and Edwards 2014; Harriet Bulkeley and 
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Castán Broto 2013a; Harriet Bulkeley and Castán Broto 2013b). These projects are often 
explicitly set up in “urban laboratories” (Karvonen and van Heur 2014) to foster learning 
and broader innovation. This relates to the third criticism in regards to the socio-spatial 
concerns: the geographies of learning and experimentation. This concern has only recent-
ly been raised, suggesting a need for synthesis between policy learning and sustainability 
transitions (Affolderbach and Schulz 2016; Voytenko et al. 2016; Sheldrick, Evans, and 
Schliwa 2016). This dissertation addresses these criticisms as well, by specifically engag-
ing with a critical perspective on urban living labs, experimentation, and policy mobilities 
theory (see Conceptual Framework section below).  
1.1.5 Summary: Addressing the empirical gaps and contributing to theory 
This section has introduced the smart grid and existing social science scholarship 
on the topic. I proposed a way of studying sociotechnical systems utilizing existing soci-
otechnical systems theory, highlighted its limitations, and proposed some ways forward. 
This dissertation addresses both an empirical gap in social science literature on smart 
grids, and adds to existing sociotechnical systems and transitions theory. Below, I pro-
pose a conceptual framework (see Figure 3) that addresses the theoretical limitations of 
the sociotechnical approach described above.  
1.2 Purpose and Significance 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the development of the US smart grid from 
a critical, sociotechnical perspective. I focus on three central issues: the construction of 
the smart grid in public discourse, the urban context of smart grid experimentation, and 
the mobility of smart grid policy, models, and knowledge.  
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This dissertation research began as a way to study what I call “urban smart grid 
experiments” that were being developed in response to a variety of electricity system 
challenges, and to consider their impacts on broader energy transition processes. The goal 
was not only to build an understanding of how smart grids were discussed in public dis-
course, largely as a national project to spur development and innovation, but also to trace 
how smart grid experiments actually were implemented in different utility territories and 
cities.  
Cities were a key concern because the smart grid offered an opportunity to trans-
form their electricity systems and reduce carbon emissions associated with electricity 
consumption. Urban smart grid experiments thus served as demonstrations of a national 
project for grid modernization, and an opportunity for cities to shrink their carbon foot-
prints. However, I saw these developments as part of one project, a program of govern-
ment through which smart grid technology and policies would enact a regime of energy 
governance, with possible significant implications for urban infrastructure and the urban 
energy transitions.  
While experimentation, itself, has been considered a form of governance, I char-
acterize this as just one part of a regime of government in which energy practices and 
energy infrastructure is governed in and through cities. Central to urban smart grid exper-
iments is their significant political attention and contributions to policy models and 
knowledge for broader smart grid development. Capturing this process of inter-city learn-
ing, not just between federal agencies and one-off projects, and comparing across differ-
ent smart grid experiments is a key goal of this dissertation.  
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As cities attempt to rework energy infrastructures and policies for the smart grid, a 
change to an extremely large sociotechnical system, understanding how urban smart grid 
experiments are created, what programs and technologies they “test-out”, and what po-
tential implications they have on both cities and low-carbon energy transitions are of ut-
most concern. With the debates and concern on climate change, resource scarcity, and 
technological change, the smart grid offers a number of potential pathways for change. 
Yet, at the same time, these smart grid experiments occur within and through the urban 
fabric and existing sociotechnical regimes, limiting wholesale sweeping changes and 
transitions, and instead developing in a piecemeal, contested, and contingent ways.  
Thus, this dissertation brings an understanding of how “governance regimes” are 
established and constructed, how they get enacted through sociotechnical systems of ur-
ban infrastructures, and how elements of those regimes in the form of policy models, best 
practices, or knowledge are mobilized and mutated en route to different places. I attend to 
the needs of addressing power through theories of governmentality. This adds a more 
nuanced understanding of power to studies of sociotechnical regimes and their role in 
governing sociotechnical systems.  
1.3 Conceptual Framework 
As outlined above, this dissertation examines the construction of the smart grid in 
public discourse, the urban context of smart grid experimentation, and the mobility of 
smart grid policy, models, and knowledge. Each of these elements are discussed further 




Figure 3: Overview of Conceptual Framework 
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Smart Grid Task Force to coordinate national smart grid policies, and the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop a smart grid interoperability frame-
work. In 2009, President Obama led the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (AR-
RA) of 2009, which focused on accelerating the development of smart grid technologies 
providing $8 billion in funding through the Smart Grid Investment Grant Program. The 
SGIG program enabled a variety of smart grid projects to be funded (cost-shared) across 
the country. The DOE played a key role in the SGIG including: selecting and monitoring 
the 99 projects, analyzing the project impacts, and identifying innovative ways to cata-
lyze follow-on smart grid investments. The national smart grid project spurred broad in-
terest from the utility industry and associated technology companies.  
These important policies at the national level spurred a tremendous amount of 
“public talk” (S. A. Moore 2007) about smart grids and their potential. Experts in elec-
tricity industry (engineers, economists, and regulators) discussed the costs and benefits of 
the smart grid, with some trying to tame public excitement and expectations while others 
promoted techno-utopian visions of a smart grid supplied by renewable energies (Slayton 
2013).  This discourse, although emerging from a variety of sources, portrayed and privi-
leged certain types of knowledge and expertise about the smart grid, what its capabilities 
and capacities were, and how it would address a number of energy related challenges. 
This “social construction” of the smart grid created through discourse structured and de-
fined how a sociotechnical transition to the smart grid would take place, what it would 
entail, and who would use it and how, and in this way helped to shaped the smart grid as 
a particular socio-technical assemblage of technologies, infrastructures, practices, and 
norms.  
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My dissertation unpacks this discursive construction of the smart grid to identify 
forms of what Foucault calls “power/knowledge,” or the way knowledge is “put to work 
through discursive practices in specific institutional settings to regulate the conduct of 
others” (Hall 1997, 75). In this way, the “construction” element of my conceptual frame-
work aims to uncover specific governmentalities that, through discourse, defines rational-
ities of governance, establishes its techniques, and creates its subjects.  
1.3.2 Smart grid experimentation  
As smart grid projects were implemented by various utilities across the country, 
spurred by national and state–level policy, and ARRA funds in many cases, different ur-
ban actors and institutions sought to participate and benefit from investments in energy 
infrastructure. Policy at the national level certainly influenced the development of smart 
grids, but the context of their implementation has also played a significant role in their 
development. For example, in Austin, Texas, the city implemented automated meter read-
ing (AMR) systems early on, fitting with their reputation as a “pioneer” in sustainable 
development, but this system was quickly outdated as new two-way systems of advanc-
ing metering infrastructure (AMI) became the standard for smart grid development 
(Carvallo and Cooper 2015).  But the urban context matters more than simply technical 
choice by early-adopters, the drive for urban innovation has created conditions in which 
local implementation of smart grids take place in particular neighborhoods or districts as 
one-off projects, or what I call “urban smart grid experiments.”  
This concept builds on three ideas of experimentation in the literature. First, from 
the field of sociotechnical transitions, the idea of “niche experiments” – small-scale, ap-
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plication domains, where risk-takers pioneering new technologies stimulate innovations 
for changes in sociotechnical regimes. Niches are projects at the fringes of regimes that 
can produce radical innovations, yet at the same time are often limited and shaped by 
incumbent regimes (Elzen, Geels, and Green 2004; Geels and Raven 2006; Kemp, Schot, 
and Hoogma 1998).  The context of niche development suggests a need to analyze power 
relations and politics in as discussed above (Meadowcroft 2009; Lawhon and Murphy 
2012; Hess 2015).  
Second, I draw on the growing literature on “urban experiments” which has ad-
dressed the ways cities are involved in creating new configurations of urban infrastruc-
tures, policies, and programs which are “interventions to try out new ideas and methods 
in the context of future uncertainties serving to understand how interventions work in 
practice, in new contexts where they are thought of as innovative” (Castán Broto and 
Bulkeley 2013b; Harriet Bulkeley and Castán Broto 2013a). Urban experiments are the 
“means through which discourses and visions concerning the future of cities are rendered 
practical, and governable” (Bulkeley and Castan Broto, 2013b: 367). In this sense, urban 
smart grid experiments contribute to regimes of governance by reconfiguring urban infra-
structures.  
Lastly, this concept builds on the notion of “urban laboratories,” closely related to 
urban experiments. Urban laboratories research focus on specific urban settings created to 
test sociotechnical interventions in “the real world” that produce knowledge about a spe-
cific issue and, in the process, materially change the city (Evans and Karvonen 2014; 
Karvonen and van Heur 2014). Urban laboratories are specific places to experiment with 
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sociotechnical interventions in urban spaces, and although they offer opportunities for 
radical innovation and change, they are often limited and shaped by existing regimes.  
This characterization of urban smart grid experiments places importance on the 
socio-spatial and political economic context of smart grid implementation. While simply 
naming and describing this concept is valuable in terms of understanding the piecemeal 
implementation of the smart grid, and its possible splintering effects (Graham and Marvin 
2001; Coutard 2008), it also is useful for understanding the politics of urban experimenta-
tion in relation to energy governance and transition.  
1.3.3 Understanding mobility of smart grid policies, models, and knowledge 
The notion of urban smart grid experiments discussed above also promises oppor-
tunities for testing and learning.  For example, the DOE conducted evaluations and de-
veloped overviews of ARRA-funded smart grid projects to facilitate learning and broader 
innovation, but the approaches they used did not consider extralocal effects or the inter-
city movement of policy models and knowledge. Instead, they assumed a more top-down 
model of smart grid policy and program diffusion and transfer. This dissertation critically 
assesses this idea of policy transfer and adoption. Instead, I build on the concept of “poli-
cy mobilities” to understand how policy models, practices, and expertise are mobilized, 
allowing different urban actors and institutions to focus on specific energy-related prob-
lems, propose specific solutions, and gather the political support and legitimacy needed to 
carry out particular interventions (i.e. smart grid experiments) (Temenos and McCann 




Figure 4: Policy mobilities approach. Source: Cook and Ward (2012). 
The “policy assemblages, mobilities, and mutations” approach (Figure 4)  “is 
characterized by a concern for the actors, practices, and representations that affect the 
(re)production, adoption and travel of policies and best practice models across space and 
time” (Temenos and McCann 2013, 345). This approach enriches the study of the geog-
raphy of sociotechnical transitions addressing some of the limitations identified above. 
First, as Temenos and McCann (2013, 346) explain, it focuses attention on “more ephem-
eral spaces of knowledge production and circulation [such as conferences, meetings, or 
technology demonstrations] ... sites of encounter, persuasion, and motivation.” This is 
important because urban smart grid experiments themselves may be temporally and spa-
tially limited; while the infrastructures may endure, the activities that define the place as 
experimental are only present for a short period of time. Capturing attention of innovative 
experimentation places importance on practices of “boosterism” and demonstration 
around urban smart grid projects, often facilitated by actors other than city officials.  Sec-
ond, the policy mobilities approach helps enhance understandings of the role of the state 
(across scales) in the production and circulation of knowledge (J. Allen and Cochrane 
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2010; J. Allen 2011; Temenos and McCann 2013). This suggests that consideration of 
national level policy and programs, like DOE’s SGIG, is still of considerable importance. 
1.3.4 Governance regimes and sociotechnical transitions 
Urban infrastructure networks, such as electricity, communication, or water sys-
tems, are key sociotechnical systems in a city’s functioning as an economic and cultural 
center of human activity. Innovations in these systems, such as smart grid technologies, 
promise opportunities to make cities more sustainable. As such a plethora of policy, 
planning, and associated research has emerged on sociotechnical transitions and the pos-
sibilities for contributing to more sustainable development (Markard, Raven, and Truffer 
2012).  
Urban infrastructures structure patterns of consumption and distribution of re-
sources, enabling and disabling particular practices (Bulkeley, Broto, and Maassen 2014; 
Vliet, Shove, and Chappells 2012), and as such are key objects of governance (Graham 
and Marvin 2001; Bolton and Foxon 2015). At the same time, infrastructures are a means 
of governance, guiding processes of socioenvironmental transformation and sociotech-
nical transition (Swyngedouw 2006; Coutard and Rutherford 2015; Bulkeley, Luque-
Ayala, and Silver 2014). An understanding of how and why these infrastructures change, 
then, is a necessary part of understanding how sociotechnical transitions are governed.  
I understand the processes of infrastructure change through my conceptual 
framework that builds on sociotechnical transitions theory (Figure 3). I expand on the 
concept of the sociotechnical regime with theories of governmentality to include a more 
robust conception of power in a “governance regime.” The governance regime influences 
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the processes and practices of the construction, experimentation, and diffusion, while 
these, also in turn, shape the governance regime. While this may result in reproducing the 
same relations of power in the governance regime, there may also be disturbances result-
ing from interconnections between experimentation, construction, and diffusion.  As a 
result, sociotechnical systems may be reconfigured, or may transition, resulting in broad-
er regime changes. In summary, this approach brings together elements of discursive con-
struction, sociotechnical experimentation, and geographies of policy and knowledge to 
understand how regimes of governance and the sociotechnical systems they govern may 
be reproduced, reconfigured, or transitioned.  
1.4 Research Questions 
Each of these elements interplay with regimes of governance that I analyze 
through the lens of governmentality to answer three research questions: 
First, How are smart grids constructed in national discourse? What is the political 
vision for smart grids in the US? Given the growing public discourse on the smart grid, I 
wondered how different concepts of the social impacts of smart grid implementation were 
being discussed. I noticed first that the general discussions circled around how energy 
consumers would adopt new smart grid technologies, such as smart meters, and how they 
might respond to smart grid enabled programs, such as demand response, both voluntary 
and automated.  
Second, How are smart grid experiments implemented in different urban contexts 
and with what results? How do smart grid experiments impact broader implementation 
locally and “extralocally”? I wondered how the different policy directives and funding 
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schemes would actually facilitate the implementation of the smart grid in different set-
tings. After primary analysis, I thought that these might be considered as “experiments” 
or demonstrations wherein smart grid technologies would be tested. But I thought that 
these infrastructure changes could present cities with a variety of opportunities and chal-
lenges, considering infrastructures, cities, and urban life are co-constituted. 
Third, How do different cities learn about smart grid experiments? How do asso-
ciated policy models and knowledge move from one place another, and with what impli-
cations and limitations? The promises of smart grid demonstrations were that they would 
inspire further innovation and promote broader economic and environmental benefits. I 
wondered how processes of learning would take place, what sorts of lessons, best practic-
es, or models would be adopted, and how different cities would change smart grid project 
to fit their needs, values, and political goals.    
1.5 Overview of Methodology 
This dissertation uses Foucauldian-inspired critical discourse analysis (Hajer 
1995; Jager 2001; Waitt 2005) and case study methodology (Burawoy 2009; Peck and 
Theodore 2012; Yin 2003) to answer the above research questions. These methods are 
rooted in constructionist and critical theory paradigms, which together strengthen the 
overall mode of inquiry (Alford 1998). The project began by unpacking the public dis-
course on smart grids. I followed Hajer’s (1995, 60) definition of discourse as “a specific 
ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that is produced, reproduced, and trans-
formed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical 
and social realities.” As such, I wanted to understand how the smart grid was being con-
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structed socially and materially through discourse, and what sets of understandings and 
practices it privileged over others. In so doing, I used discourse analysis, instead of only 
content analysis, because I was specifically interested in power and governance. Whereas 
content analysis provides a useful entry point into understanding and categorizing what 
particular texts say, it does not help provide meaning through a broader understanding of 
social context (Hall 1997, 25; Hajer 1995). Changes in meaning imply the need for inter-
pretation, which Foucault’s theory of discourse links directly to the co-production of 
knowledge and power (Foucault 1980; Jasanoff 2004b). 
I utilized case study methods to explore urban smart grid experiments with a spe-
cific focus on their urban context, bringing together multiple forms of evidence (docu-
ments, interviews, observation) to understand the phenomena of experimentation and 
mobility. I chose the Pecan Street project in Austin, Texas, because it was a key case of 
an urban smart grid experiment, presenting the possibility for exemplary knowledge 
(Flyvbjerg 2006; Thomas 2010). This key case was important to develop for this disserta-
tion because it provided a way to understand the dynamics of experimentation in relation-
ship to regimes of governance and the stability or rigidity of sociotechnical transitions. I 
build on existing theory and extend it to consider what different considerations need to be 
included. For example, as noted above, the notion of sociotechnical transitions suggests 
that niche experiments harness radical innovations and a weakness in a regime allows for 
that innovation to break through, but in the case of the smart grid, there is considerable 
resistance in regimes. Therefore, my analysis of governmentality adds to the regime of 
governance an understanding of power that is central to regime reproduction or reconfig-
uration, and a lack of transition.  
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In addition, I utilized a relational comparative case study methodology (Ward 
2010; Cook and Ward 2012) to examine and explore the processes of learning and policy 
mobility. For this method, the case includes multiple urban smart grid experiments and 
the networks that link them together (Peck and Theodore 2010a; Peck and Theodore 
2012). Guided by methodological prescriptions of policy mobility scholars, I followed 
their approach to understand the ways in which “various “local” and “extra-local” urban 
actors—consultants, planners, politicians, and practitioners—have used comparison as a 
strategy to underscore the importance” of developing the smart grid in a particular way 
(Cook and Ward 2012, 778).  These scholars suggest that policy should be more broadly 
understood as “sets of bundles of expertise, learning, and knowledge codified in one way 
or another” (Cook and Ward 2012, 779), which is produced and circulated with impacts 
not only for policy and policy making, but for knowledge and place.  This mobilities ap-
proach allowed me to not just “compare,” but to address how different urban smart grid 
experiments learn from each other, including ideas about which technologies to use, how 
to engage consumers, what studies are relevant, etc.  
1.6 Organization of Dissertation 
The dissertation is structured in six chapters, including this introduction. I struc-
tured the dissertation around the three key areas of investigation and related research 
questions discussed above: the construction of the smart grid in public discourse, the ur-
ban context of smart grid experimentation, and the mobility of smart grid policy, models, 
and knowledge. This introductory chapter has introduced the primary research problems, 
questions, and associated literature while also providing an introduction to the overall 
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conceptual framework and methodology.  I explained the several limitations in our un-
derstandings of the smart grid, the urban context and implications of smart grid imple-
mentation, the way policy models and knowledge move and mutate, and the relationships 
of these processes to the reproduction, reconfiguration, or transitions of sociotechnical 
systems. I suggested that there is a need to better understand the role of power in soci-
otechnical transitions and I proposed that theories of governmentality strengthen the re-
gime concept. This was elaborated through the conceptual framework outline above. 
In Chapter 2, I describe the research design and methodology utilized in this dis-
sertation.   I describe how this dissertation fits within the overall constructionist and criti-
cal theory research paradigms. Then I provide a justification for the methodologies used, 
focusing on the way both critical discourse analysis and case study methodologies help to 
answer my research questions. The conceptual framework for the dissertation is presented 
to highlight how the three areas of inquiry are linked together to examine and analyze 
governance regimes. I then describe the processes for data collection and analysis, the 
role of the researcher, and ethics.  
As introduced above, in Chapter 3, I analyze the discursive construction of the US 
smart grid. This empirical analysis starts by introducing the history of national energy 
policy and the creation of the smart grid as a national policy program. I describe the con-
ditions and context under which a governmental rationality enables the sociotechnical 
system of the smart grid to emerge as a solution to the problems of energy supply and 
demand. The discourse analysis provides three key rationalities: efficiency, security, and 
economy. I unpack these rationalities to address how discourse shapes our understanding 
of the smart grid, and ultimately shapes the techniques through which the smart grid is 
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implemented, for what purposes, and embodying what values. The discourse analysis 
highlights the imagined and created subjects of the smart grid, and in particular, the con-
struction of a “smart consumer.” All three of these elements, rationalities, techniques, and 
subjectivities, are central to the ways in which regimes of governance are established and 
reproduced. This chapter also highlights a contradiction that arises in the dominant tech-
no-economic discourse of the smart grid, that of the rational and smart consumer. The 
persistent failure of many price-dependent programs for consumer behavior change have 
resulted in continued studies and experiments on how to use existing (dominant techno-
economic) knowledge and making the smart grid “fit” with this approach. Instead, I sug-
gest that a social practices approach may be a more appropriate way of thinking for future 
policy endeavors, wherein smart grid technology is made to fit with the existing consum-
ers and their values.  
Following this discourse analysis, I present a case study of the Pecan Street urban 
smart grid experiment in Austin, Texas in Chapter 4. This case is used to analyze the con-
text of urban experimentation and its impacts on the city, infrastructure, and urban energy 
governance. I then explicate how urban smart grid experiments, discussed as urban living 
labs (ULLs) in literature on sociotechnical transitions, attempt to reconfigure the relation-
ship that consumers have with energy systems. Using insights from governmentality stud-
ies, I argue that smart grid experiments rely on governing through “smart” subjects who 
reshape their energy consumption patterns in line with individual economic or environ-
mental concerns. This chapter builds on Chapter 3 by focusing on how the public dis-
course on the smart grid impacts and shapes actual implementation in urban smart grid 
experiments. It also analyzes what neoliberal forms of urban experimentation imply for 
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sociotechnical transitions and urban energy governance. Specifically, it highlights the 
“test-bed” approach to infrastructure development. 
In Chapter 5, as introduced above, I present the analysis and findings of the rela-
tional comparative case studies of smart grid experiments. I suggest synergies between 
the literature on sociotechnical transitions and urban policy mobilities through the use of 
the conceptual framework advanced in this dissertation. The exploratory cases raise sev-
eral issues for further work, but the analysis also highlights the interconnected and ex-
tralocal influence that project models, such as Austin’s Pecan Street project, carries in 
diverse settings. In Oak Park, for example, Austin’s urban smart grid experiment presents 
a model for replication. After consultations and in-person meetings with the non-profit 
leading Austin’s project, Oak Park city officials gathered the model for an urban smart 
grid experiment in a 300-page “how-to manual” with the label of SmartCityUSA. Of 
course this project was modified for Oak Park’s own experience and incorporated years 
of “best practice” lessons from Austin’s project, but the Austin model itself, through ref-
erence, created the conditions for Oak Park’s own project to emerge. Similarly, I examine 
issues related to the travelling of lessons and knowledge from Austin’s smart grid exper-
iment in Boulder and Fort Collins where the existing “landscape” factors shaped the pos-
sibilities of implementing similar projects in different ways. This is discussed in more 
detail while also considering the implications of policy mobility for understanding urban 
energy transitions and governance.  
Lastly, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation synthesizing the research contribu-
tions in each of the chapters and elaborates on how these fit with the overall conceptual 
framework. I then describe the practical, policy, and intellectual contributions that this 
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dissertation makes. I end with a discussion of future research agendas that expand upon 









2 Chapter 2: Methodology, Research Design, and Methods 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design, conceptual framework, and methods 
utilized in this dissertation.  The overall approach of the dissertation fits within the quali-
tative research foundations of the disciplines of urban studies, human geography, and 
science and technology studies. I employed critical discourse analysis methodologies and 
case study research design. These overall approaches were best suited to answer the criti-
cal questions this dissertation seeks to answer with a focus on the particularities of differ-
ent urban contexts and the practices of various elite actors in urban electricity infrastruc-
ture networks.  
Studying smart grids is difficult for numerous reasons, not least of which is the 
massive nature of the infrastructure networks spanning across the entire country (conti-
nental US), intersecting large and small cities, towns, and rural landscapes, different cli-
mates and economies, and different political and regulatory contexts. Electricity infra-
structure spans across multiple levels of governance and interconnects (political and so-
cially constructed) scales from the nation-state to the individual body. While this poses 
substantial problems for understanding the entirety of the system in a detailed way, dis-
course and case study methods examine particularly significant pieces of the whole to 
elucidate understandings about how this system, and changes to this system, are gov-
erned. In addition, the multiple case studies constructed and analyzed in this dissertation 
allow for comparison, which is done in a relational perspective, to highlight not only dif-
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ferences and similarities but networks of relationships of actors who carry and move pol-
icy models, knowledge, and rationalities from place to place.  
This chapter presents the overall structure of inquiry into smart grids around three 
key issues – construction, experimentation, and mobilities/diffusion – and three associat-
ed research questions: 
1. How are smart grids constructed in national discourse? What is the political 
vision for smart grids in the US? What policy problems do smart grids attempt 
to solve? What do smart grids do socially and technically, and who do they 
benefit? 
2. How are smart grid experiments implemented in different urban contexts and 
with what results? How do smart grid experiments impact broader implemen-
tation? 
3. How do different cities learn about smart grid experiments? How do associat-
ed policy models and knowledge from one place move to another place, and 
with what implications and limitations?  
The outcomes of these questions provided me with the necessary information to 
support theoretical arguments outlined in the three following chapters, each of which 
corresponds the questions above in respective chronological order. Chapter 3 presents a 
critical discourse analysis of various national level actors in the smart grid sector to cate-
gorize how elites describe the smart grid and its various applications, benefits, costs, 
risks, and technologies, all of which are enrolled in a political vision of the smart grid 
which impacts both national and local policy and implementation. Critically, the domi-
nant discourse reveals a technopolitics of the smart grid with particular aims to spur in-
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novation and economic growth while also reinforcing particular liberal governmental 
logics of individual action as social change and technological “fixes” to socio-
environmental and systemic concerns. Chapter 4 presents a deep case study, an exempla-
ry case, of how the smart grid is actually implemented in Austin, Texas. The case study 
focuses on the concept of the “living laboratory” and highlights how the dominant dis-
course at the national level filters into local implementation and policy, but at the same 
time, shows how experimentation mutates and mobilizes urban smart grid policies. Chap-
ter 5 presents a relational comparative case study of three smart grid experiments in Oak 
Park, Boulder, and Fort Collins. I analyze these cases with respect to urban energy transi-
tions, experimentation, and policy mobilities. Each chapter corresponds to the empirical 
needs of the research questions, utilizing different methods of data collection and analy-
sis.  In general, however, each of these questions analyzes an element of governance and 
politics at different scales and through different networks of actors, institutions, and tech-
nologies. And more, there are theoretical connections between each of the chapters, be-
tween construction, experimentation, and diffusion, and their role in governing urban 
energy transitions which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 While I did not have particular hypotheses to test, I formulated propositions 
based on literature review and theoretical guidance. That is to say, while I chose an in-
ductive approach to research, my thoughts about the research were shaped and guided by 
established research. These propositions included: 
1. Smart grids are constructed as particular technological fixes for social, eco-
nomic, environmental, and political issues. The discourse is thus dominated 
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by techno-economic episteme, discourse strands, and social representations 
representative as a dominant sociotechnical regime.  
2. Smart grids are implemented as experimental projects for testing different 
types of sociotechnical interventions guided by dominant techno-economic 
epistemologies and values. While they promise to contribute to urban energy 
transitions, there is friction between economic, technical, political, and social 
outcomes and expectations.  The lessons generated from these experiments, 
although dominantly techno-economic, influence other smart grid experi-
ments. 
3. Diffusion of learning from smart grid experiments carries with it particular 
episteme, visions, and ideas, carried in discourse and embodied in technolo-
gies and policies, that shape forms of urban energy governance and the mate-
riality of the city.  
These general ideas shaped my selection of research methodologies and methods, 
which I found appropriate for testing these propositions. Data availability was ensured 
through preliminary data collection of secondary sources including policy documents, 
political speeches, whitepapers, newspaper articles, and preliminary interviews with local 
smart grid experts.  This ensured that the study was not only worthwhile, but possible. 
Through this preliminary phase and problem definition, I found several exemplary urban 
smart grid experiments, of which Austin was cited most frequently in industry journals 
and national policy discourse which signaled its importance for broader smart grid im-
plementation. I then selected three different case study sites – Oak Park, Boulder, Fort 
Collins – based on their own implementation of smart grid projects and their connections 
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to various actors involved in Austin’s smart grid experiment. This allowed me to investi-
gate relationships between different cities and the movement of policy knowledge and 
models. Of course, however, these cases are each situated in different institutional, organ-
izational, and political contexts (Table 1).  These “regime” and “landscape” factors shape 
the context and efficacy of experimentation and policy mobility, and the ability of soci-
otechnical innovations to influence urban energy transitions.  
The rest of this chapter provides detailed explanation of the research design, data 
collection process, validity and reliability, data analysis, and a reflection on my role as a 
researcher. I explain my research approach, why I chose the discourse analysis and case 
study methodologies, and explain how this methodology and methods addresses the re-
search problem and questions.  
2.2 Research Design and Orientation 
The overall approach is situated in the constructivist and critical theory research 
paradigms (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Guba and Lincoln 1994). The constructivist ap-
proach makes an assumption that reality is brought about through the processes of de-
scribing it, in language, science, and other cultural practices. Discourse is of central con-
cern and may be understood as situated symbolic action and practice. Constructivist and 
critical theory paradigms are mutually reinforcing and related. The critical theory para-
digm focuses inquiry on critique and transformation while constructivism is focused on 
understanding and reconstruction (Guba and Lincoln 1994). While these are my general 
approaches, I follow a Foucauldian understanding of power, knowledge, and truth. This 
informs data collection, analysis, and interpretation.  
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Central to the methodology of critical discourse analysis is the notion of dis-
course. Discourse, generally understood, is a way of talking about and understanding the 
world (Fairclough 2013; Hajer 1995; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002; Wodak and Meyer 
2001). Discourse is a socially and culturally constructed representation of reality, and is 
thus removed from reality, but vitally shapes it.  For Foucault (1972, 116-7), discourse is 
made up of ‘statements’ that belong to ‘discursive formations,’ which govern the mean-
ing and regularity of statements, all of which are expressed through ‘discursive practice’ 
defined as the “body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and 
space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or 
linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function.” Discourse for 
Foucault then is not only about representations of reality, but knowledge of the world and 
the way we act in it.  
Discourse, then, is intimately tied to power. Foucault (1981, p. 52) explained in 
his introductory lecture at the College de France in 1970 that, “in every society the pro-
duction of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a cer-
tain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mas-
tery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.” Discourse is 
controlled, constructs knowledge, and thus governs through the production, reproduction, 
and maintenance of categories and subjects of knowledge and sets of texts that limit what 
is conceived of as possible or not. The notion of power/knowledge thus refers to the mu-
tual relationship between power and knowledge. For Foucault, power is diffuse and circu-
lating, not only centralized, and produces both subjects and objects to be governed.    
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Discourse analysis discussed here is not only a method or a tool for data analysis, 
but also a methodology, a way of orienting the research in line with a certain way of un-
derstanding the world. This notion of discourse is appropriate for RQ1, especially, but 
also in RQ2 and RQ3 in terms of analyzing governance in each of the case studies.  Case 
study methodology is utilized to investigate the issues discussed in RQ2 and RQ3 offer-
ing arguments and contingently generalizable results. I used a relational comparative case 
study approach (Ward 2008, 2010).  Case study methods in general are particularistic, 
descriptive and heuristic.  They focus on the “how” and “why” of a particular phenome-
non by using interviews, observations and other forms of data (Yin 2003).  
This case study design entails five components (Yin 2003): (1) research questions, 
(2) propositions or hypotheses, (3) units of analysis, (4) determination of the relationship 
between the propositions and questions or linking the data collected to the research ques-
tions, and (5) interpretation of the findings.  Components (1) and (2) were discussed 
above. Particular urban smart grid experiments - assemblages of actors, institutions, and 
technologies (see Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013; Evans & Karvonen, 2014; Fuchs & 
Hinderer, 2016) – and policy assemblages – the heterogeneous set of models, knowledge, 
technology, actors, places, and policies that are processually being put together (J. Allen 
and Cochrane 2010; McCann 2011a; McCann, Roy, and Ward 2013; McCann and Ward 
2011; McCann and Ward 2012b; McCann and Ward 2013) – are taken as the unit of 
analysis (3).  Methods of data collection and analysis (4+5) are also discussed below 
Case studies are an established methodology that has, however, received criticism 
for inadequately addressing theory and for having little relevance to broader contexts 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2011; Flyvbjerg 2006). To accommodate for this, (Payne 2005) ar-
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gue for an intermediate type of limited generalization, or ‘moderate generalization’ that 
acknowledges the scope and position in which the generalization is held, which is open to 
change. This research follows scholars in STS both in theory and methods to suggest that 
all knowledge claims are situated, contingent, and context-dependent (Haraway 1999). 
Thus, the accounts produced of smart grid experiments in this research that speak to and 
are guided by theory can develop new ideas that answer pressing research questions from 
my particular (researcher-activist-human) positionality.  
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Careful selection of case studies in the context of the particular research questions can 
improve their generalizability and intelligibility for theoretical arguments (Yin 2003; 
Stake 1995; Gerring 2007). Flyvbjerg (2006) proposes information-oriented selection as a 
method to improve generalization. This research uses information-oriented selection to 
build both key and exploratory cases. The cases included particular urban smart grid ex-
periments and the networks between these cases. For example, the involvement of the 
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research and development organization, Pecan Street, who coordinated one of Austin’s 
smart grid experiments, served as a consultant and project organizer for the Village of 
Oak Park’s SmartCityUSA project. The implications of this relationship can simply be 
seen as a consultancy, or it can be seen as a political channel through which policy mod-
els and knowledge move from place to place. This is one of central characteristics of the 
policy mobilities literature (McCann 2011b; McCann and Ward 2011; Peck and 
Theodore 2010a; Peck and Theodore 2015). The cases provided here explore how policy 
mobilities frameworks inform relational policy making and urbanism instead of focusing 
on more traditional notions of policy transfer from political science literature (cf Benson 
& Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000).  
In addition, the regulatory variables in Table 1 provide critical axes for compari-
son and case justification, yet simple comparison is not the aim of the approach taken 
here. While this context is important, providing a better understanding of sociotechnical 
regimes, it is only part of the networks and processes through which the governance of 
electricity networks is accomplished. By selecting case studies in different regulatory 
contexts, I am able to consider how regulatory environments may shape urban energy 
transitions at the regime level, but equally as important, I examine how smart grid exper-
iments and policy assemblages contribute to the reconfiguration of urban electricity net-
works.  
These methodologies are well suited to my dissertation research questions for 
several reasons. First, the dominant understanding of smart grids in public policy and 
understanding is primarily captured by technical and economic concerns. Therefore, un-
covering and highlighting how these discourses have become dominant, what themes 
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they reinforce, and what political configurations for governance they enable, and crucial-
ly which discourses, themes, concerns, values, and configurations they do not support or 
even repress, calls for a critical discourse analysis. Questions of concern here are related 
to what is being constructed, what is being problematized? Are these problems construct-
ed as technical or social?  What is being ignored or repressed? How has this come to be? 
What sorts of actions, practices, identities or subject positions are made possible, desira-
ble, and/or required by the discourse and its way of understanding and representing the 
world? These questions bring to fore the relationships between power and knowledge in 
the smart grid, issues that carry across levels of governance and analysis. To analyze 
governance regimes at the national level, I draw on Hecht's (2000, 16) notion of techno-
politics and the technopolitical regime –  “linked sets of people, engineering and industri-
al practices, technological artifacts, political programs, and institutional ideologies, which 
act together to govern technological development and pursue technopolitics.” Together 
with the analytics of governmentality (utilizing methods of Foucauldian discourse analy-
sis), I not only tackle the sociotechnical nature of governance (i.e. technopolitics) but also 
the governmental logics and rationales created in these systems (i.e. governmentality).  
Second, case study methodology is useful for drawing out intricacies of particular 
phenomena, such as experimentation with smart grid technologies.  Relational compara-
tive approaches (Ward 2008, 2010; McFarlane 2011; Robinson 2011) in case study 
methodology provides opportunities for greater external validity (generalization) and 
clearer illustration of differences and similarities, and importantly, contingencies in local 
processes. Explanatory models used to draw these relationships between cases reflect 
theorizations about space, place, and scale, and about the process of knowledge produc-
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tion and its relationships with urban development and governance (see each of the fol-
lowing chapters for further explanation and engagement with respective theoretical 
frameworks).  
The relational comparative approach for case study methodology advocated by 
Ward (2010) has three key components relevant to this study.  The first suggests that the 
city should be theorized as “open, embedded and relational,” and as important elements 
of global systems, processes and flows that serve as, for example, “the ‘laboratories’ for 
policy formation and as arenas for the practising of state power” (Ward 2010: 482). The 
second concerns the dynamic and socially constructed nature of the ‘city’ scale. The third 
relates to the political aspect that the relational comparative approach takes in “speaking 
back” to established theories, and in asserting the context-specificity of theories to ques-
tion their universalizing tendencies.  
This leads to the third justification for this methodological entry. The comparative 
relational approach allows me to use comparison not to measure the cases developed in 
this dissertation against a universal ‘yardstick’ that shows difference and similarity. In-
stead, it allows me to trace how smart grid experiments are formed, how they are con-
ceived, and how these are formed in relation to one another, through policy, knowledge, 
or broader urban processes. This allows particularities and specificities to come through 
“interrelations between objects, events, places and identities; and it is through clarifying 
how these relations are produced and changed in practice that close study of a particular 
part can illuminate the whole” (Hart 2002:14-15, quoted in Ward 2010:480).  In this 
sense, examination of smart grid experiments in different contexts can help explicate the 
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relationships between knowledge production, urban governance, and sociotechnical 
change.  
Finally, each of my “axes” of inquiry – construction, experimentation, and diffu-
sion – all require considerable attention in the literature, which in general lacks empirical 
examples related to the urban energy transitions, an area of increasing concern for urban 
infrastructure governance. Therefore, the case study methodology brings to fore examples 
and a better picture of the contingencies of processes of urban experimentation and policy 
mobility, and their implications for cities and urban governance. 
The overall conceptual and analytical framework is guided by a “more political” 
sociotechnical transitions approach with attention to the national and local construction 
of smart grid discourse, the urban context of experimentation, and the geographies of 
policy (diffusion) related to “innovative” urban smart grid projects. This is represented in 
Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5: Overview of Conceptual Framework 
 
I use the terminology governance regime referring to both a technopolitical regime (Geels 
2014; Hecht 2000; Lawhon and Murphy 2012), and in relation to governmentality, 
wherein “regimes of truth and rationality” create the discursive field in which exercising 
governmental power is deemed rational (Lemke 2002). The technopolitical regime is sim-
ilar to the concept of the sociotechnical regime from the literature on sociotechnical tran-
sitions in that it includes the laws, norms, regulations, discourses, and knowledge that 
 
Governance Regime 
• Sociotechnical regimes are the heterogeneous set of actors, institutions, and 
technologies that structure sociotechnical systems   
• Governmentality brings understanding of power through analysis of rational-
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give stability, power, authority, and legitimacy to particular configurations of actors, in-
stitutions, and technologies (e.g. Avelino & Wittmayer, 2015; Geels, 2002; Moss, 2009). 
However, technopolitics entails a direct connection to politics and the materiality of tech-
nologies, or their material effectiveness, and is therefore a preferable concept for explor-
ing the smart grid.  
Different rationalities, techniques, and subjectivities are all important elements of 
governing the smart grid. In general, governing here means the “conduct of conduct,” or 
“a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or per-
sons” (Gordon 1991, 2).  By rationalities, I mean the ways of or systems of thinking 
about the practice of government (who can govern, what governing itself is, and what or 
who is governed) as a way of making that activity itself thinkable and practicable 
(Gordon 1991; Lemke 2001; Lemke 2002). The concept of problematization in Fou-
cault’s work helps locate socio-political goals, or objects and reasons for governance, and 
positions them in relation to techniques and subjectivities. Foucault was specifically con-
cerned with the problematization of population, for example, and this created political 
necessity and possibility for governmental thought: how to manage and govern popula-
tions within a certain territory (Foucault 2009). Techniques refer to the how of governing. 
For Foucault, this included disciplinary techniques, “techniques of power,” or pow-
er/knowledge “designed to observe, monitor, shape and control the behavior of individu-
als” in a variety of institutions (Foucault 1977; Gordon 1991, 3). However, Foucault was 
concerned with multiple forms of power, and disciplinary power was only one element. 
Biopower, for Foucault, referred not to power over individuals, as in the penitentiary sys-
tem, but power over populations, an essential element of his work on governmentality. In 
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his later lectures on neoliberalism, Foucault argued that power also operated through 
forms of “freedom” in a neoliberal governmentality, that shaped the conduct of individu-
als through entrepreneurial and competitive mandates (Barry and Osborne 1996; Foucault 
2010; N. S. Rose 1999). In other words, freedom was conscribed to “self-management” 
and introduced a new form of “self-regulation” always in relation to a broader set of 
norms that one either tried to distance themselves from or collapse onto (i.e. self-
improvement or responsibility). Central to each of these modes of power are particular 
subjectivities. That is, Foucault’s interest in power was related to the ways in which it 
shaped subjects and proper conduct. 
All of these elements – rationality, technique, subjectivity – add to the existing 
notion of the technopolitical regime an analysis of how governing actually happens and 
the forms of power on which it relies. This is particularly important in the smart grid be-
cause the smart grid not only entails a series of sociotechnical interventions, but itself is a 
governmental program to reshape relations of supply and demand in the electric power 
grid.   
The governance regime influences and is influenced by the construction, experi-
mentation, and diffusion of smart grid projects, policies, and knowledge. However, there 
is also an internal relation between construction, experimentation, and diffusion that in-
fluences the outcomes of smart grid development in different places. Outcomes may be 
either reproduction of existing regimes, reconfiguration of that regime where some di-
mension changes (for example the techniques or technologies), or transition of regimes.  
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2.3 Data Collection 
The data for this dissertation was collected over the course of the last two years. 
Data collection included semi-structured, in-person interviews, participant observation, 
and document review. Document (and other source media sources) review was used for 
discourse analysis and content analysis in the case studies. Interviews and participant 
observation were used for the case studies as well.  
The primary source of data was collected during fieldwork in Austin, Texas, 
Boulder and Fort Collins, Colorado, and Oak Park, Illinois.  I made three trips to Austin, 
one in October 2015, one in November 2015, and one in May of 2016, each for a period 
of approximately two weeks. In October of 2015, I travelled to Oak Park, Illinois for one 
week, and in November of 2015, I also travelled to Boulder and Fort Collins for approx-
imately two weeks.  During the course of this fieldwork I attended regulatory meetings, 
city council meetings, community meetings, technology demonstrations, and industry 
conferences. I participated in web-based meetings and reviewed and watched city council 
meetings and regulatory meetings where accessible. While in-person, I undertook partici-
pant observation, taking notes on the actors and discussions. I collected field notes ac-
cording to the methods detailed in the Handbook of Ethnography. That is, written ac-
counts and descriptions “that brings versions of these [new social] worlds to others” 
(2001, 352).  Through transcription or inscription (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 2001) in 
this ethnographic context, reference back to meeting events and discourse was made pos-
sible. This proved insightful for numerous reasons. While participant observation was not 
a key source of data for my dissertation, it provided significant for orientation and direc-
tion and for conducting successful interviews and gaining insight into local issues. Dur-
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ing these meetings I had numerous informal discussions and even recruited interview 
participants, some of which I was able to record, and some not. 
The key source of data for the case studies was developed from key informant in-
terviews. Interviewees were (mostly) contacted beforehand to schedule meeting times 
during the travel period (example email letter in Appendix A). Anonymity was main-
tained to protect the identity of interviewees, however, many interviewees hold public 
positions with the cities. I conducted over 30 semi-structured interviews across all the 
cases.  Austin was the central case study, where I spent most of my research time and 
conducted the most interviews. Interviews ranged from about 30 minutes to 90 minutes 
depending on the participant. Although I had a general interview guide, I customized 
questions based on the role of the participant. Interviewing an engineer with a municipal 
utility, for example, required different questions than interviewing a representative of an 
environmental group. Once I completed an interview, I transcribed it as soon as possible, 
taking notes on the content and themes. This was helpful in data analysis and coding. 
While I conducted over 30 interviews, only 24 were recorded due to the wishes of partic-
ipants or the circumstances of phone conversations. In Austin, I interviewed 6 city offi-
cials with Austin Energy, the Austin Chamber of Commerce, the Office of Sustainability, 
2 former Austin Energy officials, 2 former planning commissioners, 2 representatives of 
the Environmental Defense Fund, 2 representatives of the Austin Technology Incubator, 
7 researchers at the University of Texas, 4 representatives of Pecan Street, 2 representa-
tives of local development groups, 2 representatives of local media outlets, and 1 repre-
sentative of the developer of the Mueller Development.  In Boulder I conducted 2 inter-
views with city officials working in the Climate and Sustainability Division, 1 interview 
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with a representative of a local technology company, and 3 interviews with local activists 
who worked on municipalization efforts.  In Fort Collins, I interviewed 3 city officials 
with the City of Fort Collins Utilities and the Planning Department. In Oak Park, I con-
ducted 1 interview with the Village Manager.  
In-depth interviews allowed me to learn about the inner workings of each case 
study. I aimed to gather interview data that captured the experiences of key actors in each 
of the cities projects. I identified key actors by their roles in the projects, usually located 
in websites or in related documents. I further gained access to actors through snowball 
sampling and recommendations and connections through previous interviewees. While I 
was not able to interview some key informants due to geographical distance and partici-
pants’ unavailability, I used document analysis as a supplement. Interviews were con-
ducted in-person at the convenience of the interviewee.  
I also collected secondary sources of data for both discourse analysis and the case 
studies. To start, I reviewed social science academic literature on the topic of smart grids, 
urban experimentation, smart cities, governance, and technology studies.  This provided 
some insight into the ways that social scientists have studied, in a limited way, electricity 
networks at the national and urban and regional scales. While some studies have assessed 
the development of the smart grid at the national scale (Slayton 2013; Stephens, Wilson, 
and Peterson 2015), there has been little concern with a critical understanding of govern-
ance and experimentation. This presented an opportunity to develop a critical analysis of 
smart grid discourse and examination of case studies of smart grid experiments in cities. 
To collect data for the discourse analysis I followed the methodology laid out by Hajer 
(1995), Fairclough (2013), and Waitt (2005). Data collection for discourse analysis is 
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informed by my research goals, which are to answer the research questions above. In par-
ticular, I wanted to understand how “dumb” grids were becoming “smart,” and what sorts 
of problematizations of the electric grid required smartening. This accompanies both the 
techniques for making the grid smart and the subjects involved this construction.  In other 
words, I was attempting to answer the “what, how, and who” questions (which are inter-
connected in the framework of governmentality) while illuminating the “why” questions 
for further analysis in the case studies.  
Collecting data for discourse analysis includes identifying genres, audiences, and 
the places, texts, and authors. I collected over 400 documents of different genres and 
aimed at different audiences in different places. Document sizes ranged from 1 page, with 
for example a key website, to over 300 pages in the case of the Energy Independence and 
Security Act. The document coverage ranges from the late 1970s to 2016. Most docu-
ments were created within the last 10 years. For example, I not only collected documents 
produced by the Department of Energy for its smart grid program, but I also analyzed 
political speeches by President Obama, transcripts of congress hearings on smart grid 
cybersecurity, the feedback of industry to the government in requests for information, 
utility smart grid program websites, industry journals, and whitepapers of smart energy 
technology companies. In general, in keeping with the constructivist tradition, I chose 
“rich” texts from primary actors in smart grid development and testing. Richness, as 
Waitt (2005, 222) describes, refers to the depth of texts detail allowing the researcher to 
interpret the “effects of discourse in normalizing understandings.” This means that while 
I was interested in the messaging on websites, I found industry whitepapers, journal arti-
cles, and other “insider” talk useful for understanding how the smart grid was being de-
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veloped and implemented by technology, research, and government leaders. While I iden-
tified key actors in smart grid development, I remained reflexive to ongoing discourse 
analysis and inter-community referencing, such as the Department of Energy reports cit-
ing particular economics and engineering literature.  This allowed me trace links in epis-
temic communities and highlight dominant discourse.  
I collected documents with internet and database searches. I utilized search terms 
that related to each of the key components of the analytical framework: what (rationali-
ties), how (techniques), and who (subjectivities). Based on prior knowledge, experience, 
and interest in the topic of the smart grid, I found that many smart grid programs were 
being discussed in relation to making the grid more reliable, secure, efficient, and 
“green,” all of which is performed through managing demand and supply (see Chapter 3). 
Demand management, involving various end-uses across sectors, and distributed genera-
tion positioned the study of smart grids to include customers of utilities. This made 
helped me narrow many of my searches related to smart grid activities by including terms 
such as: customer, consumer, end-use, demand, demand management, demand response, 
renewable generation, distributed generation, and distributed solar. I also, as mentioned 








Table 2: Discourse actors, by sector, and document types analyzed in Chapter 3 





Speeches, briefs, whitepapers, blog 
postings 
Congress Legislation, hearing transcripts 
Department of Energy Whitepapers, research reports, website 
Environmental Protection Agency Whitepapers, research reports, website 
Energy Information Administration Whitepapers, research reports, website 
National Institute of Standards Whitepapers, research reports, website 




Electric Power Research Institute Whitepapers, research reports, website 




North American Electric Reliability 
Council 





Gridwise Alliance Whitepapers, promotional materials 
Association for Demand Response and 
Smart Grid  
Whitepapers, promotional materials 
Smart Grid Consumer Collaborative Whitepapers, promotional materials 
National Consumer Law Center Whitepapers, promotional materials 
Smart Grid Interoperability Panel Whitepapers, promotional materials 
National Resource Defense Council Whitepapers, promotional materials 





Pacific Northwest National Laboratories Whitepapers, promotional materials 




International Society of Sustainability 
Professionals 
Whitepapers, promotional materials 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers 
Whitepapers, promotional materials 
Industry Associ-
ations 
National Association of Regulatory Utili-
ty Commissioners 
Whitepapers, website 
Edison Electric Institute Whitepapers, website 
Industry Journals 
  
Public Utilities Fortnightly Journal articles 
Electric Light and Power Journal articles 




Comverge General Electric 











2.4 Validity and Reliability 
I addressed and ensured validity and reliability of the data through several strate-
gies.  The first was the inclusion of multiple sources of data. I also used “chains of evi-
dence” and asked follow-up questions to key informants to ensure construct validity. 
Secondly, during data analysis, the method of constant comparison helped address alter-
native explanations, which helped me ensure internal validity. Third, I addressed external 
validity through the use of existing theory and multiple cases. Reliability was ensured 
through the creation of a database for each case study (Yin 2003).  
2.5 Data Analysis 
I began to analyze data nearly one year ago. This primary data analysis included 
developing a database of documents in MaxQDA12 software organized by genre, date, 
and source author. I also began to develop an initial coding scheme at this time, which 
changed as I worked through further documentation and learned more about the smart 
grid discourse. My coding scheme was influenced by the analytical framework focusing 
on problematization, technical devices, and subjects of discourse. I also used thematic 
analysis in an ongoing process of coding, reflection, and revision. I continued to collect 
data for both cases and discourse analysis while I was coding and analyzing. This itera-
tive, “constant comparison” (Merriam, 2009, p. 30) involves the comparing of one seg-
ment of data with another as its collected to determine similarities and differences.  
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2.5.1 Discourse analysis 
In Chapter 3, I utilize Foucauldian-inspired critical discourse analysis to bring 
about the understandings of each text analyzed, about its production, authors involved, 
and intended audiences. There are, in general, two types of discourse analysis: critical 
and descriptive. Critical discourse analysis is the more applied version for use in under-
standing issues related to cities, planning, environment, policy, technology, and power 
(Bacchi 2000; Caprotti 2012; Cotton and Devine-Wright 2011; Hajer and Versteeg 2005; 
Hastings 1999; Jacobs 2006). Discourse analysis has an explicit focus on power and so-
cial networks that create discourses that are taken as knowledge and truth. This insight 
directed me to look for dominant discourses to focus on how they constructed arguments 
and social facts about smart grids, their abilities, and their benefits. Basic questions that 
guide this approach included: Who made the text, with what technology, and with what 
intended audience? Who commissioned the text, who owns it, and who disseminated it? 
Why was the text made and where was it made? These questions about the production of 
texts led to questions about the circulation of texts: Was this text recirculated or repro-
duced elsewhere? How does the audience change in circulation and with what effects?  
These questions guided my collection and analysis of texts. I coded the texts to 
structure and interpret the data. I coded in two main steps. First, I open coded the text to 
quickly analyze the data getting the descriptive elements while also taking notes and 
memos to generate questions and reflections for more analytical coding. I followed 
Cresswell’s (2009, 186) notion of coding, which “involves taking text data or pictures 
gathered during data collection, segmenting sentences (or paragraphs) or images into cat-
egories, and labeling those categories with a term.”  Essentially the first step of coding 
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was a content analysis aided by MaxQDA12’s lexical search function. This looked for the 
instances of main themes of concern, such as consumer engagement and customer seg-
mentation for demand response. I also coded for what Waitt (2005, 231) describes as four 
key categories for Foucauldian discourse analysis: context, practices (events, intercon-
nections, and actions), attitudes, and experiences. This led to a second stage of coding, or 
analytical coding. This involves abstraction and reduction in the generation of interpre-
tive themes in relation to the analytical framework described above.   
The outcome of the analytical coding I performed was the development of key 
themes related to the discursive structures that underline the mutual relationship between 
power and knowledge. For Foucault (1980, p. 131), power and knowledge are mutually 
reinforced in “regimes of truth” that induce the effects of power:  
Truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power ... Truth is a thing of this 
world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it 
induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 
‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts 
and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable 
one to distinguish true and false statements, the mean by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisi-
tion of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts 
as true.  
This is important in shaping how I coded the texts and my focus. The important analytical 
element here are discursive structures, or discursive order, or rules by which discursive 
practices are regulated and through which object and subjects are constituted as com-
municable and thus governable in society (Hajer 1995). Discursive structures are both 
historically and spatially contingent, operating in ways that shape the realm of possible 
ways of being and becoming in the world through the establishment of norms, attitudes, 
and practices. Here, then, social power is subtler than violent or juridical power, but still 
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operates as a mechanism of social control through the application of knowledge by insti-
tutions and the normalization of particular understandings of the world.    
I followed Hajer’s (1995) definition of discourse coalitions and storylines to ana-
lyze the, in part, the governance regimes discussed above. Hajer (1995, 62) defines story-
lines as “narratives on social reality through which element from many different domains 
are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a 
common understanding.” Storylines here link discourse to particular regimes. They are 
“political devices” that enable users to reduce discursive complexity into simple prob-
lematizations that enable solutions, such as technological fixes. They are also ways to 
stabilize meaning and reinforce knowledge/power relations. Storylines, thus, are im-
portant political resources for technopolitical regimes in maintaining and reinforcing 
power.  
2.5.2 Case study analysis 
Case study methodology involves design, data collection, and data analysis. In 
Chapter 4, I utilized an abduction approach that results not in theory but phronesis 
(Flyvbjerg, Landman, and Schram 2012; Thomas 2010; Thomas 2011). This means, that 
for a case study approach, the focus is on narrative and interpretation. Thomas (2010) 
offers several guides for this sort of modest approach to case study analysis: questioning 
and noticing reveals insight for interpretation; heuristic and incremental “chunking” that, 
similar to Yin’s (2003) chains of evidence, building a story through multiple sources of 
information; narrative diachronicity which brings history as an essential element (even 
brief history); particularity which brings focus not to existing theory but the case itself; 
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intentional state entailment that brings focus to beliefs, desires, and values; counterfactu-
ality to assess where a case may diverge from expectations; context sensitivity; and anal-
ogy, which is particularly relevant to the policy mobilities approach to case studies.  
Analysis of case study data involves content analysis and discourse analysis, as 
described above, but can also be viewed itself as a form of analysis of deep particularity 
and description of a narrative about a particular object of inquiry. Theory here is not a 
means to an end, but rather a way of reaching explanation. Certainly, however, the case 
study approach may help to build theory or test it. In Chapter 4, I utilize what Thomas 
(2011, 514) calls a key case, which is important because of its “capacity to exemplify the 
analytical object of inquiry” (urban smart grid experiments). It is also related to the ana-
lytical frame from which the case is viewed, and in this case is both of intrinsic interest 
and illustrative purpose. 
In Chapter 5, I followed the distended case approach advocated by Peck & 
Theodore (2012), coupled with methodological insights from policy mobilities literature 
more broadly (Cochrane and Ward 2012; McCann 2011b; McCann and Ward 2011; 
McCann and Ward 2012b). To do this, I “followed” the experts from Austin’s smart grid 
experiment to other locations, tracking their roles in mobilizing different models for ur-
ban smart grid experiments. This involves relational analysis of multiple research sites. 
Genealogical and discourse analyses, as described above, play an “indispensable role in 
the deconstruction of traveling policy technologies and texts, and the lineages and net-
works with which they are associated” (Peck and Theodore 2012, 23-4). To do this analy-
sis, I interviewed key informant actors involved in mobilizing policies (on both sides of 
the equation, supply and demand), and mapped the multi-sited processes by which the 
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rationales and rationalities for smart grid experiments were constructed and reconstructed 
(through analysis of interview and document data). The distended case approach builds 
on Burawoy’s extended case method (Burawoy 2009) and multi-sited ethnography, but is 
exploratory and suggests that focus needs to be on the how of projects' success (Peck and 
Theodore 2012). Important here is the selection of cases, which in Chapter 5 are intrinsic 
and exploratory, calling for the possibility of extending and reworking existing theories 
as the policy mobilities approach entails. I utilize a form of process tracing and theoreti-
cal reflection within a dominant mode of understanding sociotechnical transitions in ur-
ban energy systems, for example.  
2.6 Role of the Researcher 
My role in this research may have undoubtedly impacted the study. Factors such 
as why I chose to conduct this study and my preconceived notions certainly impacted 
what sorts of issues I noticed and didn’t.  I tried to maintain an open mind, however, and 
remained reflexive in my processes of evaluation and interpretation. My interests in the 
project and my passion played a role in my topic selection. This being said, I also situated 
my work within an existing corpus of intellectual and scholarly work on the topic or simi-
lar topics. The approaches and methods I used are proven methods for qualitative re-
search. Although some scholars may disagree with certain elements of my interpretation 
of the data, I followed methodological consistencies to ensure reliability.  
2.7 Ethics  
This research was carried out with the approval of the Human Subjects Research 
Review Committee at Portland State University (HSRRC Proposal #153371).  
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3 Chapter 3: Making Grids Smart, Making Smart Consumers  
3.1 Introduction: Smart Grids and Electricity System Change 
In the face of challenges of low-carbon transitions, energy security, and aging in-
frastructures, new programs for the development of smart electricity networks are being 
proposed by utilities and public authorities alike. The “smart grid,” as it has come to be 
called, refers to the implementation and integration of digital information and communi-
cation technologies, sensors, controls, and software that control the electric grid and mon-
itor it in real time. The smart grid allows greater integration of renewables, distributed 
generation, and energy storage while increasing the flows of information to utilities and 
their customers. These new technologies enable new models and logics for organizing 
electricity production, transmission, distribution, and consumption, often with a “more 
active” role for consumers. As such, the smart grid is often portrayed as a necessary step 
for sustainability, resilience, reliability, and growth. It responds to a series of problemat-
ics that cities have been increasingly responsible for quick response: climate change, 
economic decline, resource constraints. But in the changing landscape of electricity pro-
duction, transmission, distribution, and use, the smart grid has come to mean a variety of 
things to a whole array of different actors at different levels.  With sociotechnical change, 
there is the possibility for new norms, conventions, and forms of governance to arise. As 
such, with new technological interventions such as the smart grid, different visions and 
goals come to fore, igniting policy action but also barriers to change.  
The term smart grid itself, has come to mean everything related to electricity sys-
tem improvements and change, a “catch-all phrase” that represents the potential benefits 
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of a revamped and “modernized” electricity system that fills several societal expectations 
related to efficiency, reliability, and sustainability. Smart grids are more than singular 
technologies, but represents a networked electrical system enhanced with a variety of 
technologies and visions. Smart grids are complex, involving a diversity of social actors, 
multiple guiding visions, and multiple possible sociotechnical configurations. This pre-
sents a need to understand the social and political context of smart grid development and 
the ways in which the smart grid technology is positioned to fulfill changing social ex-
pectations of electricity systems. The variety and diversity of actors and organizations 
who control and influence smart grid development, and who benefit from smart grid 
changes is of utmost concern. 
Electricity systems are composed of interlinked technologies, social practices, 
people, organizations, and thus electricity system change is sociotechnical and political. 
The discourses of the smart grid highlight the visions and social expectations for elec-
tricity system change. Discourse expresses the interrelations between language, 
knowledge, and power. Analyzing discourse elucidates these interrelationships, and high-
lights how electricity system change enables or disables particular visions for smart grid 
development. At the same time, discourse also enacts particular kinds of governmental 
rationales and shapes subjective positions of various actors in the smart grid. This has 
tremendous implications for governing electricity system change. This chapter uses theo-
ries of governmentality to understand the ways in which smart grids are shaping new 
forms and relations of energy practice and conduct that are central to the actual imple-
mentation and realization of smart grids.  
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3.1.1 Demand, smart markets, and smart end-users 
President Obama believes in the need to transition to a cleaner, more reli-
able, and affordable 21st century power grid. Under his leadership, trans-
formations in how we produce and consume electricity are decreasing car-
bon pollution, scaling up renewable energy, and generating savings on 
consumers’ energy bills. Since 2009, renewable energy generation has in-
creased at a record pace, while costs have decreased dramatically.  Build-
ing on this progress, smart electricity market reforms, enhanced transpar-
ency, and flexible energy resources such as storage and demand response 
have the potential to further accelerate the development of a cleaner and 
smarter grid. (The White House Office of the Press Secretary 2016) 
As I was writing this chapter, a “fact sheet” emerged from the White House de-
tailing the agenda and goals of the “Summit on Scaling Renewable Energy and Storage 
with Smart Markets.”1 The fact sheet details the commitments of the federal government, 
utilities, municipalities, energy developers, and regulators to achieving an additional 1.3 
GW of energy storage over the next five years. This (relatively) massive technological 
change promises a reinvention of the way we produce and consume electricity to de-
crease carbon pollution and save consumers money. Energy storage is just one element of 
a “smarter grid,” but has been heralded as the saving grace for making (centralized and 
distributed) renewable energy integration possible (Nasiri 2008; Harris, Meyers, and 
Webber 2012; Dunn, Kamath, and Tarascon 2011). Energy storage is one way to address 
the challenges of matching supply and demand at any given point of the day, especially 
as there are increasing amounts of intermittent or variable sources of renewable energy. 
                                                 
1 White House Press Release,” FACT SHEET: Obama Administration Announces Federal and Private 




Storage technologies also offer an opportunity to smooth out the ever dynamic and pesky 
demand curves that plague energy planners and dispatchers. They offer a way out of the 
problematic “duck curve”- a demand curve shaped like a duck because of overgeneration 
during off-peak periods due to the growing adoption of solar energy technologies 
(Denholm et al. 2015).  The mismatch of supply with peak periods of demand offers an 
opportunity for smart energy storage technologies to re-align “supply” with the peak pe-
riod of demand.  
 





Figure 7: CAISO Duck Curve (Source: 
https://www.caiso.com/Documents/FlexibleResourcesHelpRenewables_FastFacts.pdf) 
 
The White House Executive Council of Economic Advisers released a report accompany-
ing the fact sheet, which explains the role of “smart markets” in developing integrated 
solutions for managing the electrical grid and matching supply and demand.2 The authors 
stress the uses of energy storage technologies to allow electricity to be released “during 
times of high value” (p. 2). The duck curve is discussed not as a problem, but as an op-
portunity for “grid management services” made possible by many new smart technolo-
gies – demand for grid management services to offer to grid operators and utilities in a 
smart market with the “correct” market structure and design. But in the section of the 
report detailing “new expanding opportunities for emerging technologies” the authors 
                                                 
2 “Incorporating Renewables into the Electric Grid: Expanding Opportunities for Smart Markets and Ener-
gy Storage,” June 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160616_cea_renewables_electricgrid.pdf 
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suggest that smart markets and technologies also help to enable or even construct the 
“smart end-user.”  
Advances in smart markets and, in particular, the smart end-user, hold 
promise to help flatten the net load curve, allowing for demand to respond 
to spikes in wholesale prices due to the intermittency of VERs [variable 
energy resources] or the higher costs of ramping to meet demand increas-
es. [...] [N]ew enabling technologies, including communications technolo-
gies, smart meters, smart inverters, and other smart grid technologies [...] 
have the potential to greatly facilitate the response of electricity demand to 
changes in price (i.e. demand response). (p. 26-27, italics added) 
The enabling technologies described here refer to industrial, commercial, and res-
idential applications. Certainly, demand response programs have been successful in many 
industrial settings where industrial processes can be altered or carried out at another time 
to shift demand to times that work better for grid operators and offer much cheaper rates 
for industrial users during these off-peak times (e.g. EnerNoc provides a business model 
for this approach).  
In residential settings, the Council of Economic Advisers discuss the role of smart 
meters and information in shaping electricity consumption behavior, suggesting that these 
technologies will help consumers respond to demand response pricing events (i.e. lower 
energy consumption at high prices during peak demand periods). As the report explains 
further, 
Smart meters, as well as other devices to provide information to customers 
(e.g., “energy orbs” that light up during times of peak prices), have been 
shown in randomized controlled trials to further help focus consumer at-
tention on reducing energy use at times when prices are high, increasing 
the elasticity of demand for electricity. [...] Developments in smart appli-
ances may eventually lead to a “smart home” that allows consumers to 
shape energy consumption patterns—and adjust them during times of 
higher prices. (p 29, italics added) 
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Although the report was focused on issues related to markets to allow integration 
of renewable generation and smart technologies into the grid, the focus on economic as-
pects of consumption behaviors of residential users points towards a deficiency in the 
approach to understanding electricity demand. If the goal is for “demand to respond,” 
then shouldn’t we better understand demand? Is demand completely about price elasticity 
and economic motivation, or something else such as collective understandings, norms, 
culture, routines, habits, lifestyle preferences, devices, and infrastructures? And if it’s the 
latter, then why does the economic logic still dominate? 
Economic perspectives on changing demand is not unique to the White House, 
DOE, NREL, or other governmental organizations, but it is present in a variety of public 
discourses about the smart grid. From environmental NGOs to technology companies to 
the media, the overwhelming focus of public discourse is on the ways both smart tech-
nologies and economic rationalities will “help” or “empower” consumers to reduce their 
energy consumption. This chapter documents and analyzes this recent discourse and asks 
why it pervades and with what implications for governing energy use. I highlight the 
dominant mode of describing, analyzing, and theorizing energy consumption and behav-
ior in policy and related public smart grid discourses. I also detail the broader discourses 
that suggest the smart grid will offer a range of solutions to a variety of economic, social, 
and environmental problems. It is this set of discourses which make up a “hegemonic” or 
dominant discourse that solidifies and reifies relations of power. I take a Foucauldian 
approach to discourse analysis, which highlights how particular discourses are privileged 
in support of certain knowledges. I use this analysis and theories relating to technopolitics 
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and governmentality to interpret and understand how “smart” energy governance operates 
in a thoroughly “neoliberalized” world.  
To situate and understand the development of the smart grid, the next section pro-
vides a brief history. I highlight how national energy policy and technological change 
influenced the electricity industry. Restructuring policies aimed at deregulating the indus-
try brought forth a need for adapting electricity infrastructure and technologies to meet 
the demands of free-market ideologies. At the same time, these technologies were already 
being developed and deployed to help maintain reliability and efficiency. The early ef-
forts for reliability and efficiency were central to the implementation of microcomputers 
in electricity infrastructure. As microcomputers were used more to manage the genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution systems, more data collection and communication 
networks were developed on top of the existing physical electrical infrastructure (Slayton 
2013). The development of these networks were carried out regionally by utilities and by 
regional transmission operators (RTOs) or independent service operators (ISOs). Local 
solutions to meter data collection, for example, were developed to allow automatic meter 
reading systems to increase the speed at which meter data could be collected for billing 
purposes – these were the antecedents of the “smart meter.” Energy efficiency, demand-
side management, and other consumer-oriented solutions developed in a parallel and in-
tertwined history. These interactions are considered as the foundations for many smart 
grid programs now underway, such as demand response and behavioral energy efficiency 
programs.     
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3.2 The Politics and Governance of Sociotechnical Systems  
Electric power networks (and energy systems more generally) are the study of 
considerable historical, geographical, and STS scholarship. Historical perspectives on 
electrification, the diffusion of electrical technologies and innovations or the management 
of electricity infrastructures help highlight how these networks are much more than tech-
nical achievements.  Thomas Hughes groundbreaking study, Networks of Power, details a 
50-year history of electrification from 1880-1930 in the US, UK, and Germany. In this 
work, he elucidates the sociotechnical nature of large technical systems (Hughes 1983). 
He advances the idea that in addition to technological artifacts – generating stations, 
lamps, relays, etc. – local, regional, and national political structures, societal needs (both 
constructed and construed), geographical and environmental factors, and so on, are actu-
ally just as much constitutive of the electric power systems he analyzes. The form of the 
system, it’s “technological style” (Hughes 2012: 62) is shaped by all of these factors. It 
explains the variation in electric power system development across the US, UK, and 
Germany, for example. At the same time, these technological systems shape and contort 
these social, political, cultural, and geo-environmental factors.  
Perhaps more than any other scholar of electricity networks, Hughes has inspired 
a variety of intellectual trajectories and put the analysis of sociotechnical systems at the 
heart of urban infrastructure studies. His influential work here is important as it docu-
mented how the electricity grid was understood as it was initially developed and gained 
“momentum” as a fundamental technology of modern (urban and rural) life (Hughes 
1983). Whereas David Nye (1992) focuses on the social and cultural aspects of electrifi-
cation from 1880-1940, he channels Hughes notion of technological momentum as a bal-
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ance to the dualism of constructivism and determinism in understanding the development 
of electrical technologies. Telling vivid stories on the impacts of electrification on nearly 
every element of American life, Nye provides another useful framework for analyzing 
how electricity and electric power networks generated social meaning across a variety of 
contexts and was sold as a symbol and harbinger of modernity and progress. But as Nye 
(1992: 390) notes, people didn’t merely use electricity, “[r]ather, the self and the electri-
fied world have intertwined.” Electricity consumption became constitutive of new forms 
of subjectivity and life itself.  
Technology studies, in general, examines, in its best instances, the mutual con-
struction of technology, politics, and culture. While these are broad categories necessitat-
ing further specification for any particular study, it is useful to think broadly about the 
interconnections between technology, culture, and politics. As Gabrielle Hecht (2000: 10, 
emphasis in original) explains, this enriches our explanations of technology: “Opening 
the black boxes of culture and technology simultaneously can (for example) give us in-
sight into how technologies constitute a terrain for transforming, enacting, or protesting 
power relations within the social fabric.”  It is this possibility of enhancing technology 
studies that informed Hecht’s version of technopolitics.  
Hecht (2000: 15) study of sociotechnical systems focused on technopolitics as a 
methodological and conceptual tool that refers to the “strategic practice of designing or 
using technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals.” But technopolitics are 
more than just politics. They entail a material reality of the technologies themselves and 
the effects technology produces in the material world. This of course limits the possible 
technopolitical configurations available to those engaging in technopolitics. It suggests 
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that the “material effectiveness of technologies can affect their political effectiveness” 
(Hecht 2000: 15-16). And further, technologies are important specifically because they 
enable and are enabled by the practices, knowledges, and expertise of technologists that 
give these actors particular kinds of authority and legitimacy.   
This framing of technopolitics offers a way to understand technologies in social 
and political context, not only as co-produced, but also as tools and means through which 
forms of power and agency are realized, usually to achieve some political ends or goals. 
A key component of technopolitics are technopolitical regimes grounded in institutions 
and “consist of linked sets of people, engineering and industrial practices, technological 
artifacts, political programs, and institutional ideologies, which act together to govern 
technological development and pursue technopolitics” (Hecht 2000, p. 16). Technopoliti-
cal regimes work towards shaping technological systems – in Hecht’s case nuclear power 
– from different institutional contexts with distinct ideas of the Hughesian technological 
styles they desire. The metaphor of regime is useful in the way it expresses an idea of 
who governs, their ideologies, and the ways they exert power (Hecht 2000, see also 
Blanco 2013; Geels 2014).  
3.2.1 Regimes of government  
Sociotechnical regimes are understood mainly as “rules” (Geels and Kemp 2007; 
Geels 2007) that guide and orient activities of social groups who maintain and refine so-
ciotechnical systems. Rip and Kemp (1998: 340) explain that these technological regimes 
are “the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of engineering practices, production 
process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling 
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relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defining problems; all of them embedded in insti-
tutions and infrastructures.” As such, regimes make and shape and influence, and are hard 
to change.  In the MLP, socio-technical regimes include scientists, users, policy makers 
and societal groups outside technical fields. These social groups interact and form net-
works with mutual dependencies (Geels 2007).  
These regimes are the meso level of the MLP, niches are the micro level, and the 
sociotechnical landscape is the macro level. The sociotechnical landscape is exogenous, 
outside the direct influence of actors (Geels 2007).  It is heterogeneous and includes is-
sues such as economic growth, cultural and normative values, environmental problems 
such as climate change, and resource scarcities. It is also the large scale “material context 
of society, e.g. the material and spatial arrangement of cities, pervasive technologies, 
etc.” (Geels 2007: 443). Niches may be thought of as the loci of innovation. They are the 
micro-level phenomenon, and often are “protected” spaces, or “incubators” for new tech-
nologies that protect them from market or societal pressures. In Chapter 4, I focus on the 
applicability of this framework and offer a critical approach to the MLP framework for 
sociotechnical transitions (Geels, 2000, 2002, 2007) by considering the political implica-
tions of these “niches” as they infiltrate the urban fabric as urban experiments.  
The regime concept is foundational in the studies of sociotechnical systems and 
technological change (Rip and Kemp 1998). However, both Hecht’s technopolitical re-
gime and Geels sociotechnical regime do not fully account for the complex and diffuse 
forms of power that create the rationalities, techniques, and subjectivities needed to gov-
ern sociotechnical systems. While the sociotechnical regimes concept includes a variety 
of social, cultural, and technical factors, it stops short of explaining how different gov-
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ernance regimes come into being and how they configure “roles” for different actors in 
the system. Rather its assumes agency dictated by structured and hierarchical forms of 
power.  Similarly, Hecht’s conception of technopolitical regimes focuses heavily on the 
political role of shaping a national identity around different sociotechnical system, i.e. 
political power, and spends less concern on the way governance of these systems is en-
acted in and through regimes of technologies, people, institutions, and political programs, 
i.e. governmental power.  Governmentality helps establish and explain the how of gov-
erning, and marks an essential task for understanding power and governance in soci-
otechnical systems.   
The regime concepts outlined above takes rather broad categories – technology, 
politics, culture – and suggests they’re co-produced and intertwined. It also suggests that 
technologies have an important agential role in shaping social organizations, institutions, 
and practices. The benefits and costs realized through the construction and implementa-
tion of sociotechnical systems are not equally distributed, which suggests a potential for 
politics. Decades of scholarship in STS has also clearly elucidated the political nature of 
science and technology, from visioning and imagination to application and use (Winner 
2010; D. A. MacKenzie 1993; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Jasanoff 2004a). Ques-
tions of politics are interested in who wins and who loses from the outcomes of soci-
otechnical change. Yet, this is decided through the access to and control over various 
forms of knowledge, expertise, and authority that sway persuasion, cooptation, or coer-
cion necessary for political power. However, the question of power in regimes, their abil-
ity to shape socio-technical systems and their relation to broader “landscape” issues are 
less well studied.  
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Geels (2014) more recently has attempted to address power in regimes to explain 
resistance. He suggests that studies of instrumental, discursive, material, and institutional 
power and their relation to political economy can help provide a better understanding of 
how regimes reinforce particular sociotechnical configurations and resist change.  Geels 
(2014, 29) discussion of discursive power begins to address “what is being discussed (set-
ting agendas) but also how issues are discussed.” Geels (2014, 29) suggests that an analy-
sis of framing can show how the manipulation of discourse enhances the legitimacy of 
regimes: “a) diagnostic framing, which identifies and defines problems; b) prognostic 
framing, which advances solutions to problems; and c) motivational framing, which pro-
vides a rationale for action and serves as a ‘call to arms’.”  
Geels (2014) conception of power here is concerned with a “center” of power, so-
lidified in incumbent sociotechnical regimes, wielded to create resistance to challenges, 
creating lock-in and technological momentum. While there certainly is this form of pow-
er operating in sociotechnical systems, more diffuse forms of power must also be consid-
ered.  
One promising approach to address these limitations suggests that a “Foucauldi-
an-inspired analysis of governmentality and liberalism, as political regime, provides theo-
retical resources with which we can begin to think about the crucial question of the inter-
action between specific socio-technical systems and broader power regimes” (Tyfield 
2014, 592). Furthermore, Tyfield (2014, 593) explains, “the focus on power relations 
mediated via knowledge and measurement technologies also alerts us to the possibility 
that the key technological issue for a [sociotechnical] transition may well not be in the 
technologies (i.e. machines) [] per se, but rather in how these interact and coordinate 
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amongst themselves and the power-knowledge technologies they must integrate for this to 
be possible.” I take these criticisms into account in my analysis of “governance regimes” 
in the conceptual framework for this dissertation, utilizing theories of governmentality to 
focus on governmental rationales, techniques, and subjectivities.   
In a governance regime, the dynamics of sociotechnical systems change entails 
broader consideration of what are typically considered “landscape” factors: cultural 
norms, everyday practices, and political economy. This allows for a better account of 
forms of disciplinary power and biopower, what Foucault broadly termed the “power 
over life” (Foucault 1990). This form of power focuses on the norm and normalization as 
the central “technology of power” and the enabling effects of power through optimization 
of the body (disciplinary) or the population (biopolitical). This form of power acts to 
manage the “average” to promote consistency in a population, eliminating outliers or 
what Foucault (1990) calls “aleatory events.” Biopower is enabled by the statistical sur-
veillance of populations, and reinforces trends or what is “normal” and acceptable con-
duct. Managing this conduct, or more generally the “conduct of conduct” is the simplest 
definition of Foucault’s notion of governmentality (Li 2007a).  
The central point is that governing sociotechnical systems and transitions is also 
about governing people and practices. Governmentality, then, fills a necessary role in 
understanding how governing populations is central to enabling the smart grid, which has 
the central goal of changing the rhythms and temporalities of energy demand.   
 77
3.2.2 Analyzing governance regimes: rationalities, techniques, subjectivities 
In his lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault developed the concepts of gov-
ernmentality, biopolitics, and neoliberal subjectivity as ways to understand power and the 
“art of government” (Foucault et al. 2003; Foucault 2009; Foucault 2010).  Although 
these works were actual lectures, not intended for eventual publication, they have in-
spired a plethora of disciplines and a field of Foucauldian scholarship. Governmentality 
studies has arguably itself grown as a “field” within academic scholarship (Foucault et al. 
1991; Bricking, Karman, and Lemke 2010; Brady 2014).  
Governmentality has been defined in numerous ways, but Foucault (2009:144) 
describes it generally as three things: 
First, by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institu-
tions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that al-
low the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has 
the population as its target, political economy as its major form of 
knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instru-
ment. Second, by “governmentality” I understand the tendency, the line of 
force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led to-
wards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, disci-
pline, and so on – of the type of power that we can call “government” and 
which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental ap-
paratuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other]† to the devel-
opment of a series of knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by “governmentality” 
I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the pro-
cess by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the adminis-
trative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually 
“governmentalized.”  
In this definition, Foucault stresses the complex assemblage of actors and tech-
nologies involved in the management of populations. Political economy is the governing 
knowledge, providing the dictates of the state and the market according to principles of 
liberalism. Security “apparatuses” are the technologies of power that shape the field of 
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possible action for the population for the sake of wellbeing or liberal values. The infa-
mous definition of governmentality as the “conduct of conduct” here refers not to the 
disciplinary focus of early Foucault (1977) that pitted freedom and power in opposition, 
but extends the notion of power in a “positive” way such that liberal freedom is seen as a 
mode of power (Rose 1999). In this way, the agency of individuals contributes to the 
overall impact of governance. 
The concept of normalization also differs between discipline and security; where-
as discipline used normalization to separate normal from abnormal in individuals, securi-
ty establishes an overall statistical norm for a population and then produces a norm based 
on rational, calculative techniques to regulate normal and rational conduct of the popula-
tion (Elden 2007).  Foucault here also refers to a historical process of “governmentaliza-
tion” which refers to the many “problems of government” and the specific practices of 
government within the institutions of the state that respond to these problems (Jessop 
2007). The “art of government” is concerned with the population – not a single body – 
but still tends to focus on the minute and seemingly mundane techniques of producing 
subjectivities that control the behavior of the collective(Foucault 2010; Lemke 2001). 
Governmentality is not only the practices of government, but a way of thinking about 
government, a rationality, and a description of the subjects being governed.  
Governmentality studies has taken on a range of issues ranging from development 
and the “will to improve” and development (Li 2007a; Li 2007b), to healthcare and psy-
chology (N. Rose 1998; N. Rose 2001), environmental protection, resilience, and sustain-
ability (S. Rutherford 2007; Gabrys 2014; Goldman 2001; Joseph 2013). More recent 
scholarship has focused on climate change (Dowling 2010; Rutland and Aylett 2008; 
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Stripple and Bulkeley 2013), energy transitions and solar photovoltaic electricity (Bues 
and Gailing 2016; Harriet Bulkeley, Powells, and Bell 2016), and smart technologies and 
smart cities (Vanolo 2013; F. Klauser, Paasche, and Söderström 2014). While these ap-
proaches provide insights into the study of the smart grid, I argue for an analytics of gov-
ernmentality following Dean (2010) that highlights rationalities, techniques, and subjec-
tivities. By integrating sociotechnical systems theory with governmentality, I am able to 
investigate how discourses, knowledge, practices, and technologies contribute to a partic-
ular mode of power and governance that utilizes various techniques and rationalities to 
manage energy consumption in the electric grid, and in this way enact and enable the 
smart grid.  
In short, theories of governmentality bring an analytics of governmental rationali-
ties, techniques, and subjectivities to bear on how governing occurs, enabling “regimes of 
government” or “regimes of practices” (Foucault et al. 1991; Bröckling, Krasmann, and 
Lemke 2010; Nadesan 2010; Dean 2010). Each of these concepts – rationalities, tech-
niques, subjectivities – needs further elaboration to understand how they are deployed in 
the rest of this dissertation and its analyses of smart grid discourse and urban smart grid 
experiments.  
First of all, it is important to note that governmentality implies that governmental 
rationalities are interconnected with techniques and subjectivities. As Gordon (1991, 3) 
explains,  a “rationality of government will thus mean a way or system of thinking about 
the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or 
who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable 
both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it it was practiced.” For example, Fou-
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cault worked through the political rationality of liberalism and neoliberalism in his lec-
tures, The Birth of Biopolitics, explicating the ways in which neoliberal rationality was 
entwined with market activities and the proliferation of enterprise into the social body, 
working on and through a particular subject, homo oeconomicus. Gordon (1991) argues 
that these later lectures were outcomes of Foucault’s interest in “techniques of power” or 
“power/knowledge technologies” which were used to observe, monitor, shape, and con-
trol the behavior of individuals in societal contexts, but now applied to populations of 
subjects.  
Governmental rationalities are specifically tied to “regimes of truth”, or historical-
ly specific mechanisms which produce discourses that are perceived and accepted as true 
in particular places (Foucault 1977). They drawn on regimes of truth as bodies of 
knowledge and expertise to create the calculative means of addressing, reasoning, and 
responding to a set of particular problematics (N. S. Rose 1999, 19). Rationalities are thus 
tied to the Foucault’s notions of episteme and power/knowledge, as well as “fields of 
visibility” (Dean 2010). Episteme refers to the specific set of ways of thinking and ques-
tioning, the general conditions for knowledge at a specific historical moment. As Rose 
(1999, 29) notes,  
An analytics of government are not primarily concerned with language as 
a field of meaning, or with texts embodying authorial intentions which 
may be recovered and made intelligible in the appropriate historical con-
text. They are concerned with knowledges, or regimes of truth. [...] It is 
not so much a question of what a word or a text ‘means’ – of the meanings 
of terms such as ‘community’, ‘culture’, ‘risk’, ‘social’, ‘civility’, ‘citizen’ 
and the like – but of analysing the way a word or a book functions in con-
nection with other things, what it makes possible, the surfaces, networks 
and circuits around which it flows, the affects and passions that it mobiliz-
es and through which it mobilizes. It is thus a matter of analysing what 
counts as truth, who has the power to define truth, the role of different au-
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thorities of truth, and the epistemological, institutional and technical con-
ditions for the production and circulation of truths.  
It is the forms of knowledge that shape and are shaped by, enact and empower 
particular forms of governing. The basic questions concerning episteme are: What are the 
essential bits of knowledge, expertise, means of calculation, and rationality utilized in 
practices of governing? How do practices of governing elicit particular forms of common 
sense knowledge? How do different ideas and knowledges seek to transform these prac-
tices? How do regimes of governance seek to render particular issues, domains, and prob-
lems governable? (Dean 2010, 42). 
Fields of visibility make legible “who and what is to be governed, how relations 
of authority and obedience are constituted in space, how different locales and agents are 
to be connected with one another, what problems are to be solved and what objectives are 
to be sought” (Dean 2010, 41). They are, for example, architectural drawings, manage-
ment flow charts, maps, panopticons, or, related more closely to the smart grid, demand 
curves, consumption profiles, and energy monitoring. Closely related are governmental 
techniques, or the technical means of government. Questions relating to governmental 
techniques include: What are the means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, 
technologies and vocabularies by which authority is constituted and rule accomplished 
(Dean 2010, 42)? Sometimes referred to as “technologies of government,” governmental 
techniques not only are the technical means, but also make possible certain forms of gov-
erning. 
Lastly, analyzing governmentality entails attention to the formation of identities 
(individual and collective) and subjectivities. Questions related to this axis of analysis 
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include: “What forms of person, self, and identity are presupposed by different practices 
of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek? What statuses, 
capacities, attributes, and orientations are assumed of those who exercise authority (from 
politicians and bureaucrats to professionals and therapists) and those are to be governed 
(workers, consumers, pupils and social welfare recipients)? What forms of conduct are 
expected of them? [...] How are certain aspects of conduct problematized? How are they 
then to be reformed? How are certain individuals and populations made to identify with 
certain groups, to become virtuous and active citizens, and so on?” (Dean 2010, 43).  It is 
important to note here, however, that regimes of government do not determine forms of 
subjectivity, rather, they “elicit, promote, facilitate, foster, and attribute various capaci-
ties, qualities, and statuses to particular agents” (Dean 2010, 44).  
These concepts of episteme, fields of visibility, technique, and identi-
ty/subjectivity are intertwined in the transformation of regimes. However there is one 
more element that Dean (2010) suggests is essential, the “utopian element.” This means 
that governmentality has a utopian understanding of efficacy of government, of not only 
logic, but in action and possibility of reaching desired outcomes and goals. “It is to as-
sume that we can draw upon and apply forms of knowledge to that task, that we can gain 
a secure knowledge of the world and of human beings in that world, that we can ‘make 
things better’, improve how we do things” (Dean 2010, 44). Unraveling and extracting 
this utopian element, or telos of government (Dean 2010, 44), is also a central part of 
analyzing governmentality.  
Together, these elements of rationalities, techniques, and subjectivities (and the 
concepts within them – episteme, telos, visibility, technique, identity) provides a way to 
 83
understand how different governance regimes are enacted through reconfigurations of 
particular socio-technical systems including technologies, policies, norms, and rules of 
conduct.  We may think of this as adding an analysis of the “programmes of conduct” to 
the sociotechnical regimes approach: by this I mean adding an analysis of “all the at-
tempts to regulate, reform, organize, and improve what occurs within regimes of practic-
es in the name of a specific set of ends articulated with different degrees of explicitness 
and cogency” (Dean 2010, 43).  
Because the smart grid has a central goal of making energy demand less dynamic 
and more controlled, it is essential to unpack different ways of understand energy de-
mand. In the next section, I provide a brief overview of understanding domestic energy 
use as a basis for understanding how electricity consumption is problematized.   
3.2.3 Problematizing consumption: Ways of understanding domestic energy use 
Existing work on understanding domestic energy use has three primary approach-
es. The first is the engineering and technical approach. Under this approach, engineers 
identify a problem with domestic energy consumption and develop technological solu-
tions. Technological solutions range from smartness, automation, design, information and 
feedback, or efficiency (Higginson, Thomson, and Bhamra 2014). For example, engi-
neers can help reduce energy consumption by increasing energy efficiency of buildings, 
appliances, or other technologies often utilized in the home. This captures the simple en-
gineering notion that the same amount of work can be accomplished with fewer energy 
inputs. Policy approaches over the last three decades have taken this approach, with some 
success (Geller et al. 2006).  Many of these policy approaches include the development of 
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new standards for appliances, starting as early as the development of the US DOE in 
1979. The National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 helped established min-
imum efficiencies for appliances, and the EPAct of 1992 and 2005 and the EISA 2007 set 
new standards for a variety of appliances. These standards aim to increase energy effi-
ciency through market transformation (Geller and Nadel 1994). Yet there are numerous 
problems with an engineering only approach. The most common cited issue is the “re-
bound effect” which suggests that energy costs will decrease with greater efficiency 
yielding consumption increases (Greening, Greene, and Difiglio 2000; Berkhout, 
Muskens, and W. Velthuijsen 2000; Saunders 2013). Limitations of technological ap-
proaches often are characterized as market failures (M. A. Brown 2001; M D Levine et 
al. 1995) that limit the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs and policies. 
This brings us to the second general approach to understanding domestic energy 
consumption: the economists’ approach. The economists’ approach typically works in 
concert with the engineering approach to develop market directed policies. These ap-
proaches typically consider economic agents as rational individuals looking to maximize 
utility, or make the best economic decision for whatever set of circumstances they inhabit 
(Slovic et al. 2002; Mirowski 1991). This approach takes on a psychological bent, often 
utilizing theories from psychology to understand how people make decisions relating to a 
variety of economic and social factors (Simon 1986; V. L. Smith 1991). Still, these ap-
proaches take an individual approach and are often critiqued for their limitations includ-
ing complete access to information and lack of broader social considerations (Goode 
1997; Kahneman 2003). This has informed different varieties of economic approaches 
 85
that try to provide better information to rational actors to enables better decision-making, 
and the development of new theoretical models in the field of behavioral economics.  
The third approach to understanding domestic energy use critiques both the engi-
neering and economics approaches, and takes culture and social practices as the primary 
explanations for energy consumption patterns.  These approaches suggest that a number 
of alternative factors, both structural and cultural, are important to consider in addition to 
the techno-economic (Wilhite et al. 2000; Wilhite and Lutzenhiser 1999; Lutzenhiser 
1992; Shove 2004). Lutzenhiser (1992) had explained the limitations of approaches from 
engineering, economics, psychology, and sociology approaches and the growing presence 
of cultural models of household energy consumption almost 20 years ago.  In the same 
article, Lutzenhiser explains how a cultural model of energy that considers materiality – 
that is, technologies, resources, objects – and the political economy of energy would pro-
vide not only a better theoretical understanding, but a better policy approach.  
Cultural analysis involves the empirical investigation of what technologies 
mean to actors, and how they actually are used in everyday life in the US 
(where the fact that greater energy flows are involved in some end-uses 
than others may be of little significance to persons who are not consuming 
energy, per se, but rather are pursuing cultural forms of life). [...] The so-
cial sciences tell us that cultures are organized in social structures, by 
means of which political and economic interests find expression. It fol-
lows, then, that an approach which inquires only at the site of consumption 
will overlook political and economic dynamics that contribute directly to 
the creation and maintenance of that consumption.  (Lutzenhiser 1992: 
55,58) 
This cultural approach considers technology, political economy, and consumption 
as intertwined.  The model developed by Lutzenhiser provided inspiration for much of 
the work following in social practices, energy anthropology, and social science research 
on energy, more generally. The social practices approach is complementary, but different. 
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Building off the work of numerous theorists (Shove 2014; Shove, Pantzar, and Watson 
2012; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny 2001; Gram-Hanssen 2010; Hargreaves 
2011), the practices approach challenges economic and psychological behavior change 
models arguing that norms, conventions, institutions, and habits – social forces and struc-
tures – play more important roles in determining consumption patterns. The focus on de-
mand side management and now demand response and flexible demand within the elec-
tricity industry itself represents a semantic and discursive shift away from energy conser-
vation, a behavioral approach, to a science and policy approach focusing on efficiency at 
the least cost (Wilhite et al. 2000). This trend still holds true despite the tremendous re-
cent social science research on energy (Stirling 2014; Sovacool 2014; Lutzenhiser 2014; 
M. Huber 2015; Calvert 2015; Boyer 2011) and the growing trend towards understanding 
social practices impact on energy demand (Shove and Walker 2014; Shove, Watson, and 
Spurling 2015; Strengers 2012).  
The majority of smart grid related approaches to demand side management and 
demand response utilize engineering and economic epistemologies and tools. This limits 
the potential of these programs and their effectiveness. Governing electricity demand 
seems to escape the purely economic form of decision-making that market approaches 
would enable. Yet, there is a continued reliance on price mechanisms and economic ap-
proaches. Smart technologies are intended to develop new producer-consumer relation-
ships, enabling two way flows of information that can improve management of the grid 
for better social, economic, and environmental outcomes (Clastres 2011). These technol-
ogies rely on the same epistemological underpinnings that early DSM strategies utilized – 
pricing fluctuations and information provision – to influence actions and behaviors 
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(Rahimi and Ipakchi 2010; Siano 2014). But these technologies have multiple applica-
tions and also enable extended opportunities for automated energy management through 
interlinked networks of sensors, devices, appliances, communications, and controls. As 
such, the smart grid “paradigm” has elicited a tremendous response from the electricity 
industry, ICT companies, and government, much in speculation of what the technological 
future will hold. “Smartness” itself demands a new interpretation to understand how po-
litical technologies are used to govern energy conduct. 
The next section discusses the sociotechnical and political history of the smart 
grid. Section 4 reports on the discourse analysis highlighting key rationalities, techniques 
and imagined subjectivities for the governance regime. 
3.3 Making a Smart Grid Regime  
The energy consultant and professor of practice at Boston University Peter Fox-
Penner argues that the smart grid has its roots in deregulation policy. In his text Smart 
Power (Fox-Penner 2014), one of the most widely-read and acclaimed texts on the smart 
grid, Fox-Penner explains how deregulation and smart technologies enable the transition 
away from the traditional kilowatt-hour commodity business model to new business 
models of utilities: either network operators (he calls “the smart integrator”) or energy 
service utilities. In the old business model, the regulated electricity market guaranteed 
and set rates of profit for utilities based on the rate base – the value of property on which 
a public utility is permitted to earn a specified rate of return. This incentivized utilities to 
build more, sinking investments in new generation and transmission systems to enable 
further profits. This guided the early development of regional power networks, especially 
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after the trust-busting Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) and the 
period of unregulated monopolies. 3 Along with this, there was a general incentive to sell 
more electricity. More electricity consumption coincided with economic growth generally 
in the US economy, especially in the post-WWI period. New business models require 
utilities to change and adapt to a new electricity landscape characterized by distributed 
generation facilities, two ways flows of information and electrons, and a more liberalized 
electricity market.  
The evolution of the utility industry was heavily shaped by the technologies avail-
able, corporate organizational structures, and regulatory systems (Hirsh 2003). It also 
responded to the material realities of energy scarcity and the economics of energy pro-
duction. Historian Richard Hirsh (2003) explains how the electric utility industry de-
clined during the 1970s as it reached a period of “technological stasis” – what he de-
scribes as the decline in technological progress and system efficiency of the electric in-
dustry that arose alongside a specific managerial culture, a specific set of manufacturing 
techniques and utility practices that only heightened stagnation and created barriers to 
addressing it. Hirsh shows how the industry began to lose the moniker of “high tech” to 
electronics and aerospace industries, failing to attract talented and skilled individuals who 
                                                 
3 President Roosevelt established the National Power Policy Committee (NPCC) in 1934 to create “yard-
stick” rates for public and private utilities.  This fueled public power enthusiasts and conservationists to 
lobby for the dissolution of monopolistic holding companies (Funigiello 1973). These large holding com-
panies were broken up with the 1935 Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), one of the “trust-
busting” initiatives enacted in response to the Great Depression. The PUHCA of 1935 established in the 
wake of the Great Depression to enable securities regulation and prevent abuse of holding company power 
and control over electricity markets.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was required to 
approve holding companies control of only a single integrated electric system.  
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might have challenged the industry’s stasis. The old, staid utility managers only allowed 
inefficiencies to become more deeply entrenched, contributing to the idea that utilities are 
slow-moving bureaucracies ill-equipped to innovate or change. Hirsh’s idea of stasis 
alongside Hughes (1987) concept of technological momentum helps explain how the util-
ity industry garnered the reputation it still holds (in many ways) today – rigid, inflexible, 
resistant.  
Hirsh’s (2002) more recent text Power Loss deals with the issues of deregulation 
and restructuring in the electric utility industry following this period of stasis.  Hirsh de-
scribes the development and decline of the “utility consensus” – an agreement that utili-
ties were “natural monopolies” that should be regulated by rate-setting as they achieved 
greater economies of scale and scope to increase their bottom line. Yet as Hirsh describes 
in the book this model was problematized as uncertainties in demand, price, and capacity 
complicated the traditional model.  Coupled with the growing concerns over environmen-
tal pollution, accompanying new regulations, and technological stasis, the utility consen-
sus began to be challenged and free market ideologies gained traction against traditional 
regulatory frameworks.  
In 1978, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA 1978) was enacted to 
help promote energy conservation and promote the development of domestic and renew-
able energy. As a part of President Carter’s National Energy Act, PURPA was developed 
in response to the energy crisis of 1973 (Hirsh 1999). Fueled by anxieties of oil scarcity 
and extremes in oil prices, the US sought to boost its “energy independence.” PURPA 
encouraged non-utility power production especially renewable sources, cogeneration, 
hydroelectric power, and conservation while limiting promotional rate structures – the 
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decreased cost per kWh with increased usage. The development of a market for non-
utility power production began the restructuring of the electric industry, providing com-
petition in generation (Hirsh 1999). Vertically integrated companies no longer were the 
sole generators of electricity in their territory, challenging the half century long consen-
sus that the electricity market encouraged a “natural monopoly.” Although the intention 
of the Act was to provide momentum to the environmental movement, it served to intro-
duce and stimulate competition into the generation sector of the electricity market. In 
addition, President Carter’s energy focus also brought forth the Department of Energy 
Organization Act in 1977, which established the US DOE and replaced the Federal Power 
Commission of the President Roosevelt era (1935) with the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC). FERC was established to create and enforce wholesale electricity 
prices.  
By 1992, there was a strong impetus to further restructure the electric industry. 
This was fueled by the characteristic neoliberal, free-market ideology of the 1980s and 
1990s. Regulation was challenged on the grounds that it would only continue to interfere 
with the maximum efficiency allowed for by the free-market (Rudolph and Ridley 1986). 
Telecommunications, transportation, and natural gas industries were deregulated provid-
ing precedent for the electricity industry (Graham and Marvin 2001). The loss of the utili-
ty consensus, environmental groups movement to change energy policy, the growing re-
alization that energy systems were contributing to a changing climate (e.g. Limits to 
Growth 1972, Brundtland Report 1987), strong movements towards energy efficiency, 
and a declining rate of electricity consumption all signaled a new era for energy policy. 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992) partially repealed PUHCA 1935 even as 
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concerned citizen and environmental groups grew anxious about the potential for corrup-
tion. President Bush’s EPAct 1992 opened the transmission networks to non-utility gen-
erators or independent power producers (IPPs) and facilitated the creation of a competi-
tive market for electricity by creating another category of qualifying facilities in addition 
to the cogeneration and IPPs President Carter’s policy established 14 years earlier: ex-
empt wholesale generators (EWGs). EWGs were exempt from regulations of traditional 
utilities and were aided to participate with the FERC Orders 888 and 889 which provided 
guidelines for opening electricity transmission networks for interstate commerce (Hirsh 
2004). State level action also followed with California and Rhode Island passing deregu-
lation legislation that allowed consumers to choose their electricity supplier. The “power 
to choose” has thus resonated as a popular discourse for consumer sovereignty and en-
gagement with the electricity industry.    
As the old utility business model was challenged, new structures needed to be im-
plemented. Natural monopoly and state or federal regulation began to be replaced with a 
restructured system of electricity generators competing in a market designed to be effi-
cient and profitable (Breslau 2013). Utilities provided maintenance of the transmission 
and distribution systems, while generators provided wholesale electricity to markets 
where power marketers and brokers would facilitate sales and transactions. Proponents 
suggested that the cost of electricity decreased due to competition, ultimately benefiting 
the end-use consumer. Environmental benefits of energy efficiency were also considered 
as competitive advantages.  A new market for renewable focused IPPs was enabled to 
help meet mandates from renewable energy portfolio standards, such as the one imple-
mented in 2002 in California or in Texas in 1999. The impacts of deregulation, however, 
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are contested. Many argue that the opening of markets and market restructuring caused 
the electricity crisis in 2000-2001 in California (T. Slocum 2001). The failure and short-
age of electrical supply was contributed to market manipulation, Enron’s role in natural 
gas cut-offs, and capped retail electricity prices (Sweeney 2002). Many policymakers and 
think tanks suggest that deregulation in itself is not a bad goal, rather that the implemen-
tation of policy was flawed (Isser 2015).  
A 2002 report from the Pacific Northwest National Labs (PNNL) provided a pri-
mer to understanding deregulation and restructuring, and it described the new business 
model for utilities results in “giving retail customers the opportunity to choose their pow-
er supplier” which “is expected to stimulate markets to reduce power costs and increase 
power products and services” (Warwick 2002: vi). In the deregulated market, the report 
notes, competition will take place in every part of the electricity system, from generation 
and transmission to wholesale markets (with many new third-party operators), and even 
in retail power sales as a variety of new power suppliers (often subsidiaries of existing 
utilities across state boundaries) enter the market. As competition reduced the incentive 
for utilities to implement energy management programs, new companies offer customers 
services of energy audits and other energy management services, often with a fee (paid 
by utility billing in many states with independent groups managing these funds, not utili-
ties). In Oregon, for example, the Energy Trust of Oregon is one such provider of energy 
efficiency funded by utility billing fees, or a “public purchase charge,” from customers of 
Portland General Electric, Pacific Power, NW Natural, and Cascade Natural Gas (Oregon 
Senate Bill 1149 1999).  
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Deregulation policy slowed after the 2000-2001 California crisis, causing many 
states to reconsider their own restructuring laws. Numerous analyses emerged for the 
failure of electricity deregulation (Ardoin and Grady 2006; Blumsack, Apt, and Lave 
2006; Woo, Lloyd, and Tishler 2003; Borenstein 2002; Joskow 2001), but the thought 
and drive for a competitive, thoroughly deregulated market for electricity did not dissi-
pate. In 2005, President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) at 
Sandia National Laboratory in a symbolic nod to the support for ramping up nuclear 
power production. The Act fully repealed the PUHCA of 1935, eliminating corporate 
structure and governance restrictions enabling holding companies to tap a broader array 
of sources of capital for investment. This provided a victory to free-market enthusiast, 
and it fit with the logic of neoliberal capitalism towards deregulation and privatization 
(Harvey 2007). It also resonated with the strong desire of national security in a post-9/11 
world. President Bush hammered home the idea that domestic energy resources including 
coal and renewables were key to “reducing our reliance on energy from foreign coun-
tries,” and helping the US “economy grow so people can work” (Office of the Press Sec-
retary 2005). But the Act also contained a hefty section on energy conservation and effi-
ciency. President Bush (Office of the Press Secretary 2005, emphasis added) remarked: 
The bill recognizes that America is the world's leader in technology, and 
that we've got to use technology to be the world's leader in energy conser-
vation. The bill includes incentives for consumers to be better conservers 
of energy. If you own a home, you can receive new tax credits to install 
energy-efficient windows and appliances. If you're in the market for a car, 
this bill will help you save up to $3,500 on a fuel-efficient hybrid or clean-
diesel vehicle. And the way the tax credit works is that the more efficient 
the vehicle is, the more money you will save. Energy conservation is more 
than a private virtue; it's a public virtue. And with this bill I sign today, 
America is taking the side of consumers who make the choice to conserve. 
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President Bush attempted to align a culture of American patriotism with a moral 
requirement for energy efficiency and conservation. As an individual consumer, it 
seemed, you could participate in the nation’s goals for energy independence and security 
in a time of war by doing your part: purchasing a fuel efficient car and energy-efficient 
windows and appliances. And you could do so knowing you would uphold a public virtue 
while benefitting privately. But conservation for President Bush was not about changing 
behaviors or habits, but merely adopting new technologies. This quote illustrates the lim-
ited and technologically deterministic approach to energy efficiency and conservation 
that equates consumer-citizenship with environmentalism and patriotism (see: R. Slocum 
2004a; R. Slocum 2004b).  
While much of the EPAct of 2005 focused on oil and gas, the provisions for elec-
tricity solidified an era of deregulation and competition.  Just two years later, the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA 2007) brought forth the “smart grid” as a 
national goal for modernization of the electricity grid. The act explained that the smart 
grid would utilize “digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, 
security, and efficiency of the electric grid.” It also held provisions for renewable energy 
integration, demand response programs, information provision, and deployment of smart 
technologies.  
In 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) provided the 
funds to research, implement, and demonstrate smart grid technologies throughout the 
country. The smart grid was positioned as a way to modernize aging electricity infrastruc-
ture improving security, efficiency, reliability, and environmental sustainability. Modern-
ization, however, means many things. I argue that modernization, and much of the ac-
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companying discourse about technological change and consumer empowerment, are 
aimed at transforming infrastructure to enable a free-market inspired electric power net-
work and at making demand price responsive. Simply put, smart grid technologies were, 
and are being, implemented as a governance regime that places market-driven efficiency, 
securitization of supply, and consumer empowerment as key rationalities, with accompa-
nying techniques, and imagined “smart consumer” identities. 
3.4 Efficiency, Security, Economy 
3.4.1 Overview of governmental rationalities: efficiency, security, economy 
Preliminary analysis of smart grid discourse resulting from content and thematic 
analysis (see Chapter 2 for more discussion of methods) identified key textual phrases 
that I grouped with codes and themes. The background above explains the historical con-
ditions that allowed for this discourse to emerge.  This discourse analysis helps to unravel 
the episteme, field of visibility, telos of government, the techniques and identi-
ties/subjectivities thus contributing to the analysis of governmentality and governance 
regimes in the smart grid. The analysis and coding identified efficiency, security, and 
economy as governmental rationalities. These enable and enact the smart grid through 
various techniques and a “smart consumer” identity. As such, the attention to the “con-
sumer-side” of the smart grid discourse receives significant attention. It is through the 
creation of the “smart consumer” and associated practices that make the smart grid possi-
ble as a governmental program and as a sociotechnical infrastructure.  
This discourse analysis reveals problematizations of the electricity system as the 
basis for three governmental rationalities: efficiency, security, and economy. By efficien-
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cy, I mean both technical and economic efficiency. Technical efficiency discourses come 
from the technical literature: electrical, power, computer, mechanical and other engineer-
ing disciplines; utilities and research organizations; government offices and research la-
boratories; nonprofit environmental groups; and more. Technical efficiency discourse 
focuses on improvements, benefits, and limitations resulting from smart grid technolo-
gies.  
Technical efficiency is closely linked to the notion of economic efficiency, where-
in both engineering and economics discursive practices interact. Economic efficiency 
discussion is based on the claims of technical efficiency with the basic conception that 
less energy is wasted. Economic efficiency often refers to the dollars saved in operation 
and maintenance costs across the entire grid. Efficiency is central to the dominant techno-
economic, even techno-utopian discourse of the smart grid. Various social visions are 
incorporated into this broad theme, making the smart grid an empty signifier capable of 
recruiting multiple meanings and expectations under the same moniker.  
A second prevailing theme is security and securitization. Security refers to several 
concerns. As the grid becomes “digitized,” that is controlled and managed with a digital 
information and communication infrastructure network, increasing concerns about the 
ability of hackers to break into the secured network and cause havoc on the electric grid 
is being battled with cyber-security and physical security programs. Security also refers 
to the role of the smart grid in reducing pollution and enabling renewable generation, a 
form of “ecological security” (Hodson and Marvin 2009a). Carbon and climate issues are 
enraveled in both security and efficiency discourses.   
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Of course, however, climate change is also discussed in an opportunistic way, 
presenting the opportunity for “re-inventing” the power sector and creating an economy 
that runs on clean energy. Economy, thus, is a third major theme and refers to the tradi-
tional and more modern usage of the term. The modern usage of economy fits with the 
idea of a managed realm of social actions in which consumption and production, supply 
and demand are conducted in a regulated or unregulated market. Rooted in its etymology, 
economy also refers to “household management,” “thrift,” and “administration.” Fou-
cault’s (2010) lectures on neoliberalism start from this meaning, as does Agamben’s 
(2009) tracing of oikonomia and the theological roots of economic thinking, and Mitch-
ell’s (2008; 1998) discussion of Hughes (1983) work on electricity networks, for exam-
ple, discusses how the economy was created in the production of a sociotechnical system. 
This latter meaning of economy is closely affiliated with domestic electricity consump-
tion, energy management, and the variety of practices associated with household con-
sumption.  
While this is by no means exhaustive, these three groupings capture a majority of 
the social meanings and expectations assigned to the smart grid captured in major dis-
courses. These three rationalities are sometimes at odd with each other. Sometimes, secu-
rity concern is negotiated to enable new actors to participate in electricity management, 
such as is the case with distributed generation and home energy management systems 
(HEMS). Other times, environmental concerns over securitization of the climate (pre-
venting further climate change) confronts an argument for economic or even technical 
efficiency, as is the case of the higher costs and intermittency of renewable energy 
sources such as wind and solar. There is considerable debate between actors in the smart 
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grid. It is here where political visions collide and contestation ensues. Yet, there is a dom-
inant way of thinking about government, the role of technology, and the imagined sub-
jects of the smart grid.  
This analysis brings to surface these three rationalities, how they are discussed, by 
whom, and with what effect.  Discourse is used to aid in the stabilization of sociotech-
nical regimes, but act in a broader governance regime, analyzed through different gov-
ernmental rationales, techniques, and subjectivities that are captured in sociotechnical 
changes and visions of the smart grid. In short, this analysis helps elucidate forms of gov-
ernance enacted through the discourse and materiality of the smart grid.  
3.4.2 Efficiency: Smart grid as technical progression for electricity markets and 
consumers 
Technical efficiency discourse originates in engineering research and develop-
ment. Specific discourses relating to technical and economic efficiency of the smart grid 
are produced in many different institutional contexts with a variety of practices, most 
notably here by engineers and economists. The professional organization, IEEE, has pub-
lished journals, magazines, and conference proceedings that contain the minutiae of tech-
nical efficiency benefits of the smart grid, rationales for these benefits, and techniques of 
realizing these benefits. Practices and institutions matter a great deal to the “discursive 
order” of social transformations and to the production of subjects and objects of 
knowledge (Hajer 1995; Foucault 2002).  
As early as 1988, with the inaugural issue of IEEE’s Computer Applications in 
Power, engineers discussed the ability of the nascent “smart grid” to step away from 
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nameplate data references and to harness the power of actual, real-time data to better 
simulate and manage generation, transmission and distribution (Undrill 1988); they dis-
cussed future applications of computers in power system operations, construction man-
agement, design engineering, maintenance, and new business opportunities for utilities 
(Denny 1988); and they highlighted the applications for data collection on energy-usage 
in end-use experiments where “the proliferation of inexpensive, high-quality computing” 
had enabled utilities to “have the necessary knowledge to design demand-side manage-
ment programs and to demonstrate their value to customers and regulators”(Shirilau 
1988, 20).  Already in 1988, the capabilities of a smarter grid were being discussed with 
application to different sectors of electricity system operations.  
Technical efficiency refers to the many things in the engineering and industry dis-
courses: increases in reliability, decreased losses in the transmission and distribution sys-
tems, and greater utilization of generation assets are just some (Gellings 2009; Carvallo 
and Cooper 2015). As the widely acknowledged “father of the smart grid,” University of 
Minnesota Professor Massoud Amin, has explained: “Smart grid is the enhancement to 
the sensors, communication, controls and devices and systems that operate as an overlay 
in parallel on top of [the] hardwired system to enhance reliability, minimize cost, reduce 
cost, improve security and resilience, robustness of the system” (Flatow 2011; see also 
Amin 2008). During his career working on smart grids, Amin worked with the Electric 
Power Research Institute, a nearly fifty-year-old non-profit research and development 
organization. EPRI’s members represent approximately 90 percent of US power produc-
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tion, and thus, EPRI is largely responsive to their needs.4 EPRI’s reports, documentation, 
and journal represent a key window into the issues that electricity industry finds im-
portant and pressing.  
EPRI’s decades of research on smart and intelligent grid technologies (IntelliGrid 
is EPRI’s own methodology for integrating smart grid technologies) and collaborations 
with utilities and energy companies has highlighted technical efficiency gains. In the in-
troduction to the June 1989 issue of the EPRI Journal, a featured article highlight how 
silicon thyristor technology “promises to transform the nations transmission system with 
fast, ‘smart’ solid-state switching devices that eliminate bottlenecks encountered with 
conventional, electromechanical equipment” (p. 5).  
By 1997, the term “smart grid”, or “SMART (Self-Managing and Reliable 
Transmission) Grid” was already catching on with promises to “use information technol-
ogy to improve grid reliability and capability”(Vu, Begouic, and Novosel 1997, 42).  The 
notion of a smart grid was tied to the idea of “self-healing” energy infrastructure systems 
that would improve grid reliability, and at the same time utilize the “infrastructures for a 
digital world” to “develop distributed management and control systems to keep infra-
structures  robust and operational” (Amin 2001, 27). In early 2000s, sociotechnical 
changes presented an opportunity for smart grid discourses to emerge, as Amin (2001, 
27) notes: “Economic restructuring and increasingly powerful sensing, computation, and 
control options are changing the context in which power systems are operated and stud-
                                                 
4 See http://www.epri.com/About-Us/Pages/Our-Story.aspx. 
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ied.” With the introduction of enterprise energy management systems (EEMS), new con-
figurations were being considered for the way producers and consumers interacted, and 
presented opportunities for “market-based pricing.” Rising demand and the power and 
reliability (six nines or 99.9999%) requirements of the “new digital economy” presented 
challenges for the existing industry, who was characterized as needing more information 
and more choice (Forth and Tobin 2002). Smart grid technologies, such as EEMS, pro-
vided a solution to the “technological barrier preventing true market economics from pre-
vailing, regardless of what the regulators had intended” (Forth and Tobin 2002, 24). The 
need for appropriate technologies to enabled market-responsive (dynamic) pricing and  
responsive demand (price elastic) was also expressed by economists in the pages of 
IEEE’s Transactions on Power Systems (e.g. Kirschen 2003). The idea of information 
technology aiding increases in the price elasticity of electricity demand, or in general 
making demand more responsive across sectors (industrial, commercial, and residential), 
is a common thread among the technical discourses of the smart grid.  
Technical discourse related to efficiency is almost always bolstered by arguments 
or visions for economic efficiency. In the history of the smart grid, since the 1970s when 
microcomputers became popular, the structure of the utility industry shaped and was 
shaped the role of information infrastructure where economic efficiency, technical effi-
ciency, reliability, and security were points of negotiation in sociotechnical changes that 
took place. Slayton (2013) argues, firstly, that information infrastructure helped vertically 
integrated utilities gain economies of scale and scope because it allowed utilities to plan 
for the most economic dispatch from various generating sources now, in ever more dis-
tant locations in a growing electricity network. This meant that the technical benefits of 
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information infrastructure could be used to increase economic efficiencies of utility or-
ganization. Computers were used not only for planning, but also for controls. SCADA 
systems were developed to manage industrial systems in a more centralized and coordi-
nated way. Information infrastructure aided both economic efficiency and physical effi-
ciency simultaneously. The improvements in information technology allowed more cost-
effective production, expansion of networks, and this reduced the cost of electricity as 
demand sored through the turn of the century to 1973.  
Secondly, Slayton (2013) argues that information infrastructure aided the creation 
of electricity markets, which would yield “more efficient” transactions (Rozek 1989; 
Forth and Tobin 2002). After the oil crisis of 1973, utilities’ economies of scale and 
scope were threatened. Costs of electricity rose as did environmental concerns, and ener-
gy security became increasingly salient. This led to the decline of the natural monopoly 
paradigm solidified in the PURPA 1978. In response, utilities began to create smaller and 
less centralized forms of electricity generation, which was only made possible by ad-
vances in IT such as microprocessors and computer networks (Slayton 2013).  
Third, a new regulatory order was implemented alongside IT advances. New 
computer networking and microprocessor developments “could enable a more competi-
tive market structure, reducing of eliminating the need for regulators to establish market 
prices” (Slayton 2013: 458). MITs Energy Lab, and more prominently EPRI (part of Edi-
son Electric Institute), began to advocate for the role of computing and information tech-
nology to enhance productivity and competitiveness with “smarter and more efficient 
microtechnology.” Economic efficiency was assumed for market competition. In many 
ways, technical improvements and efficiencies in the smart grid shaped and were shaped 
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by the push for market competition (Slayton 2013; Mitchell 2008). PUCs also played a 
major role suggesting that microelectronics could help provide consumer choice, a trope 
that still rings true more than twenty years later. ICTs also enabled new forms of spot 
pricing systems to help cut demand in a more “consumer-oriented” way. ICTs enabled a 
complex power market feasible, and this fueled the boosterism from economists and 
some regulators who believed that the market would allow the most efficient allocation of 
resources (i.e. the cheapest generating units would run so prices could be competitive). 
Computer networks allowed trading between ever more utilities and non-utility genera-
tors.  
The vision of a future smart grid was pronounced in the pages of technical jour-
nals, industry magazines, and in public media as well. A realization that the smart grid 
was a necessity of the energy future was stated almost universally. For example, repre-
sentatives of EPRI and CEIDS (Consortium of Electric Infrastructure to Support a Digital 
Society) wrote in the pages of IEEE’s Power and Energy Magazine about the coming 
necessity of two-way communications network for electric power systems: “The future of 
the power industry will require the continued development and integration of two infra-
structures, not just one: both power delivery and communications” (Gellings, Samotyj, 
and Howe 2004).   Likewise, the Department of Energy, in collaboration with Pacific 
Northwest National Labs, developed the GridWise™Testbed Demonstration in 2004, 
suggesting that “smart grid-management technologies based on real-time, electronic 
communication and intelligent devices” would mature within several years eliminating 
the need for expanding construction of traditional power-grid infrastructure 
(Hammerstrom 2007, v). The end-use energy experiments with dynamic pricing and au-
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tomation and control of smart appliances would set the pace for industry growth in this 
area. Peter Fox-Penner describes the Sequim, Washington based GridWise experiments 
in his influential text, Smart Power, as precursors to the smart grid of today, with demand 
responding to “sometimes sever price spikes” to successfully prevent overloading on the 
small town’s grid infrastructure. The GridWise Alliance and the GridWise Architecture 
Council were offshoots of this initial project, with the Alliance serving as a member or-
ganization for a broad range of energy supply chain actors, from utilities and large tech-
nology companies to academia, venture capitalists and emerge companies.  
As the smart grid paradigm has emerged in the last fifteen years, political coali-
tions, such as GridWise, have been built around smart technologies and advocated for 
industry and regulatory changes. As they explain in their informational brochure: “The 
technology exists to enable a radical overhaul of the way in which energy is generated, 
distributed and consumed—an overhaul whose impact on the energy industry could 
match the Internet’s impact on communications. But unless regulators restore the eco-
nomic incentives for investment, the future looks bleak.” 5  Organizations such as these 
pronounce the technical and economic benefits and efficiencies of the smart grid, and 
attempt to create further public and government support for smart grid technologies.  
At the center of these appeals to policymakers is a central notion that smart grid 
technologies benefit consumers. The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel’s, mission state-
ment, for example, explains: “SGIP is an industry consortium representing a cross-
                                                 
5 See http://www.gridwise.org/smartgrid_whatis.asp 
 105
section of the energy ecosystem focusing on accelerating grid modernization and the en-
ergy Internet of Things through policy, education, and promotion of interoperability and 
standards to empower customers and enable a sustainable energy future.” 6 While the 
notion that efficiencies will not only benefit utilities and technology companies, but also 
the public has been around since the early provisions of the EISA 2007, a renewed inter-
est in making appeals to cost and convenience benefits to consumers. Discourse in IEEE 
publications, in EPRI’s Publications, and in industry journals, has turned to embrace 
these notions of consumer empowerment (see discourses of economy below).  
Environmental benefits of efficiency have also been discussed by groups such as 
the Environmental Defense Fund and the National Resources Defense Council.  But the 
primary benefits of smart grid improvements for carbon dioxide emissions, climate 
change, and environmental pollution are discussed in the smart grid’s potential to help 
consumer save energy and increase energy efficiency: “The smart grid can reduce CO2 
emissions primarily by helping customers use less electricity, and in some cases by shift-
ing demand away from peak periods, reducing the need for utilities to bring extra power 
plants on line that emit CO2 and other pollutants” (Succar and Cavanagh 2012, 4). Simi-
larly, EDF focused on how many of the environmental benefits of the smart grid are real-
ized through consumption changes via dynamic pricing programs, more efficient smart 
technologies, and opening electricity markets to competition and entrepreneurs (EDF 
2016b; EDF 2016a) 
                                                 
6 See http://www.sgip.org/about-us/organization-purpose/ 
 106
And certainly these environmental benefits are welcome! Strategies to reduce 
consumption are necessary components of a sustainability transition. Smart grids enable 
greater integration of renewables, but dominant discourse strands from environmental 
groups tend to focus on efficient use of energy. This places responsibility for environ-
mental change on consumers, and suggests utilities are too staid, rigid, and not responsive 
enough to achieve the goals of environmental protection and climate change mitigation 
and adaptation.  
 While industry groups, utilities, and non-profits highlighted efficiency benefits of 
the smart grid, the White House, Congress, and National Labs all touted these benefits 
louder and with more force. On October 26, 2009, President Obama traveled to Arcadia, 
Florida to celebrate the largest solar power plant in the nation. Florida Power and Light’s 
plant was celebrated by President for its contribution to growing the economy and reduc-
ing the carbon impacts of electricity production. But, he also remarked that the electric 
grid was old, inefficient, and susceptible to blackouts and outages. He compared the re-
building of the electric grid to the building of the US system of interstate highways, a 
massive investment that reinvented the way people travelled the country. It would sup-
port economic growth through jobs and industry and at the same time save customers 
money on their utility bills.  It was on this day that President Obama also announced, as a 
part of the Recovery Act, the largest ever investment in a “stronger, smarter, and more 
secure electric grid,” totaling 3.4 billion dollars. Investment in “recovery” also meant 
“strengthening, smartening, and securing” the nation. The smart grid, thus, was a national 
project for reinvigorating the US economy through the stimulation of a clean energy 
economy. 
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What is surprising, however, is how President Obama didn’t focus so much on the 
technical specifics of how the grid was getting safer, more reliable, or more secure, but 
rather the benefits this posed to customers of utilities. He didn’t focus on smart trans-
formers, sensors or grid operations, but rather he focused on smart meters and consumer 
benefits.  
[Smart meters] will help you greatly improve the energy efficiency in your 
own home. ... Smart meters will allow you to actually monitor how much 
your family is using by the month, by the week, by the day, or even by the 
hour. Coupled with other technologies, this is going to help you manage 
your electricity use and your budget at the same time. Allowing you to 
conserve electricity during times when prices are highest, like hot summer 
days.  
President Obama described the transition to a clean energy economy as a desirable 
future, but also a contested and uncertain one, a future that would require substantial 
change by individuals and the incumbent energy regimes. Promises of the modernization 
of the electric grid and the demonstration projects he championed meant a “continuation 
of that long march of progress in this country, and we refuse to believe our politics are 
too broken to meet this challenge” (infomisa 2016). Efficiency coincided with a discourse 
of technological modernization and progress that “determined” social progress as well.  
The smart grid needed to prove its efficiency as hype and speculation grew in the 
broader discourse. Many of the claims for efficiency were met with new social expecta-
tions for the smart grid: that it could be more responsive to customer needs, more relia-
ble, more efficient, cleaner, integrate more renewable energy, and be more resilient 
against severe weather. To meet some of these growing expectations, a considerable fo-
cus on demonstration projects was established with the Recovery Act funds. Prioritization 
of delivery on various promises created tensions between various actors in the smart grid, 
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as some wanted more focus on renewable energy integration while others wanted more 
focus on market liberalization, for example.  
Although there was considerable discussion and tension, in the 2011 “A Policy 
Framework for the 21st Century Grid,” plan was laid out that put priorities into place, 
with a focus on boosting a clean energy economy and creating of new jobs while “em-
powering consumers” and reducing carbon dioxide emissions (seemingly in this order). 
The policy framework “promotes cost-effective investment, fosters innovation to spur the 
development of new products and services, empowers consumers to make informed deci-
sions with better energy information, and secures the grid against cyber attacks” (Chopra, 
Kundra, and Weiser 2011, 1). As technical and economic efficiencies were touted from 
Capitol Hill, the growing concern of security also began to take hold in smart grid dis-
course revealing another tension in smart grid implementation.  
3.4.3 Security: Smart grid as a mechanism to secure critical infrastructure for 
human well-being 
Growing concerns of cybersecurity had started as early as 1988, recognizing the 
increasing role of computers in grid operation. In the wake of terrorist attacks at the 
World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995, President Clinton 
ordered a study of critical infrastructure(Slayton 2013). This spurred numerous studies by 
industry groups such as EPRI and the National Research Council. After Sept 11, the work 
exploded significantly, claiming smart and intelligent solutions were to be the most im-
portant changes in combating cyberattacks. The Department of Homeland Security had 
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been given responsibility over critical infrastructure protection, not FERC, and it had no 
authority over private-sector changes.  
Cybersecurity is seen both as a strength of the smart grid, and a possible weak-
ness. As the smart grid is implemented, new sensors and networks are designed to be 
more secure, yet at the same time, provide more access to the network through various 
internet enabled devices (Kurada, Dhanhal, and Venkatesh 2014). In 2012, Televent, a 
large smart grid company owned by Schneider Electric released a notice that their net-
works had been breached by hackers who installed malicious software and accessed pro-
ject files for SCADA systems used to control the power grid (Zetter 2012). Coupled with 
attacks on the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, President Obama 
issued an executive order (EO13636) for increasing critical infrastructure cybersecurity. 
This led to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework that was “created through collaboration 
between government and the private sector, uses a common language to address and 
manage cybersecurity risk in a cost-effective way based on business needs without plac-
ing additional regulatory requirements on businesses” (NIST 2014, 3). Critical infrastruc-
ture Protection is part of the work of DHS and NERC. NERC established CIP standards 
for electric power systems and FERC mandates NERC Compliance (as established in the 
EPA of 2005).  
Experts on the smart grid highlight the security tradeoffs with goals for economic 
growth (Amin 2008; Amin 2002; Amin 2004). As Amin (2004, 31) notes, “[the electrici-
ty] network has evolved without formal analysis of the system-wide implications of this 
evolution, including its diminished transmission and generation shock-absorber capacity 
under the forces of deregulation, the digital economy, and interaction with other infra-
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structures.” Security issues already were of concern with smart grid applications in 2004, 
when terrorist activities were of great concern, and multiple vulnerabilities were being 
explored for repair and reconfiguration. These also reflected public concerns over “cyber-
terrorism” and more general terrorist attacks on vital infrastructures.  
But the security of the grid also relates to its reliability and protection from ex-
treme weather events and other external pressures.  In the wake of Superstorm Sandy 
which create extended blackouts in Manhattan and billions of dollars in “lost output and 
wages, spoiled inventory, delayed production, inconvenience and damage to grid infra-
structure” cast the light on an “aging” grid with the oft-cited statistic that it has been built 
over the last one hundred years (Council of Economic Advisers and US Department of 
Energy 2013).  In addition, the DOE highlighted multiple vulnerabilities resulting in de-
creases in plant efficiency, reduction in available generation, and increased risk to inland 
and coastal facilities, while demands for heating and cooling would increase (Zamuda et 
al. 2013).  Likewise, the Union of Concerned Scientists cautioned that “unless we reduce 
global warming emissions and mitigate the worst effects of climate change, the need for 
costly adaptation measures will only grow”(Davis and Clemmer 2014, 9). One common 
effort to make grids more resilient is to bury power lines, but this is a costly endeavor that 
would likely require rate increases for customers (Short 2016). This again positions secu-
rity concerns against economic efficiency.   
 In addition to the concerns over securing networked infrastructures from climate 
change and weather, there is a parallel concern on geopolitical security through energy 
independence. While this discourse was stronger during President George W. Bush’s 
term, there is still considerable effort at securing the US supply of energy through a tran-
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sition to an electrified transportation system made possible by smart grid technologies. 
The EISA of 2007 made this a goal and policy of the nation, and political discourse has 
continued to support “independence” variably from “foreign oil” and for individuals will-
ing to be isolated from the electric grid (Hertzog 2013; Murray 2014; Lacey 2015).   
3.4.4 Economy: Helping customers save money 
President Obama’s charge for a clean energy economy under the Recovery Act of 
2009 championed the economic benefits of an American energy transition, one that like 
ecological modernization discourses, promised both economic and environmental im-
provements (Hajer 1995). President Obama remarked about the ARRA funds earmarked 
for smart grid development in 2009:  
We’ll fund a better, smarter electricity grid and train workers to build it – 
a grid that will help us ship wind and solar power from one end of this 
country to another. Think about it. The grid that powers the tools of mod-
ern life – computers, appliances, even blackberries – looks largely the 
same as it did half a century ago. Just these first steps toward modernizing 
the way we distribute electricity could reduce consumption by 2 to 4 per-
cent.7 
Two issues about President Obama’s remark are poignant. What caught my eye 
was the way his phrasing makes it seem that smart grid development inevitably leads to 
reduced consumption. This suggests that smart technologies enable and indeed guarantee 
some sort of reduction in demand. The experience of energy efficiency industry suggests 
that technological change does not automatically lead to reduced consumption 
                                                 
7 President Barack Obama, “Remarks of President Barack Obama: Promoting the Recovery Plan with Sec-
retary Chu”, February 5, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/02/05/serious-about-energy-
independence 
 112
(Lutzenhiser 2014). Certainly technologies enable new forms of energy consumption, 
control, management, etc., but they do not guarantee people will use them as intended, 
nor does it prevent the dreaded “rebound effect.”  This phrasing obfuscates the centrality 
of consumption behavior, and the larger issues of cultural and societal expectations, con-
ventions, and norms, which create the context for energy demand. The second issue re-
lates to the way President Obama’s vision, although quite broad, highlighted how he en-
visioned the smart grid as a “modernization” project, freeing the US electric industry 
from its technological stasis in the late 20th century (Hirsh 2003). The discourse mirrored 
the language of post-war electrification associated with grand visions of progress. Obama 
was hoping to create economic growth and innovation, a “new new deal.”8 As Grunwald 
(2012) explains, “the smart grid seemed perfect, a modern moon mission, a 21st century 
version of the interstates.”  
It is worth considering the central role of economic collapse in the heightened at-
tention to smart grid development. After the mortgage crisis, economic stagnation and 
recession created a deafening and disheartening decline. Marked by responses of massive 
layoffs, austerity measures from local governments, and sharp decreases in housing val-
ues, the national government and politicians across the partisan aisle sought solutions. 
One area that promised to boost the economy was the ecological modernization agenda of 
clean-tech solutions. Alternative energy and smart grid solutions became the saving grace 
                                                 
8 Greenwald’s 2012 book, A New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in the Obama Era shows how 
the smart grid project for Obama was about getting the US out of a heap of economic trouble following the 
Great Recession of 2007-8 and its legacy years on. A short glimpse of the smart grid aspects of this book 
are available in a Time article by Greenwald at http://business.time.com/2012/07/26/obamas-smart-
electrical-grid-plan/. 
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for venture capitalists. As venture capitalists funded startups and established companies 
from Solyndra and Solar City, to Tesla and Opower, the distributed technologies of the 
smart grid were subject to financial speculation as new financial products were created to 
aid development and investment in these firms.  
From solar panels and associated hardware, to electric vehicles and energy stor-
age, and energy efficiency programs, a large part of smart grid innovation was subject to 
the variability and risk of venture capital. In many sectors, this led some of the “thought-
leaders” to look towards the microcomputer and digital tech worlds for precedence.  The 
term “disruption” often leads discussions of innovation and market opportunity. The story 
goes something like this: utilities are encountering a threat to their existing business 
models as distributed generation technologies electric vehicles, LED lights, and energy 
storage technologies “disrupt” the $300 billion electricity market in the US. This presents 
an opportunity for investors to ride the wave of technological change, making great sums 
of money while helping the environment.  
Even as investors position the old and failing grid as an investment opportunity, a 
way to make returns and profit, a blank slate for rebuilding our relationship to energy, we 
are encountering a hurdle. And it’s not just technical. The move towards the smart grid 
has positioned the “social” front and center. Consumer/customer engagement, consumer 
behavior, and consumer empowerment have overtaken parts of the smart grid agenda. 
New utility departments focused on customer relations, outreach, and engagement have 
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been appended to billing departments, often offering customer additional services.9 As 
the “social” is positioned as a key to smart grid development and success, new ways of 
managing the so-called “social element” has failed to take a more nuanced understanding 
beyond individual behavior change. Studies of behavior change fail to understand the 
broader social, political, and cultural context that shapes energy demand (Moezzi and 
Janda 2014; Lutzenhiser 1993; Shove 2010). Instead, they take only economic or envi-
ronmental concerns as factors that influence individual decision-making.   
For example, the smart grid research lead by the Department of Energy and na-
tional labs conducted a series of “consumer behavior studies” in numerous demonstration 
project locations: from Detroit to Sacramento.  In Vermont, for example, the Transco 
eEnergy Project was a collaboration between 11 publicly and investor-owned utilities that 
implemented smart grid technologies on the transmission, distribution, and end-use areas 
of the grid. The consumer behavior study investigated the impacts of time-of-use and 
peak-time rebate programs utilizing customer web portals and in-home displays 
(Bleything et al. 2015).  The study saw as its major question, “What influence do chang-
ing electricity prices have on residential utility consumers?” (Bleything et al. 2015, 5).  
In their variable peak pricing events, customers were notified of upcoming chang-
es in price, and findings suggest customers were responsive in the summer and spring 
(and less so in the winter) but they also noted uncertainty of perceived benefits. Custom-
ers reported saving money was their primary reason for participating in the program 
                                                 
9 Two important elements here: (1) organizational change to address growing importance of customer en-
gagement, and (2) transition to energy services rather than purely commodity or a singular service. 
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(Bleything et al. 2015, 48). Similarly, a study in FirstEnergy’s Ohio Territory (conducted 
by EPRI) described their study focus was “to quantify how residential customers respond 
to a monetary inducement (Peak Time Rebate (PTR)) to reduce load during pre-specified 
hours (events) with a day’s advance notice” (Neenan 2013, iii).  
Referencing the successes of industrial and commercial demand response pro-
grams using similar “treatments” (or technological interventions or pricing events), this 
study highlighted that residential applications of demand response programs utilizing 
programmable communication thermostats (such as Nest) and in-home displays coupled 
with PTRs produced statistically significant responses (reductions) but with many cave-
ats. These include rebound-effects of increases usage after event pricing, “event fatigue” 
which indicated less response over time as the summer progressed, and small or no re-
duction in total daily energy usage on days with pricing events (Neenan 2013, 6–3). 
In general, the DOE’s approach to consumer behavior studies focuses on econom-
ic or rate-based treatments for demand response including time-of-use pricing, variable 
peak pricing, and peak time rebates (Table 3). These are made possible by the rollout of 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), which enables data collection, storage, trans-
mission, and communication to consumers and utilities at intervals ranging from one to 
sixty minutes. As the DOE explains, “By introducing more dynamic rates and providing 
customers with more detailed information about their usage patterns, AMI provides cus-
tomers with an incentive to invest in control technologies that can make it easier for them 
to change their consumption patterns with real and predictable impacts on their overall 
electricity bills” (US Department of Energy 2011, 2).  
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Table 3: Rate schedules for demand response10 
Programs Description Participation 
Time of Use Pric-
ing 
Broad blocks of hours are given specif-
ic rates which are predetermined and 
constant (e.g. 6 hour peak vs. non 
peak). 




Prices vary when utilities are stressed 
and they trigger a response event (e.g. 
summer between 3pm and 6pm on a hot 
day). Prices and duration may be prede-
termined or not. 




Prices are updated on an hourly basis 
based on market costs. 
Voluntary response or 
automated response to 
price signals through 




Similar to TOU, blocks of hours are 
predetermined, however, prices fluctu-
ate based on market and utility condi-
tions 
Voluntary response or 
automated response to 
price signals through 




Critical events are predicted and denot-
ed and price remains the same, but cus-
tomers are given a rebate at a predeter-
mined outcome for energy conserved 
compared to historical or utility ex-
pected consumption 
Voluntary response or 
automated response to 
price signals through 
opt-in programs and 
smart appliances 
 
Smart meter and user control technologies enable a new regulatory regime of dy-
namic pricing, which has been discussed in utility commissions and regulatory agencies 
across the country over the last decade (and longer) (Hausman and Neufeld 1984; 
Faruqui and Malko 1983; Faruqui and Sergici 2010). A key issue is economic recovery of 
investment in AMI for utilities which claim operational benefits are not enough, and in-
                                                 
10 See https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/time_based_rate_programs.html for more definitions.  
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stead need benefits from peak demand reductions which can drastically reduce the cost of 
power at those times (from “peaker plants”). As such, demand response from the residen-
tial sector is a key component of making an economic argument for utilities to implement 
smart grid technologies (such as AMI).  
Consumer behavior studies thus presented a key area of research for smart grid 
implementation. In the smart grid ARRA funding (of more than 3.4 billion dollars), the 
DOE “encouraged applicants to propose [consumer behavior] studies and collect hourly 
load and customer demographic data for investigating AMI and its ability to integrate 
pricing and customer systems to accomplish changes in the electricity usage and behavior 
of consumers”(US Department of Energy 2011, 3). Differences amongst “market seg-
ments” would need to be investigated: “Advanced metering infrastructure provides the 
opportunity to expand a utility’s offering of time-based rate programs for electricity, po-
tentially changing customer behavior through the interaction of pricing mechanisms, 
technology, and information systems in the home”(US Department of Energy 2011, 5). 
These ideas were also carried out in a number of other campaigns aimed towards educa-
tion of the general public on the smart grid, and through different technological competi-
tions (Green Button, Apps for Energy, etc.).   
In the former, the US DOE “brought knowledge to power” (the Foucauldian met-
aphor here is too strong to pass) with the Smart Grid Book with aims to “acquaint non-
technical yet interested readers about: the existence of, and benefits accruing from, a 
smarter electrical grid; what the application of such intelligence means for our country; 
how DOE is involved in helping to accelerate its implementation”(US Department of 
Energy 2016b, i). With allusions to “killer apps,” the way email changed our lives, and 
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the colossal project of the interstate highway system, this introduction implies technolog-
ical progress determines social change that will result in better social outcomes. The re-
port communicates risks of rising demand, power reliability requirements, and the strug-
gles of infrastructure to “keep up” with the digital economy. And it positions the smart 
grid as “an enabling machine” for EVs, renewable energy, energy storage, green build-
ings, and importantly, a “new era of consumer choice” (US Department of Energy 2016b, 
15). The report also details the way the smart grid transforms consumers’ relation to en-
ergy and introduces a new form of economic management and responsibility on the part 
of consumer for the electric grid and their “home”: 
For most consumers, energy has long been considered a passive purchase. 
After all, what choice have they been given? The typical electric bill is 
largely unintelligible to consumers and delivered days after the consump-
tion actually occurs – giving consumers no visibility into decisions they 
could be making regarding their energy consumption. However, it pays to 
look at electric bills closely if for no other reason than this; they also typi-
cally include a hefty “mortgage payment” to pay for the infrastructure 
needed to generate and deliver power to consumers. A surprisingly sub-
stantial portion of your electric bill – between 33% – 50% – is currently 
assigned to funding our “infrastructure mortgage,” our current electric in-
frastructure. This item is non-negotiable because that infrastructure – 
power plants, transmission lines, and everything else that connects them – 
must be maintained to keep the grid running as reliably as it does. In fact, 
the transmission and distribution charge on the electric bill is specifically 
for infrastructure. With demand estimated to double by 2050 – and more 
power plants, transmission lines, transformers and substations to be built – 
the costs of this “big iron” will also show up on your bill in one way or 
another. (The only difference this time is that global demand for the iron, 
steel, and concrete required to build this infrastructure will make these 
commodities far costlier; in fact, the cost of many raw materials and grid 
components has more than tripled since 2006.) (18) 
In addition to this threat of rising utility bills, the DOE explains that consumers 
are going to benefit from smart grid implementation, and they are going to help the grid 
in a collective sense. Paradoxically, this “collective” sense of maintaining the grid is real-
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ized through changes in individual consumption habits and choice.  President Obama 
remarked in his Policy Framework that “[E]very institution and every household has to 
start thinking about how are we reducing the amount of energy that we’re using and do-
ing it  in more efficient ways” (Chopra, Kundra, and Weiser 2011).  
The role of consumers is to be connected  
by means of the right price signals and smart appliances, for example – a 
smarter grid can reduce the need for some of that infrastructure while 
keeping electricity reliable and affordable. [...] By enabling consumers to 
automatically reduce demand for brief periods through new technologies 
and motivating mechanisms like real-time pricing, the grid remains relia-
ble – and consumers are compensated for their help. [...] Ultimately, tap-
ping the collaborative power of millions of consumers to shed load will 
put significant brakes on the need for new infrastructure at any cost. [...] 
Consumers are advocating for choice in market after market, from telecom 
to entertainment. Already comfortable with the concept of time-
differentiated service thanks to time-dependent cell phone rates and airline 
fares, it follows that they just might want insight and visibility into the en-
ergy choices they are making, too. Enabled by Smart Grid technology and 
dynamic pricing, consumers will have the opportunity to see what price 
they are paying for energy before they buy – a powerful motivator toward 
managing their energy costs by reducing electric use during peak periods. 
Currently, recognition of the time-dependent cost of energy varies by re-
gion. In areas where costs are low and specialized rates to this point non-
existent, there is little interest or economic incentive on the part of the 
consumer to modify usage or even think about energy having an hourly 
cost. In California, on a hot afternoon, consumers are well aware of the 
possibility of a blackout driven by peak demand and familiar with adjust-
ing their energy usage accordingly. [...]At the residential level, Smart Grid 
must be simple, “set-it-and-forget-it” technology, enabling consumers to 
easily adjust their own energy use. Equipped with rich, useful information, 
consumers can help manage load on-peak to save money and energy for 
themselves and, ultimately, all of us. (US Department of Energy 2016, 19-
20)   
This characterization of the consumer role in the smart grid captures several is-
sues. The first, which stems from the prior quote suggests a logic of dependence paradox-
ically positioned against control and responsibility. While there is a growing cost of the 
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“infrastructure mortgage,” consumers are supposed to contribute to solutions by reducing 
peak period consumption. Another key tension is pronounced here in the provision of 
information and consumer awareness and incentive to change behaviors against a logic of 
“set-it-and-forget-it” technological automation. While the desire for an informed and ac-
tive consumer is detailed and made “real” through dynamic pricing, there is concern that 
consumers will not care enough to change with rhythms of the market. Thus, a logic of 
automation and control away from consumers is desirable.  
Underlying these notions of consumer change is an economic understanding of 
energy consumption habits. In the findings of these studies, the DOE reported that smart 
meters “require customers to ‘climb learning curves’ that require extensive communica-
tion and education” (US Department of Energy 2014, iv). This implies normalization of 
smart technologies is needed for their success in reducing peak demand and enabling 
further innovations. But this process of normalization also carries specific logics, eco-
nomic and managerial. Similarly, in programs such as the popular Green Button – an ini-
tiative of the Obama Administration facilitated through the Smart Grid Interoperability 
Panel to work with utilities, technology companies, and entrepreneurs to develop private-
sector online tools for providing customers information on energy use.  
Armed with that information, consumers can use a growing array of new 
web and smartphone tools to make more informed energy decisions, opti-
mize the size and cost-effectiveness of solar panels for their home, or veri-
fy that energy-efficiency retrofit investments are performing as promised. 
Consumers can even use fun innovative apps that allow individuals to 
compete against Facebook friends to save energy and lower their carbon 
emissions. (US Department of Energy 2016a) 
Green Button provides open data for app developers and utilities alike. The focus 
is on data provision and catering to influence and shape the behavior of consumers. 
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Green Button has brought together federal agencies (e.g. NIST, DOE), industry groups 
(e.g. Association for Demand Response and Smart Grid (ADS)), utilities (e.g. Austin 
Energy, SDG&E, PG&E, etc.), and technology companies (e.g. Itron, Tendril, Comverge, 
etc.) to “empower residential consumers to better manage their electricity consumption 
by allowing them and authorized third parties access to their electricity usage information 
on demand through a standardized data access architecture” (US Department of Energy 
2016a). Similarly, Itron, a giant in the smart metering industry, released a press statement 
on the Green Button in which the President and CEO, Leroy Nosbaum was quoted: "Itron 
is deeply committed to changing the way energy is managed by providing tools to em-
power consumers who want to control their energy usage and costs. [...] With a modern-
ized grid and engaged consumers, we aim to achieve broad societal, environmental and 
financial benefits and help build a sustainable future" (S. Moore 2012).  
Other companies, smaller startups like Tendril, for example, offer energy man-
agement apps and services that help utilities “succeed in the Age of the Customer, 
[where] what matters most is user experience. Look no further than the taxi industry, 
which Uber has completely upended with its mobile app and its focus on simplicity for 
the consumer” (Tendril 2016, 3). The proliferation of digital technologies, on-demand 
services, and smartphone ease of access is forecast to alter social expectations about en-
ergy utilities as well. The customer no longer is passive, but active, informed, and en-
gaged. The discourse of empowerment captures this trend, but does so in the context of 
energy management. Empowerment here refers to the ability to control consumption, to 
manage the household activities that consume energy, and to renegotiate social practices 
around price signals and other utility cues.  
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The Environmental Defense Fund utilizes a similar discourse to describe the smart 
grid and demand response possibilities of consumer engagement. By quoting former 
FERC Chairman, Jon Wellinghoff, saying “Demand response is clearly the ‘killer appli-
cation’ for the smart grid,” and emphasizing the way demand response enables consumer 
to “take control over their energy use and lower their electricity bills,” EDF highlighted 
the role of consumer empowerment and technologies for engaging consumers in protect-
ing the environment (EDF 2014). The US EPA, likewise, explained that the smart grid 
can also be a “green grid,” but this depends largely on consumer behavior: 
Many of the benefits of a smart grid come from expected changes in con-
sumer behavior.  However, it is difficult to accurately predict how cus-
tomers will react to price signals. It is possible that customers may not 
change their electricity demands much, even when faced with different 
prices at different times of the day. [...] If customer demand is not notably 
affected, then the costs of smart grid implementation may outweigh the 
benefits. Putting into place proper, complementary policies (such as fund-
ing broader programmatic efforts to educate and encourage customers to 
save energy and adopting fair rates and interconnection standards for dis-
tributed generation) are therefore critical for successful implementation of 
a smart grid. (US EPA 2011, 6) 
The utility industry had similar concerns with the notion that “consumers don’t 
understand that it costs more to produce electricity at peak times,” suggesting their lack 
of education and understanding are barriers to smart grid implementation (Spencer and 
Vadari 2009, 49). Digital technologies, information, and education – “knowledge” dis-
semination – is seen as a key component of smart grid success (Vadari 2009; Durand 
2013; Ockwell 2016; Casey and Jones 2013; Chassin 2010; Hledik 2014). Consumer em-
powerment is the vehicle to communicate and spread this knowledge. Programs have 
been designed to be more passive, or more active (Table 4), playing on different types of 
consumer “segments”: “innovators” who are tech savvy, “early adopters” who are opin-
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ion leaders for their social networks, “early majority”, a “late majority”, and laggards 
(Spencer and Vadari 2009; Pedersen, Hydro, and Authority 2008). Rate designs accom-
pany these different approaches, which poses issues for equity and fairness. 
Table 4: General types of user participation in industry discourse 
Programs Activities Technologies Outcomes 














ing on utility bills 
or through apps or 
texts 
Consumer behav-
ior change possible 
(early adopters)  
Passive/Enabling 
Incentives to 
change behavior or 
technology 
HEMS, GreenBut-













“Set and forget” 
approach where 
utilities control 
tech (late majority) 
 
 New interest groups with industry partners have been formed specifically around 
consumers in the smart grid (i.e. the Smart Grid Consumer Collaborative), while staid 
consumer advocacy and privacy groups have made a presence in smart grid discussions 
(e.g. Electric Privacy Information Center). The Smart Grid Consumer Collaborative was 
formed through a group of companies and organizations including GE, IBM, Silver 
Spring Networks, the GridWise Alliance, NREL, and others in March 2010. The purpose 
and mission of the organization was to boost consumer acceptance for the smart grid 
(Price and Thomson 2009; Price 2010). The organization continues to do advocacy, plan-
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ning and policy work, addressing consumer needs that correlate with smart grid imple-
mentation. 11  
There is an inherent tension here between consumer protection, for privacy and 
other data security concerns, and consumer education and awareness. This is represented 
in the different discourses and issues as discussed by different consumer advocacy 
groups. For example, the SGCC focuses on “consumer empowerment” and “value propo-
sitions” to the consumer, while EPIC focuses on the collection and use of data for infor-
mation provision (i.e. “empowerment”) programs and concerns over privacy and security. 
While facilitated by the same technological intervention, the technical bits of how data 
management and who manages data, for example, are still to be worked out in a contested 
sociotechnical domain.  
3.4.5 Summary of discourse analysis 
This discourse analysis revealed three rationalities and associated techniques and 
imagined subjects that form a specific form of governmentality in the smart grid. This 
governmentality attempts to render electricity system issues technical, in a “will to im-
prove,” as Li (2007b, 7) suggests, that directs knowledge and action to address particular 
problematizations.  
First, the electricity system is problematized as inefficient, or at least not as effi-
cient as it could be. The discussion of efficiency above highlighted the way new smart 
technologies enable more efficient production, transfer, and consumption of electricity, 
                                                 
11 See http://smartgridcc.org/  
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and at the same time, more efficient means of transacting electricity markets.  This is 
backed by a techno-economic episteme, understanding electricity as a strictly technologi-
cal system. New technologies enable the envisioning, monitoring, and identification of 
deficiencies in the system making them open and ready for change (creating the field of 
visibility). The notion of efficiency is also tied to the idea that governing electricity mar-
kets and technologies will result in better outcomes, less waste, lower cost, greater bene-
fits (telos).  
Efficiency is both the means and ends in this case. Techniques that enable greater 
efficiency include the implementation of ICTs for the smart grid, the regulatory space and 
coordination to allow for electricity markets, and the everyday practices of engineers and 
economists who utilize their expertise towards maximizing efficiency. The imagined sub-
jects and identities concerned with efficiency are not only engineers that privilege effi-
ciency over competing concerns (cybersecurity for example), but also particular publics 
who value market-led decision making over public regulation.  
Second, while most literature on energy security refers to geopolitics or cyberse-
curity (M. Amin 2008; Clastres 2011), here I mean security in the sense Foucault dis-
cussed related to security “apparatuses” in his lectures on governmentality. Security here 
refers to the rationalities of government, providing “security” for a particular population 
of governed subjects. Security as related to electricity system, then, considers electricity 
as a vital infrastructure for human well-being. Management of this critical infrastructure 
is dominated by the techno-economic episteme enacted as technological solutionism 
fueled by concerns over economic losses resulting from failures or blackouts.  Similar to 
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efficiency, then, the both the approach to governing and its telos are dominated by engi-
neering and economics that shape political discussion and governmental approaches.  
Here, however, the techniques differ because they refer to securitization. Whereas 
efficiency saw the technological benefits of ICTs and smart grid technologies as ways to 
improve processes for reduction of costs, the rationalities of security utilize techniques to 
maintain normal conditions, ensure reliable supply, and smooth demand. This implies, 
however, an imagined subject who participates in demand side schemes, either in volun-
tary programs, or in opt-out type forms of automation.  
Lastly, I highlighted the theme of economy. Here, again, a techno-economic epis-
teme shapes the field of visibility and the telos of government, but as a political rationali-
ty it is much aligned with Foucault’s discussion of neoliberal governmentality (Foucault 
2010). Here, the techniques are related with the economization of all aspects of life (W. 
Brown 2015), policies and technologies that enable price mechanisms to guide decisions 
of “active” consumers. As Brown (2015, 61) explains, “the distinctiveness of neoliberal-
ism, for Foucault, is that it ‘generalizes the economic form of the market’ or ‘generalizes 
the ‘enterprise’ form within the social body,’ producing an ‘economization of the entire 
social field.’”  
Techniques highlighted above include various forms of pricing, behavioral exper-
iments, consumer engagement, and public education. The notion of economy relates to 
self-regulation and enterprise, two concepts that Foucault explained were central to a 
neoliberal form of governmentality that places the imagined economic subject, homo 
oeconomicus, at its center. As such, homo oeconomicus, is created through the “idea and 
practice of responsibilization—forcing the subject to become a responsible self-investor 
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and self-provider—reconfigures the correct comportment of the subject from one natural-
ly driven by satisfying interests to one forced to engage in a particular form of self-
sustenance that meshes with the morality of the state and the health of the economy” 
(Brown 2015, 84). The rationality of economy, thus, places the conduct of populations 
towards using energy differently, in lines with the health of the grid system, as the proper 
or correct mode of conduct.  
Each of the governmental rationalities discussed above solidifies the smart grid 
not only as a sociotechnical system that is under transition or change, but a governmental 
program that seeks to “conduct the conduct” of energy consumers in lines with efficien-
cy, security, and economy.  
3.4.6 Review of findings 
This section has focused on the discourse of powerful smart grid actors at the na-
tional scale. These actors influence state and local level smart grid projects and imple-
mentation as funders, experts, and producers of discourse from positions of power. 
Through analysis of documents, texts, policies, speeches, websites, scholarly and industry 
journals, and media, I identified major discourse strands and grouped them around three 
primary analytical categories: efficiency, security, and economy.   
I found that the dominant discourse highlights technical and economic efficiencies 
in relation to security and economy benefits, while positioning consumer adoption, edu-
cation, and awareness as the major barrier to smart grid implementation. The result of this 
is a growing effort to educate and inform consumers, a discourse of “empowerment,” that 
focuses on energy savings through behavior change and technology adoption motivated 
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primarily by monetary gains (or cost savings). This discourse, and the smart technologies 
which make these programs possible, are utilized by an emergent governance regime that 
has moved beyond the utility-regulator model to involve a broader array of stakeholders 
in a utility- regulator- interest group model.  
While this shift signals greater consideration of the consumer, the dominant dis-
course explains a knowledge-power relationship that privileges economic, social psycho-
logical approaches to understanding consumer energy use behavior. These models have 
been critiqued for their lack of attention to larger structures of power. However, using a 
Foucauldian governmentality perspective, it is also clear that power operates in more 
diffuse and subtle ways, through knowledge and techniques and rationales of smart grid 
programs, compromising a form of governing the smart grid through economic, consum-
er subjects.  
3.5 Conclusion: The Smart Grid and Smart Consumer 
In this chapter, I presented a discourse analysis of major policy, regulatory, tech-
nical, media, and interest group texts. I highlighted several different promises of the 
smart grid, accompanying visions, and the discursive storylines that weave together vari-
ous actors, practices, technologies, and rules in a sociotechnical regime. The main argu-
ment of the chapter is that the discourse of the smart grid shapes the conceptions of do-
mestic energy consumption as a purely (or mostly) economic and individual activity, en-
acting governmental power to enable a governance regime that shapes the conduct of 
energy consumers.  
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I interpreted the discourse using an analytics of governmentality, describing the 
ways in which relations of power/knowledge are manifest through “technologies of gov-
ernment” to manage and control populations of economic subjects (homo oeconomicus). 
In this regard, I focused not only the control and governance of populations through the 
exercise of various forms of state power (biopower and biopolitical technologies) – 
through information provision, behavioral nudging, metrics, labels, and standards – and 
also on the central role of energy in the shaping of social action and political power. 
This analysis of governmentality aids in our study of sociotechnical transitions 
because it adds an important dimension of power, understanding how the transition to-
wards the smart grid is also part of a governmental program. This places emphasis on the 
rationalities, techniques and subjectivities, highlighted above, which enable and enact the 
governing of the conduct of energy consumers. As Li (2007a, 279) explains:  
a program is the goal to be accomplished, together with the rationale that 
makes it thinkable, and the associated strategies and techniques. In order 
to formulate a governmental program, the domain to be governed must be 
rendered technical, that is, represented "as an intelligible field with speci-
fiable limits and particular characteristics...whose component parts are 
linked together in some more or less systematic manner by forces, attrac-
tions and coexistences.” The relevant ensemble of population must be 
bounded, linked to a defined problem, and that problem linked again to an 
account of the mechanisms through which the problem can be addressed, 
the design for measures for evaluation and so on.  
Therefore, what I outlined above positions the smart grid as a governmental pro-
gram, one that has real impacts on the sociotechnical system of the smart grid. Yet, “real” 
impacts do not mean that the envisioned program is fully realized. Power operates and 
produces actual effects, but with limitations. As Li (2007a, 279) explains, programs are 
not determinant, they have “instabilities, fragilities, and fractures” that often create 
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grounds for “new programming.” This is particularly important in the context of soci-
otechnical transitions. Transitions depend on instabilities in regimes for niche innovations 
to be realized. These niche-regime dynamics, however, are influenced strongly by gov-
ernmental programs that attempt to shape the conduct of a population in line with particu-
lar rationalities of governance. This highlights a need for attention to the practices of eve-
ryday life in studies of sociotechnical transitions and further ethnographic study (Shove 
and Walker 2010).  
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4 Chapter 4: “A Living Lab for the Smart Grid”: Experimentation, Governmen-
tality, and Urban Energy Transitions 
4.1 Urban Living Labs and Smart Grids 
Cities are increasingly experimenting with smart grid technologies to simultane-
ously address climate change, environmental, economic, and sustainability concerns.  
Reconfiguring urban electricity systems to allow for more renewable energy integration, 
increased reliability, and new forms of consumer engagement have been seen as a vital 
ingredient for a smart, and low-carbon, energy transition. In attempts to govern energy 
transitions, sociotechnical interventions are being tested out in experimental venues 
where new knowledge can be gained on how cities are best to react to pertinent energy 
sustainability issues.  On the one hand, experimentation offers opportunities for radical 
alternatives and innovations, and on the other, it opens pathways for existing regimes to 
be further entrenched.  
In Austin, Texas, an urban smart grid experiment known locally as the Pecan 
Street Project, was developed as an urban living lab to demonstrate and learn from vari-
ous sociotechnical interventions. Fueled by local political leaders, a private-public part-
nership, and a national smart grid demonstration program (funding support), the Pecan 
Street Project created “the most innovative neighborhood” and the “world’s largest data-
base on customer energy use” (Frangoul 2015). By engaging environmentally concerned 
and/or technologically savvy residents of the Mueller neighborhood (and beyond) with 
incentives to adopt electric vehicles, solar panels, home energy management systems 
(HEMS) and numerous other smart technologies, Pecan Street was able to get considera-
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ble participation and access to collect fine-grained data on energy usage of consumers. 
This urban smart grid experiment has garnered attention from numerous city officials, 
technology companies, and researchers interested in the smart energy transition and all of 
its possible benefits, including “jolting up the green economy.”  
Urban smart grid projects, like this one, are being pursued as experiments that 
take place outside the normal processes of long-term planning and investment aimed at 
improving both physical and social infrastructures. In the face of stalled state and national 
action on climate change, cities have become key sites for the governance of energy tran-
sitions (Rutherford & Coutard, 2014; Rutherford & Jaglin, 2015). Urban energy govern-
ance, as Rutherford and Jaglin (2015, p. 174) note, refers to the “multitude of ways in 
which urban actors engage with energy systems, flows, and infrastructures in order to 
meet particular collective goals and needs, framed or expressed in policymaking process-
es, but also in debates, contestations, and conflicts over policy orientations, resources, 
and outcomes.” This definition suggests that urban energy governance does not only rest 
in official policy making procedures or contestations, but also in the various ways that 
urban actors interact with energy infrastructures.   
Urban living labs (ULLs) are one mode of experimentation. They are simultane-
ously modes of technological implementation in the “real-world,” forms of experimenta-
tion that facilitate learning and experiential knowledge production, and social arrange-
ments that interlink various actors from research and development to government and 
industry. ULLs are one particular mode of urban experimentation that facilitates action in 
a particular (often closed-off) place. The burgeoning literature and emergent policy atten-
tion to living labs suggests that they can serve not only as one-off projects for demonstra-
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tion, but sustained sociotechnical niches that help cities achieve goals for sustainability 
and low-carbon transition more broadly. At the same time, however, ULLs are often one-
off projects, mapping particular pathways and materializing visions, but not generative of 
systemic change.  
ULLs have been implemented to address a variety of challenges, especially relat-
ing to climate adaptation, urban sustainability, and more recently, “smart” technology. At 
the intersection of these challenges is the urban smart grid. The growth of smart city and 
smart grid projects has made integration of digital information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs) a prominent part of the urban electricity system (Marvin, Luque-Ayala, 
and McFarlane 2015; McLean, Bulkeley, and Crang 2015). Smart grids are being imple-
mented as a “necessary” part of a larger transition to “smart” urban infrastructures. The 
“smart city” has become a dominant trope for the future city arising in discrete places all 
over the globe.  Although the definition of smart is broad and discordant, there is consid-
erable purchase in the idea that smart urbanism is a necessary socio-technological pro-
gression for the cities we inhabit (Marvin, Luque-Ayala, and McFarlane 2015). The 
growth in smart city plans and projects, corporate models and businesses emerging 
around smart technologies and services, and the staggering figures on the projected value 
of smart cities markets point towards an established trend. For example, ARUP, a con-
sulting and engineering firm, estimated the value of “smart city solutions and additional 
services required for deploying them to be $408 billion by 2020” (ARUP 2013). With 
such tremendous investment potential, smart city advocates and companies are promoting 
transformative visions of urban futures riddled with techno-utopian fantasies and a whole 
array of smart city technologies and products for cities to test-out (Luque-Ayala and 
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Marvin 2015; Wiig 2015). These promises and fantasies are infiltrating the minds of 
powerful decision-makers in cities around the globe – from India’s 100 Smart Cities pro-
ject to the Smart London Plan.  
A dominant area of concern across comprehensive smart city projects is energy: 
the more efficient use of energy, integration of renewable energy, and a more robust and 
resilient energy system. The smart grid integrates ICTs with the electricity system to pro-
vide data on the use, distribution, supply, and demand of electricity on the electrical grid. 
Equipped with sensors, monitors, and internet-enabled digital communication devices, 
data circulates alongside electrons to provide information on outages, time-of-use, varia-
tions in loads, and energy consumption in fine-grained detail. But the smart grid is much 
more than an array of networked technologies. As Luque (2014, p. 160) explains, “the 
smart grid is an assemblage of networks, technologies, and users interacting through tele-
communications platforms. It is a socio-technical intervention that relies on utility net-
works, technological equipment and digital software as well as knowledge networks and 
an emerging set of user practices.” As a socio-technical intervention, smart grids offer a 
jumping off point for new relations of production and consumption, but also further in-
vestment and public buy-in for larger smart city projects including implementation of 
smart, networked technologies for transportation, environmental conditions monitoring, 
water, waste, government operations, etc.  
The urban smart grid project discussed in this chapter configures governance 
through experimentation (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013b; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 
2013a), utilizing the city as a place to experiment with different ways of implementing 
and governing smart grid technologies and infrastructures. But it also is an experiment in 
 135
changing the way energy users interact with energy infrastructures and consume energy. 
This chapter thus fills an empirical need to explicate how experimentation aims to recon-
figure everyday energy use through smart technologies utilizing theories of governmen-
tality.  
I start by discussing how ULLs are created materially and discursively as particu-
lar places – living laboratories, demonstrations, and test-beds. ULLs tend to focus heavily 
on demonstration and market-testing rather than radical changes or transitions towards 
low-carbon or socially just urban futures.  I then discuss the development of the smart 
grid experiment in Austin and how this experimentation facilitated demonstration and 
test-bedding approaches. This ‘governing by experiment’ relates to the broader political 
economy of urban development in the knowledge-based and high-tech economy of Aus-
tin.  I then explicate how smart grid experiments attempt to reconfigure the relationship 
that consumers have with energy systems. Using insights from governmentality studies, I 
argue that smart grid experiments rely on governing through “smart” subjects who re-
shape their energy consumption patterns in line with individual economic or environmen-
tal concerns. The discursive formation of smart subjects used to characterize and govern 
energy consumption limits our ability for innovative energy system changes that are sen-
sitive to the social context of consumption – meeting the demands of everyday urban life.  
Tying smartness to neoliberal forms of rationality paints the smart grid end-user as an 
entrepreneurial subject, wherein the practice of governance focuses on individual envi-
ronmental commitment motivated by reductions in energy costs, environmental egoism, 
or the acquisition of more sustainable technologies and products. This influences the de-
sign of ULLs, their practice, and the knowledge produced from their implementation.  
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4.2 Laboratorizing the City: A Smart Grid Experiment in Austin, Texas 
Claims that are true everywhere should come from nowhere in particular... Exper-
iments conducted in physical surrounds just like anyone else’s lab become “eve-
rybody’s” beliefs (Gieryn, 2008, p.798) 
For the world to become knowable, it must become a laboratory (Latour, 1999, p. 
43)  
4.2.1 Labs in, of, or for the city? 
Cities are increasingly made the node for experimentation with sociotechnical in-
terventions for sustainability and low-carbon transitions through living laboratories (Kö-
nig and Evans 2012), urban laboratories (Evans & Karvonen, 2013; Karvonen & van 
Heur, 2014), and urban living labs (Reimer et al. 2012; Voytenko et al. 2016). The con-
cept of the laboratory invokes the idea of a sterile, enclosed, and exclusive space for 
knowledge production wherein scientific experiments are run separate from society 
(Strebel and Jacobs 2014; Evans and Karvonen 2013; Gopakumar 2014; Heathcott 2005; 
T. F. Gieryn 2006; B. L. Allen 2011). But classic work in science and technology studies 
(STS) – especially laboratory studies in the late 1970s – examined and unpacked the 
“hard core” of scientific work: its technical content and the production of knowledge 
(Knorr-Cetina 1995). 12 These early studies showed how cultural and social process im-
pacted and shaped the work of scientists and “contaminated” the otherwise sanitized and 
purified scientific process.  
                                                 
12 See Latour, B. and S. Woolgar (1979) Laboratory life: the social construction of scientific facts. Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton, NJ; Lynch, M. (1985) Art and artifact in laboratory science: a study of 
shop work and shop talk in a research laboratory. Routledge, London.   
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The laboratory itself, as Knorr-Cetina (1995) posits, is an important theoretical 
notion in the social studies of science because it reveals “the power of locales in modern 
institutions and raise[s] questions about the status of ‘the local’ in modern society in gen-
eral.” At the same time, Livingstone (2003, p. 3) suggests that the laboratory is a privi-
leged place of knowledge production, where a concerted effort was made to create it as a 
“placeless place” to do scientific activities and where local contingency has no impact on 
those activities. A laboratory here is the same as a laboratory anywhere. This “placeless-
ness” was also key to securing the credibility and objectivity. The concept of placeless-
ness poses difficulties for ULLs, however, because they are situated in urban contexts 
which often have porous boundaries presenting a complex mix of endogenous and exog-
enous or environmental factors contributing to observed changes. At the same time, the 
place of an urban living lab tends to influence the legitimacy and credibility of 
knowledge claims within and about the city (Gieryn, 2006). For example, early Chicago 
School urban sociology used the city both as a field site—an uncorrupted reality—and a 
laboratory—a controlled environment providing the ability for generalizations true for 
other cities.  Living labs tend to draw on the virtues of both lab and field, wherein the city 
becomes both the object (what) and venue (where) of study, allowing multiple modes of 
inquiry to make “valid” claims while “creating a discursive situation in which location, 
geography and situated materialities get foregrounded as ratifiers of believability” 
(Gieryn, 2006, p. 28). Sites where knowledge claims are made about the efficacy of urban 
sustainability or low-carbon transitions have a bearing on how urban sustainability or 
low-carbon transitions are defined and legitimated. 
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4.2.2 Urban living labs and governance 
As a mode of governing urban sociotechnical systems, such as the smart grid, liv-
ing labs facilitate forms of experimentation that utilize place-based claims and claims to 
placelessness simultaneously. This central tension filters through the two modes of urban 
energy governance examined in this chapter: governing by experiment and governing 
through consumer-subjects. First, governing by experiment relies on place-based claims 
to demonstrate the efficacy of urban experiments, to provide material manifestations of 
possible futures, and to show how novel sociotechnical configurations work in the real-
world.  At the same time, knowledge generated from these experiments is supposed to be 
useful in other places, providing a real-world “truth-spot” that attests legitimacy of 
claims. The design and siting of the living lab are important political resources for giving 
authority to experiments and building momentum for transitions.  As Gieryn (2006, p.28) 
notes, “political pronouncements have different consequences when uttered from the 
street corner – or from the floor of an official parliamentary space.” So, while experimen-
tation may harness the radical contingency and messiness of cities, living labs provide a 
structured and politically powerful space for protecting and nurturing sociotechnical in-
terventions.  
Secondly, governing through smart subjects expresses a mode of governance tied 
to relations of power tied to the provision of information and proper conduct, building on 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality. Instead of using place or placelessness to support 
claims, ULLs use the discursive space of the “laboratory” to attempt to shape actions and 
behaviors through power relations, practiced primarily through discourse but also embod-
ied in technologies, or forms of political knowledge and rationality undergirded by ne-
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oliberal conceptions of homo oeconomicus, or economic man. Similar to Strengers (2013, 
p. 51) “resource man” – “a data-driven, information-hungry, technology-savvy home 
energy manager” – homo oeconomicus captures the subjectivity of energy users implied 
in many urban living lab strategies. The critical perspective of Foucauldian governmen-
tality helps us to locate and potentially confront this political rationality in urban smart 
grid experiments. 
At the same time, STS scholars show us how science and technology co-produce 
social orders and arrangements (Jasanoff, 2004a). In particular, technological systems 
generate certain forms of “user scripts” – sets of “normal” and acceptable use for various 
technologies – which govern the way people use technologies (Oudshoorn and Pinch 
2005). These technological inscriptions are of course contestable and open to change. 
Technologies have “interpretive flexibility” but often are locked-in over time (Bijker, 
Hughes, and Pinch 1987), becoming part of larger sociotechnical systems, sets of practic-
es, and political economic rationalities that make them resistant to change. As smart 
technologies are implemented in the context of ULLs, they configure particular sets of 
user practices normal and acceptable. In the smart grid, this is primarily concerned with 
energy conservation and the temporality of energy use. Modifications in use behavior are 
supposed to be achieved by persuading, nudging, or convincing through appeals to envi-
ronmental or economic rationalities. The epistemological approaches of social psycholo-
gy and economics influence these strategies of governing energy consumption – infor-
mation provision and enhanced control made possible by the use of smart grid technolo-
gies. Governmental logics and forms of expertise are solidified in smart grid technolo-
gies. 
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4.2.3 A living lab for the smart grid in Austin, Texas 
 




The City of Austin has been recognized as a leader in sustainability. Austin is 
known for an environmentalist ethos that emerged most prominently in the actions to 
preserve Barton Springs and the Edwards Aquifer during the 1970s and 80s, an issue that 
aligned various actors on two sides of a long-term environmental and political struggle 
(S. A. Moore, 2007). Since the early 1990s, the city has worked to tackle energy and cli-
mate issues through green building programs, energy efficiency strategies, and imple-
mentation of clean energy production. With the growth in Austin’s economy - focused on 
creative and tech industries – the city is positioned as a leader for innovation in clean tech 
and clean energy solutions. The large research university – the University of Texas (UT-
Austin) – has also positioned Austin as an important hub for knowledge-based industries, 
often leveraging university partnerships for research and development.  Austin’s organi-
zational structure of energy provision also helps to foster an engaged citizenry: Austin 
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has one of the largest municipal utilities in the nation, Austin Energy, responsible to Aus-
tin’s City Council. These characteristics of Texas’s most liberal and progressive city cre-
ated a favorable environment for the smart grid demonstration project implemented by 
Pecan Street, a 503 (c) non-profit research and development organization.    
The smart grid project, originally known as the Pecan Street Project, aimed to re-
search and learn from the implementation of various smart grid and smart home technol-
ogies – including solar panels, electric vehicles, various home energy management sys-
tems, smart meters, control and visualization technologies, and energy storage technolo-
gies – implemented in an urban neighborhood. The project started at the Mueller Devel-
opment - a private-public redevelopment project that commenced in 2004 on a nearly 
700-acre defunct airport base just three miles northeast of downtown Austin and the Uni-
versity of Texas.  The redevelopment project was a source of political contestation during 
development and more recently during disputes over affordability and density (Clark-
Madison 2002; King 2015; Reeves 2008). As the LEED certified neighborhood was cele-
brated for its sustainability, it was able to gain the political momentum needed for im-
plementation of the development plan. The “clean slate” of the new development project 
also served as an ideal location for the Pecan Street urban living lab project. As one in-
terviewee mentioned: 
Our research started here because it’s really easy for us to get involved 
with people when they are building homes. It started here because it was 
easy to get people, the equipment. We had our laboratory here... it’s easier 
when they are doing new construction to get some of these things put in. 
We knew they had good electrical service if we wanted to do any electri-
cal testing, you know things like batteries, EV level 2 chargers, its harder 
when you get into old homes, it costs a lot more.  (Pecan Street representa-
tive, Interview, October 2015).  
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The demands of the smart grid experiment, thus, required a physical infrastructure 
that was already “modernized,” or in this case, built from scratch. This included the de-
velopment of Austin Energy’s smart grid platform (Carvallo and Cooper 2015), new 
green-built homes, and Pecan Street’s own information and communications or smart 
grid network. In addition, to test various smart grid technologies, the research participants 
needed to acquire various smart grid technologies – everything from solar panels and 
electric vehicles to smart appliances and home energy management systems (HEMS) 
equipped with visualization and control technologies. The new development project in 
central Austin was the ideal location for this ULL also because it served as a way to re-
cruit participants for the research Pecan Street would conduct. As one of the studies 
based on the demonstration project describes it: “Mueller was selected as the test-bed for 
this research project because of its location, the relative uniformity of new homes, and the 
developer’s requirement to build energy efficient homes and buildings” (Rhodes et al., 
2014: 463).   
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Figure 9: Three dimensional model of Mueller PUD in the development offices on 
site. The right side of the model shows the planned residential area and are of future 
housing growth. Photo: Anthony M. Levenda. 
The living laboratory project started as a partnership with the University of Texas, 
the Mueller Development, the City of Austin, Austin Energy (the municipal utility), the 
Austin Technology Incubator and industry partners, led by the non-profit umbrella organ-
ization, Pecan Street Inc. Now known simply as Pecan Street, the organization has been 
leading research and implementation of smart grid technologies on “the consumer-side of 
the grid” (Pecan Street representative, Interview, October 2015).  The smart grid experi-
ment started as an “energy internet demonstration” project, spurred and supported by a 
Department of Energy Smart Grid Demonstration grant part of the larger American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009.  One of the key actors in the project de-
scribed the genesis of the project and explained its initial purpose and goals:  
That group came together and then, I acted as chairman of the group, and 
we applied for DOE grant that kicked us off with major funding. So we 
started working and focusing on the data acquisition and manipulation side 
of energy, energy efficiency, renewable energy, electric vehicles and so 
forth. And through the DOE grant we were able to take a new develop-
ment at the Mueller Airport site and focus on it. [...] Through that grant we 
were able to focus on a mass deployment of both electric vehicles and so-
lar, so we had the highest concentration of electric vehicles and solar in 
any neighborhood in the country. We were able to analyze the impact of 
that on the electric grid. And of course it’s a new grid out there the city put 
in, but we were able to show such things as how the electric vehicles, well 
we did electric vehicles initially and I was part of the group that got the 
automakers to build plug-in hybrids and such. One of the arguments we 
made for them was that there was plenty of capacity for the electric vehi-
cles because people would be charging at night. Well, we actually didn’t 
know that... [laughter] and if everyone was plugging in their vehicles and 
charging them in the afternoon, then that adds to the problem rather than 
relieving it. Fortunately, the research has shown the charging is spread out 
pretty evenly throughout and we were able to document that and show it. 
And we were also able to show that orientation of solar on the roof be-
tween south and west, and the benefit to the electric utility with a different 
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orientation and carry that forward, and we expanded from there. We have 
a very sophisticated data collection now, making it available to universi-
ties around the world, and curated data sets, and a lot of different re-
sources going on now. Because we are able to, we are about the only place 
able to get 15 second granularity of the data by circuit on this built infra-
structure, the home and such.  (Former Austin Energy Executive, Inter-
view, May 2016)  
As the interview quotation above suggests, the project was aimed at proving that smart 
grid technologies would allow integration of electric vehicles and distributed solar gener-
ation reliably. The data collected through the smart grid project also helped show the ef-
ficacy of interventions, with granularity providing greater insights.  By focusing on ener-
gy monitoring and data collection, Pecan Street’s database, analysis and sharing wiki, 
Dataport, the group has built a fundamental resource for energy research in smart grids. 
The dissemination of information via Dataport on energy consumption and production 
has influenced numerous lessons and possible research trajectories on energy manage-
ment both by consumers and utilities (inter alia Alahakoon & Yu, 2013; Ranganathan & 
Nygard, 2011). This ever-growing dataset is informing research on a variety of issues 
positioned as solutions for numerous energy and environmental problems (such as cli-
mate change) and technical problems for utilities (such as demand side management and 
peak load shaving). This focus has positioned this smart grid experiment as a place for 
learning about how to create a viable and profitable smart energy transition.  
4.3 Governing through Experimentation: Demonstration and Test-bedding 
Pressures to mitigate and adapt to climate change are necessitating and shaping 
urban transitions to sustainability. As actors and sites for transitions, cities have devel-
oped key strategic responses in the form of urban experiments with new policies and 
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technologies. Experiments are “purposive and strategic but explicitly seek to capture new 
forms of learning or experience... they are interventions to try out new ideas and methods 
in the context of future uncertainties serving to understand how interventions work in 
practice, in new contexts where they are thought of as innovative” (Castán Broto & 
Bulkeley, 2013: 93). They offer the “means through which discourses and visions con-
cerning the future of cities are rendered practical, and governable” (Bulkeley and Castan 
Broto, 2013b: 367). The way localities respond to and govern energy challenges such as 
climate change and sustainability are, in part, choreographed and mediated through the 
experimental landscapes and infrastructures of ULLs. Thus, ULLs not only require con-
sideration as spaces of knowledge production and innovation, but also as places where 
(the future of) cities are governed.  
ULLs entail different forms of experimentation that characterize and define the 
ULL itself. Although many scholars suggest that ULLs move beyond policy experiments 
or “protected” niche innovations, they also seem malleable enough to include protected 
sociotechnical niches, private sector-led test-beds, and technological demonstrations.  
Thus, ULLs may be thought of as experiments to carry out sociotechnical interventions 
and associated policies, demonstrations of particular technological systems carried out in 
real-world settings, or as test-beds or niches for testing out various technologies in con-
trolled settings. In many ways, the smart grid experiment carried out in Austin fits all of 
these definitions, suggesting the framing of the ULL and its various interventions is im-
portant to its broader impacts on urban (energy) governance.  
ULLs are not only aimed at guiding particular “experiments” but are experiments 
themselves. This disambiguation explains the difference between living labs as mere 
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hosts of technological interventions, and living labs as unique sociotechnical configura-
tions that promise learning and radical innovations in both social and technical realms. 
ULLs can be more formalized experiments, consisting of a “specific type of niche that is 
often created by university-led partnerships to emphasize the importance of knowledge 
production” (Evans and Karvonen, 2011: 415). And like many other ULLs they often 
simply provide a space for “testing existing forms of knowledge and technology” (Evans, 
2011: 225) in the context of the city.  
While experiments offer opportunities for learning and radical innovation, they al-
so may simply reinforce existing regimes. Experiments are often driven by the motiva-
tions of powerful actors – profit, a sense of urgency to act, a desire to expand authority 
and express ideologies. These are all clearly visible in the ways cities are responding in 
experiments, and in the visions they express discursively and manifest materially 
(Hodson and Marvin 2009a; While, Jonas, and Gibbs 2010). At the same time, experi-
ments can be exclusionary, technological “fixes” for issues that are inherently social and 
political, reflecting particular visions of powerful actors and interests reinforcing or creat-
ing new injustices (Swyngedouw 2011; While, Jonas, and Gibbs 2004). Experimentation 
offers opportunities to “open-up” the city for private investment and control of urban 
infrastructures. Fitting with the dominant form of neoliberal urban governance, governing 
through experiment aligns with the entrepreneurial role of local governments (T. Hall and 
Hubbard 1996; Davidson and Gleeson 2014; MacLeod 2002). As Harvey (1989: 5) ar-
gued, with the turn from managerialism to entrepreneurialism in urban governance, “in-
vestment increasingly takes the form of a negotiation between international finance capi-
tal and local powers doing the best they can to maximise the attractiveness of the local 
 147
site as a lure for capitalist development.” Opening up the city as a test-bed or a demon-
stration site for new smart technologies provides an opportunity to attract highly mobile 
capital. However, this may have “splintering” impacts in the city (Graham and Marvin 
2001) that create spaces of high-value while simultaneously excluding and marginalizing 
other spaces and communities.  
Numerous case studies and a plethora of literature supports this idea, understand-
ing local processes of globalization and urban development wherein the state becomes a 
facilitator rather than regulator of market processes leading to, for example, gentrification 
and displacement, privatization and financialization of infrastructures (Swyngedouw 
2004; Torrance 2008; Hackworth 2008; Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2009; Brenner 
2004). Similarly, entrepreneurial urban strategies and policies focused on creating spaces 
that can reproduce a system of accumulation have taken on sustainability and the urban 
environment as a central focus in order to clear new spaces for development and to neu-
tralize political opposition (While, Jonas, and Gibbs 2004; Davidson and Gleeson 2014). 
Under these “new environmental politics of urban development,” carbon reduction strat-
egies, such as implementation of low-carbon infrastructures, have profound implications 
for interurban competition and the practices of local governance and planning (Jonas, 
Gibbs, and While 2011; While, Jonas, and Gibbs 2010).  
In Austin, for example, the Mueller redevelopment project has been marred with 
the problematics of meeting and sustaining affordable housing requirements guaranteed 
in the original partnership and development agreement. This problematic stems from the 
Travis Central Appraisal District (TCAD) methods for taxation, appraising affordable 
housing at market rates, sometimes 100 percent over the purchase price (King 2015). 
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While the rising attention to the Mueller redevelopment as a model of sustainability has 
captured the attention of so-called new urbanists and sustainability officers of cities 
around the world, it has also contributed a growing unaffordable housing market and the 
correlated issue of greater displacement of communities of color in east Austin (Long 
2016).  
A representative of the development group involved with the project explained the 
conundrum of meeting the 25 percent affordable housing commitment referring to some 
of the technical details with appraisal and homeowners selling the affordable homes at 
market rates, and the nonprofit Mueller Foundation: 
The original buyer, in a lot of affordable housing programs, they are only 
required to stay in the home a year before they sell it, and they bought it at 
a controlled price, but they can sell it at market price and then get a wind-
fall which wasn’t what the city was trying to achieve. So the idea was how 
can you prevent that from happening, have people gain from the apprecia-
tion of the asset, and the investment and the responsibility they had, but 
reinvest that and keep the program going. Not lose that house into just a 
market value housing. So the foundation has, essentially, the first option to 
keep the house in the program and sell it to another affordable buyer so 
that way we imagine affordability will be here in the much longer term. 
(Catellus Development Representative, Interview, November 2015) 
While the affordability issue of “losing properties to the market” was battled with a non-
profit organization, the Mueller Foundation, considerable taxation increases based on 
market-rate appraisals were creating un-affordable conditions for many homeowners. The 
program’s commitment to a sustained affordable homes program is laudable, but the 
struggle to keep housing “off the market” will likely continue as the redevelopment pro-
ject continues to add new housing units into the future. And while many of the initial 
homeowners benefitted from the subsidies and tax breaks organized by the Pecan Street 
project, state government, and federal government, the access to smart grid technologies 
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(including EVs, PV systems, HEM systems, smart appliances, etc) may not reach the 
broad growing community of affordable homes buyers.  The affordability issues are not 
only tied to the improved infrastructure of the redevelopment and the technological inno-
vation spurred by the ULL project, but it also signals a larger trend in the political econ-
omy of Austin’s urban development with the creation of “ecological enclaves” for well-
off sustainability-minded citizens and urban “technological zones” for the testing and 
establishing network and connection standards for new ICT infrastructures (Barry 2006; 
Hodson and Marvin 2010c).  
A popular media story portrayed the Mueller development as a “masterwork of 
smart urban design,” a model for sustainable new-urbanism concepts in practice, and 
home to the smart grid demonstration project, but also highlighted several incidents at 
Mueller that illustrates the community’s struggles with racial segregation (Burnett 2015a; 
Burnett 2015b).  The problematic of inequality does not escape the settings of ULLs or 
urban experiments, and instead, the Mueller community highlights how the context of 
ULLs must be considered when conducting different sociotechnical interventions so that 
inequalities are not further reinforced.  
Mueller’s sustainability features also made the development particularly desirable 
for conducting research on smart grids and renewable energy. As a representative of the 
development group explained: 
On the sustainability front, the Pecan Street consortium, the community 
leaders, the City of Austin, the electric utility, the university, the signifi-
cant leaders in the commercial community were trying to look ahead at 
Austin’s future and talk about how do we manage the grid how do we as a 
utility better supply, but where do we find better energy options, they were 
trying to grapple with the future of electric and water utilities. So that 
group for at least two years before the DOE grant opportunities came up 
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were at work in the conceptual, lets have a vision about this, lets figure out 
something long-range because our community is going to need that and so 
the DOE was doing smart clean energy demonstration grants so that be-
came it was viewed as an opportunity to take this thinking about what the 
future could be and apply for a grant to really pursue what those alterna-
tives might be and to do what DOE was looking for which was demonstra-
tion projects. So they were evolving that thinking about what that would 
look like, and this development with a sustainability platform and a green 
building approach was being rolled out, it was a logical marriage that that 
demonstration project could be housed here, and its expanded well beyond 
Mueller for the types of study they are doing. But to have a place to begin, 
and the advances that were being made in how the infrastructure was be-
ing delivered here and what they could do with all this new housing that 
was all at least a 3 star building requirement and they could do all the 
smart meters and they knew that there were controls already in the infra-
structure to support the project, that this would be a logical place to do it. 
The application went through that way. And being a public-private part-
nership and the city of Austin being the utility all of that made a whole lot 
of sense.  (Catellus Development Representative, Interview, November 
2015) 
As a sustainability-focused development with a “clean-slate” of green-built homes, and a 
newly modernized electrical grid, the smart grid experiment and demonstration was 
thought to “logically” fit at Mueller. This highlighted the necessities of new infrastructure 
for integration of smart grid technologies, and the difficulties of retrofitting older homes.    
4.3.1 Urban living labs as demonstrations  
Providing vision and leadership is essential to governing in a democracy (Ezrahi 
1990). Living labs test out competing visions of urban energy futures that align various 
actors around extensive reconfigurations of urban infrastructures (Bulkeley, Castan 
Broto, & Maassen, 2013). These visions reflect broadly shared values and beliefs about 
technologies and their social impacts (Jasanoff 2004b; Jasanoff and Kim 2009). Living 
labs offer ways to produce, reinforce, and strengthen particular visions of technologically 
mediated urban futures (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013b; Hodson & Marvin, 2009a; 
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Reimer et al., 2012). At the same time, they provide opportunities to address global cli-
mate and energy concerns with particular “testable” or demonstrated solutions in local-
ized places (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2012; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013a). Alterna-
tive conceptions of urban experimentation offer different and often competing modes of 
knowledge production about urban sustainability that provide a different set of norms and 
rules by which communities can respond to climate change.  
Serving as a model for other urban sustainability projects, the Mueller neighbor-
hood the takes this as a central goal.  The Mueller development itself – not just the Pecan 
Street project – is characterized as an urban living lab and a model for sustainable urban 
development. A representative of the development company explained: 
A model of urban development, that’s part of our vision. We actually 
learned from Stapleton, and other folks are learning from us.The other 
thing that this has done for the City of Austin is that it sort of has become 
a living lab. A lot of the zoning for this site was done as a PUD, a planned 
unit development, where you can have a lot of different regulations to the 
standard zoning or building ordinances. So for us it was narrower streets 
than you can build anywhere else in the city, the houses are closer togeth-
er, the houses are closer to the curb, that whole new urbanist development 
style where you develop on a small footprint so you preserve open spaces, 
and so there were 100 differences to build what we are building at Mueller 
to what is normal for the ordinances in Austin. And they had to actually go 
department by department to say OK fire department, if a street is this 
wide, if the houses are alley served, are you going to be able to provide 
service. (Catellus Development Representative, Interview, November 
2015) 
Mueller had to push the threshold of what was prescribed for Austin development pro-
jects, and by doing so offered a controlled area wherein new ordinances could be tested 
for evaluation and possible future use and adoption in the great Austin area. The public-
private partnership documentation – the Master Development Agreement between the 
City and developer – made many provisions for the PUD, and the design guidelines high-
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lighted how the community would focus on green buildings and green infrastructure to 
mitigate urban heat island impacts and protect the night sky, for example.  The develop-
ment project was cast both as a demonstration and a place of learning and experimenta-
tion.  
In the case of the Pecan Street smart grid demonstration project, a similar trend of 
demonstration and learning is evident.  Given the context of the project – the Mueller 
development – the Environmental Defense Fund (2014) ardently promoted it:  
The Mueller neighborhood, the locus of Pecan Street, is a laboratory of 
ideas and technologies that will move the nation’s $1.3 trillion electricity 
market toward a future in which energy is cheap, abundant and clean. If 
Pecan Street is successful, every neighborhood in America will look like it 
in 20 years.  
Creating knowledge in living labs has an intensive focus on learning and demonstration. 
Thus, the way people view the living labs and the knowledge they generate or demon-
strate is integral to the activities conducted within. This has informed the Pecan Street 
projects movement towards the production of datasets and an accessible database on 
home energy consumption. By focusing on energy monitoring and data collection, Pecan 
Street Inc.’s database, analysis and sharing wiki, Dataport, is a fundamental resource for 
energy research on smart grids:  
We have built the world’s preeminent research network of energy and wa-
ter customers. The anonymized data from these volunteer participants’ 
home electricity use, solar panel performance, electric vehicle charging, 
and response to utility programs has become the world’s largest research 
database of customer water and disaggregated electricity insight. Our 
unique research network data is at the core of Dataport, which makes the 
terabytes of customer data accessible, manageable, visible and usable for 
university researchers around the world. In the year our data has been 
made available, researchers from more than 50 universities in 12 countries 
have joined. (PecanStreet.org, February 2015) 
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This database serves several purposes. First, it offers researchers data on energy usage 
where smart technologies have been implemented. This influences research findings and 
possibly, future policies regarding smart grid systems. Second, it offers companies oppor-
tunities to see how effective their technologies are, both in terms of energy efficiency or 
reliability, and in terms of customer acceptance. As one Pecan Street representative ex-
plained: 
We’re always happy to exchange information with people. It really helps 
that we are a non-profit. [...] I talk to cities, I talk to for-profit companies. 
We meet with them and they say, what have you learned, and I’ll be happy 
to tell the for-profit company that is trying to build a product that this is 
what we’ve learned, this is what’s failed, and this is what’s succeeded. [...] 
We’re happy to show off our work, even though our work is in beta, and 
you would think that like oh we shouldn’t show off our secrets before, but 
I’m happy to say like look, this is the cool stuff we are making right now. 
My job is to make sure we can get as much data as possible to give to 
people so they can utilize it and learn from it. (Pecan Street representative, 
Interview, October 2015) 
Living labs, thus, can be viewed as a “theatre of proof” (W. Smith 2009; E. Simakova 
2010) for ways of configuring smart technologies in urban space to achieve sustainable, 
low-carbon outcomes. Stemming from work in STS around the role of demonstrations 
and public engagement with technology (Rosental 2014; Marres 2011; Marres and 
Lezaun 2011; Laurent 2011), especially in contemporary practices of the product 
“launch” in high-tech industries, this notion of the theatre of proof typically is framed by 
the situation where an organization “offers a ‘novel’ product to ‘the market’” (Simakova 
2010: 549).  Living labs, I suggest, are not only places of knowledge production, but 
venues for linking technological artifacts and publics. In this sense, livings serve as me-
diators between possible sociotechnical futures and a wider public who might adopt the 
knowledge or technological systems emanating from the living lab.  
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4.3.2 Urban living labs as test-beds and protected niches 
Connecting local, place-based “experiments” to broader urban transitions has been 
the subject of much research utilizing the multi-level perspective on transitions. The MLP 
is primarily concerned with how sociotechnical regimes interact with niches and innova-
tions that result in shifts or replacement of current regimes. Sociotechnical regimes are 
understood mainly as “rules” (Geels and Kemp 2007; Geels 2007) that guide and orient 
activities of social groups who maintain and refine sociotechnical systems.  
As such, regimes shape and influence, and are hard to change.  In the MLP, socio-
technical regimes include scientists, users, policy makers and societal groups outside 
technical fields. These regimes are the meso level of the MLP, niches are the micro level, 
and the sociotechnical landscape is the macro level. The sociotechnical landscape is ex-
ogenous, outside the direct influence of actors (Geels 2007).  It is heterogeneous and in-
cludes issues such as economic growth, cultural and normative values, environmental 
problems such as climate change, and resource scarcities. It is also the large scale “mate-
rial context of society, e.g. the material and spatial arrangement of cities, pervasive tech-
nologies, etc.” (Geels 2007: 443). Niches may be thought of as the loci of innovation. 
They are the micro-level phenomenon, and often are “protected” spaces, or “incubators” 
for new technologies that protect them from market or societal pressures.  
As protected niches, ULLs might serve as mediators in urban energy transitions 
but they are also geographical configurations that leverage local and regional assets to 
address more than local concerns and influence broader global audiences.   Transitions 
research, however, is insufficiently prepared to account for the “the advantages, conflicts 
and tensions that are constituted by the economical, institutional, social and cultural terri-
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tories in which transitions dynamics and pathways by default are embedded, except as 
passive contexts” (Coenen & Truffer, 2012: 367).   Although some urban scholars and 
geographers have addressed the role of the city in transition processes (i.e. Bulkeley & 
Castan Broto, 2013; Hodson & Marvin, 2010a; 2010b; Karvonen & Evans, 2013), there 
are still gaps in understanding that may be bridged by more actively engaging economic 
geographers and regional studies scholars in these issues (Coenen & Truffer, 2012; 
Truffer & Coenen, 2013). For example, links between transitions processes and uneven 
urban development and urban political economy still have yet to be made explicitly.  
But the conception of a test-bedding approach helps bridge this gap in many ways 
by considering the development of “platforms” for development and testing. The rise of 
so-called “platform capitalism” (Morozov 2015) makes information infrastructure central 
to the provision of urban services, from transportation to energy, marked by the growth of 
the knowledge-based and sharing economies.  The platform metaphor is popular in the 
electricity industry as well, and Pecan Street’s original idea was to create a so-called “en-
ergy Internet” – an open-platform for testing a variety of smart grid technologies. The 
group developed their own open-platform that fits with the broader movement towards 
creating an “information technology platform that makes possible a wide range of new 
products and services that provide customer value” where “mobile phone app stores and 
the Internet provide powerful examples of how a grid operator can earn more revenue and 
catalyze significant private sector opportunity by structuring its grid as a platform for a 
broad range of private sector activity” (Pecan Street, 2011:7). The obvious allusions to 
the platform services such as Facebook, Amazon, and Uber are discussed here as models 
for the electric grid. This allusion to the cell phone apps provides a vision of a radically 
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decentralized electricity system where grid operators supply a platform and utilities and 
new energy companies offer energy services to customers in a highly competitive electric 
marketplace. This vision has captivated a whole array of private sector actors operating 
on speculative future scenarios to capture the growing smart grid and internet of things 
markets. Cities operating in financially restricted positions with limited budgets and pres-
sures to develop and meet a variety of public needs find this opportunity to attract capital 
enticing, thus creating entrepreneurial strategies to retain large smart grid and internet of 
things (IoT) companies.  
In Austin, the Chamber of Commerce has a specific strategy to attract startups 
with potential to receive venture capital for growing their companies. Startups working 
on clean energy and power technology, creative and digital media technology, or data 
management are able to add to the key industries in Austin, all of which relate to smart 
grid technology and development. The Austin Chamber of Commerce boasts the munici-
pal utilities commitment to renewable power, the Pecan Street’s research potential, and 
ERCOT’s willingness to integrate clean energy companies into their electric grid as 
drawing points for energy companies.13 Supportive of these efforts is the University of 
Texas Clean Energy Incubator, the Clean TX cluster development organization, and the 
already large clean tech industry located in Austin. But the city more largely is thought of 
as an experimental space for these companies, nurtured by the various resources the city 
offers. As one Chamber of Commerce representative explained:  
                                                 
13 Please see: https://www.austinchamber.com/economic-development/key-industries/clean-energy-power. 
 157
The Chamber cares about business. So we were tasked with bringing the 
industry, bringing the clean industry. We like what Pecan Street was do-
ing, we do have a board seat because they are a pretty iconic clean tech 
group, and they are headquartered here. [...] From a more strategic stand-
point this year is that, alright look, there is a lot of wind in this state, no 
one is going to come here and build a wind farm. There are a lot of solar 
panel manufacturers and there is a lot of, there are a lot of companies who 
support residential solar installations, and yada yada yada. So those com-
panies, let’s assume, these companies are going to continue to grow. 
What’s the future of clean energy, clean tech? Its that efficiency piece, 
right. So, clean energy has grown into from renewables, natural gas, what-
ever into this ‘how can we do things better, cheaper, faster?’ Pecan Street 
is a great example. Any technology now, is what, my targets are less solar 
panel manufacturers and more people creating efficiency. So, like, anyone 
who is doing battery, software, hardware integration to support communi-
cations between utilities and residents, etcetera... there is a lot of software 
engineers here, there is a lot of people who know how to analyze data. 
Austin is a good fit for those companies. This is a natural place for them to 
be.  [Clean tech] is going towards devices that communicate to create effi-
ciencies. Austin is very good at, we have a lot of software engineers, and 
there is an incredible quality of life. You’ve got the Pecan Street Project 
where companies can test their sensors. You’ve got a very progressive 
utility, who is more or less open to adopting new things and trying new 
things, and they’re changing their generation mix to look very green. 
(Chamber of Commerce Representative, Interview, November 2015) 
The political-economic position of a sociotechnical regime has implications for how 
these “niches” infiltrate the urban fabric as socio-technological experiments in living 
labs. In Austin, for example, having a large public-private redevelopment project provid-
ed the opportunity for the smart grid demonstration project to flourish in a community of 
so-called “early adopters”: largely upper-middle class residents that are motivated to save 
energy or participate in new technology testing.  
We have a unique opportunity that if someone approaches us, and this 
happens all the time, someone will come up to us and say I have this prod-
uct right. Like, these incubator companies will come up to us, I have this 
product, I need to get it field tested. We have three hundred volunteers in 
this neighborhood who will let us install it in their house. And, I would 
say, more than half of them want it in there, and the other half you usually 
have to convince a little bit with a financial incentive, and say hey if you 
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let us install this we will give you a five dollar gift card to Home Depot, 
and most of them will say yes, but more than half will jump at the fact to 
become a test-bed you know what I mean. So I would wholeheartedly 
agree with that synopsis of Mueller [as a living laboratory]. It’s a really 
great test-bed of people that are early-adopters. Now having said that, its 
also self selecting, right. Because everyone here is an early-adopter, so its 
really funny because we do work in Austin because we have to beat peo-
ple off with a stick when we tell them have a new product and everyone 
wants it, I mean like I only got like twenty. But then its funny because we 
get paid by utilities to do work in other jurisdictions. We went to Califor-
nia of all places, and recruitment out there was so difficult because, A, no 
one knew who we were, and the utility wanted us to recruit a very specific 
location, and it was just hard to convince people to let us install our 
equipment in their house. And its funny because we have never, like, that 
kind of difficulty. It’s really nice to work here because we have such a 
close relationship with the participants.  (Pecan Street representative, In-
terview, October 2015) 
Certainly, particular kinds of people are more likely to participate in field trials for new 
technologies, but what is less well understood is the role of citizens (users, consumers, or 
prosumers) in urban energy transitions and broader sustainability transitions. While there 
are more grassroots approaches that promise greater democratic engagement (Blanchet 
2015; Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012; A. Smith et al. 2016), the approach taken in the 
Mueller neighborhood utilizes a more top-down approach where residents are encouraged 
to install technologies, receive incentives or benefits for doing so, and in return they par-
ticipate in the research that monitors energy consumption and performance. This ap-
proach relies on “early-adopters” who are willing to participate in already designed pro-
grams, unlike a grassroots approach that focuses on collective visioning processes and 
ownership to govern energy system change. The focus of approaches taken in Pecan 
Street research, instead, is on individual energy consumption behaviors and technological 
efficiency, fitting with the existing sociotechnical regime of energy provision. While this 
is certainly a worthwhile project for understanding technical limits of the smart grid, this 
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approach contributes to the lock-in of particular pathways for smart grid development 
without broader consideration of the various concerns of citizens or with structural limita-
tions to managing energy consumption and production.   This problematic is reinforced 
by the rhetoric of collaboration and innovation that much of the Mueller development 
officials use.  
You had to have, I think again the spirit of collaboration that has always 
been around this supports doing innovative things, trying new things, test-
ing new things, so it was the perfect setting for this. The DOE grant was 
applied for and they got the grant, the idea that the lab would be built so 
they could literally test things in the lab, the idea that there were people, 
residents moving into Mueller, into these homes, and that by virtue of the 
fact that this was rolling out, and we had connections with the homebuild-
ers, that the introductions could be made between the research project and 
the residents, so we facilitated those introductions, finding people to intro-
ducing them to the demonstration project, and saying they were looking 
for volunteers, and having them meetings where pecan street could edu-
cate and inform and inspire and rally folks to participate. So they, that’s 
the way we supported the research, or the opportunity for them to do re-
search, and then how they have taken that and expanded that to the dimen-
sion of solar panels, and the dimension of electric cars, and the dimensions 
of both combined, and water savings. Because as the grant evolved, it 
wasn’t just the supply but also the consumption part of it, so how do you 
manage both. And also understanding how its used. I’m sure you’ve heard 
about all the statistics about how much data they have, in such tiny incre-
ments, and what they’re learning from that, and then also what they are 
learning as far as the end-user, and when you supply them with that kind 
of knowledge, does that change their behavior, and what does change their 
behavior, and how do you encourage that, how do you as a utility get peo-
ple to do the right thing in their house. So its apparently the largest amount 
of data in the tiniest increments ever available. (Catellus Development 
Representative, Interview, November 2015) 
In addition, governing by experiment in demonstrations and test-beds suggests that a par-
ticular, governable subject already exists. However, in ULLs and other urban experi-
ments, urban citizens are often made to be the object of engagement – the engaged cus-
tomer, active participant, technology adopter. The literature on urban experiments has 
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treated these urban sociotechnical interventions mainly as governmental programs and 
projects applied to existing urban landscapes and populations. Empirically, however, as 
suggested in urban smart grid experiments, the governing of energy use is enacted 
through particular subjectivities. More than simply technological interventions aimed at 
increasing renewable integration or grid reliability, smart grid experiments attempt to 
orchestrate and govern energy demand according to particular political-economic ration-
alities.  
4.4 Making Smart Consumers, Governing Demand 
Urban living lab projects offer new opportunities for various actors to participate 
in urban energy and sustainability transitions. If ULLs take on test-bed or demonstration 
approaches, what are the roles of participants and other actors? Do test-bed approaches 
suggest citizens are just consumers awaiting more sustainable technologies, or are they 
passive observers of demonstration projects, waiting to lend their approval for new tech-
nological solutions? As smart grid experiments proliferate, customer-utility relations are 
being reconfigured. The consumer, or household, is positioned as an engaged and active 
consumer, making decisions about energy consumption throughout the day. The smart 
grid enacts a set of relations and practices, both materially and discursively, wherein the 
conduct of end-users is governed through “technologies of government” guided by par-
ticular political-economic rationalities. Smart grid experiments reconfigure familiar do-
mains and categories – the household, the consumer – to govern how everyday practices 
are performed.   
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For example, smart grid demonstration projects have increasingly used the vocab-
ulary of customer engagement and empowerment (Gangale, Mengolini, and Onyeji 
2013). The customer moves beyond the role as a passive consumer and becomes an ac-
tive participant in the electricity grid with new responsibilities, choices, and opportunities 
(Naus, van Vliet, and Hendriksen 2015).  Yet, as this discourse becomes pervasive, there 
is still little evidence that households are afforded autonomy or agency for engaging in 
smart energy transitions, with the existing sociotechnical regimes playing the dominant 
role in shaping the implementation and standardization of smart grid systems (Goulden et 
al. 2014).  
The growth in attention to demand response, time-of-use pricing, and other “cus-
tomer side” interventions have been celebrated by utilities and electricity providers as 
potential opportunities to shave or shift peak demand while increasing customer aware-
ness and engagement. Yet, these practices rely on significant changes in energy consump-
tion that have not been realized (Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2013). Underlying much 
of these programs is a conceptualization of the end-user as a rational economic actor, or 
what Strengers (2013: 51) calls “resource man” – “a data-driven, information-hungry, 
technology-savvy home energy manager.” These depicted smart end-users are made to be 
subjects, conscribed by social norms, expected to perform the scripted uses for smart 
technologies, with the encouragement to act rationally both economically and environ-
mentally.    
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4.5 Rationalities of Governance Experimentation 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Foucault’s lectures from 1977-1978 at the College de 
France focused on the “genealogy of the modern state” wherein he built the concept of 
governmentality as a guideline for analyzing technologies of power with an analysis of 
political rationality (Lemke 2002). Governmentality helps us analyze how power operates 
beyond consensus or violence, linking technologies of the self (self-regulation) with 
technologies of domination (discipline), while also providing a linkage between the state 
apparatus and the constitution of the subject. Foucault posited that power was about 
“governing the forms of self-government, structuring and shaping the field of possible 
action of subjects” (Lemke, 2002: 50), or in other words, the “conduct of conduct.”  
 Foucault also suggested that political rationality creates a discursive field wherein 
the exercise of power is made rational: “One isn’t assessing things in terms of an absolute 
against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of ra-
tionality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices 
or systems of practices, and what role they play within them, because it’s true that ‘prac-
tices’ don’t exist without a certain regime of rationality” (Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, & 
Miller, 1991: 79, italics added). Thus, if we take governmentality as a way to understand 
the governance of urban energy systems, we must understand the way it operates through 
the practices of those being governed (i.e. subjects), and the political rationalities inform-
ing these technologies of governance. Foucault’s later lectures from 1979-1980 
(Foucault, 2008) suggest that a specific neoliberal political rationality was coming to pre-
dominate the practice of government.  
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The proliferation of “enterprises” was a central tenet within Foucault’s under-
standing of neoliberalism. He suggested that that the role of homo oeconomicus – the 
consumer subject – is not so much a consumer as a person of “enterprise and production” 
(Foucault, 2008).  Foucault (2008: 147-8) argued that the “generalization of forms of 
‘enterprise’ by diffusing and multiplying them as much as possible …within the social 
body is what is at stake in neoliberal policy. It is a matter of making the market, competi-
tion, and so the enterprise, into what could be called the formative power of society.” 
Lois McNay (2009: 56) explains how neoliberal governmentality is expressed through 
the concept of “self as enterprise” where individuals are encouraged to view their lives 
and identities as an enterprise, “understood as a relation to the self based ultimately on a 
notion of incontestable economic interest.” Foucault’s investigation into American ne-
oliberalism explains the proliferation of enterprise, entrepreneurship, and policies em-
powering individuals into the social fabric, and reveals its central importance as a rein-
forcement of neoliberal subjectivity.  
The concept neoliberal governmentality can be extended to analyze the informa-
tional (self-) governance of home energy management through the shaping of discourse 
and standards of practice (Levenda, Mahmoudi, and Sussman 2015). Likewise, Bulkeley, 
Powells, & Bell (2016: 20) argue that governing energy use in the smart grid “works 
through the disposition of sociomaterial configurations through which conducts unfold 
and accompanying processes of normalized what constitute both acceptable and optimal 
forms of conduct,” and that smart grids entail a specific governmental program that 
works through “recomposing the ways in which everyday practices are conducted.” It is 
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in this sense that the reworking of relations of consumption and production in smart grid 
experiments can be understood through the notion of governmentality.  
4.5.1 Making smart subjects or a smart techno-fix? 
Smart grid experiments, as a governmental program and specific locale (i.e. in a 
ULL), suggest a proper and optimal form of social conduct for their participants. The idea 
of “self as enterprise” is central to the implementation, political legitimacy, and “success” 
of smart grid experiments. The promise of smart grids relies, in one part, on behavioral 
changes of users, expecting “smart users” to become active participants in the smart grid, 
performing their part as solar pioneers, eco-energy misers, or flexible energy users adjust-
ing consumption to the dynamics of a time-of-use rate structure. In this sense, smart grid 
experiments “success” presupposes (rational and individual) market actors who manage 
their everyday practices in a careful, calculative, and reflexive way. But as the experience 
in some of the households in Austin’s smart grid experiment show, people do not neces-
sarily act “rationally.”   A Pecan Street representative explained this point directly with a 
story of a multi-family tenant and research participant: 
We found crazy stuff occurring. We showed up to one unit, and, the guy 
knocks on the door, our technician, and he’s like ‘Oh I’m here to diagnose, 
there is a problem with our monitoring device,’ and the guy goes, ‘Oh 
yeah what’s going on?’ And he’s like, ‘well it always shows your oven’s 
on’, and the guy goes, ‘yeah, my oven is on,’ and our technician was like, 
‘no no no no, we show that your oven is on’ and the guy’s like, ‘yeah yeah 
yeah, my oven’s on.’ And it turns out this guy just like left his oven on all 
the time. Cause like, he always wanted a hot oven because he didn’t have 
a microwave and he’d throw his food in there when he wanted it hot, and 
he’d heat up his food and take it out and eat it. We have actually heard of 
other cases, by the way, since this where this has occurred which is just 
crazy to me, but nonetheless. So going to this person, we were like, it costs 
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a lot of money to you right. And the guy had like no clue.  (Pecan Street 
Representative, Interview, October 2015). 
Similarly, a representative from the Environmental Defense Fund, a part of the founding 
of Pecan Street and a continuing member of the board, explained that from his research in 
the smart grid experiment in Austin, and on energy more generally, people just don’t 
think or care about energy enough to change their behavior or their practices. 
It’s a very wonky subject, its not necessarily the most interesting conver-
sation material for a lot of people so one barrier is just peoples interest 
levels. There is a statistic that is widely quoted that people think about 
their energy bills and electricity six minutes a year.  For most people its 
not something that you choose to focus on. One barrier for scaling up de-
mand response and smart technology and that sort of thing is just generat-
ing interest. I’ve talked to representatives of utilities. I feel like demand 
response is pretty well received, but I guess there is a barrier in the way its 
designed. Getting the design of these programs right so that customers 
have a positive experience, that’s one of the current barriers for it to catch. 
Even if they don’t think about it that much, they think about ways to save 
money, if something is a no-brainer, then you make that choice. (EDF 
Representative, Interview, October 2015) 
As energy researchers engage with smart grid users, they often seem to get dismayed by 
the irrationality of human energy decisions. As the quote above illustrates, the researchers 
involved with smart grid experiments understand that end-users don’t necessarily think 
about energy very often, but they still feel they can be persuaded economically. However, 
this logic is changing the nature of smart grid implementation. Lessons learned from ear-
ly studies on energy efficiency impacts of smart meters and in-home displays suggest 
little evidence of sustained behavior change (Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2010; 
Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2013). Studies on voluntary demand response and time of 
use pricing have indicated that these options may work (Dyson et al. 2014; Muratori, 
Schuelke-Leech, and Rizzoni 2014), but the trend towards automating decision-making to 
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maximize energy and economic efficiency seem to be the dominant trend. As one EDF 
representative explained: 
In terms of energy efficiency and smart grid and how they are related, its 
just sort of the next evolution, its using machines and technology that 
doesn’t have the human error element, or the human interest level, you 
have these items programmed to be more efficient and at scale that will 
take a lot of the human element of being more efficient with energy out of 
the equation. So its just the next evolution of it. It just makes it easier for 
humans to act with the environment in mind. I mean, humans might want 
to act with the environment in mind, but they have their priorities and they 
have a lot of other things to do that day, and some things slip through the 
cracks, and if you want to be a good environmentalist but that’s a low pri-
ority for you that can slip through the cracks and the technology can make 
it a lot easier. (EDF Representative, Interview, October 2015) 
While automation may provide energy and cost savings for end-users, it also rationalizes 
and normalizes the deep integration of smart technologies in everyday life most probably 
without deliberation over end-users concerns or values (Strengers 2013).  Putting in place 
of a technological fix for the seeming inflexibility of energy demand and the irrationality 
of human behavior frames these problems as purely technical ones. But, these problems 
are more than technical. Energy demand is structured by the rhythms and patterns of eve-
ryday life (Walker 2014). Consumption is not for the sake of consumption, but rather for 
aiding in everyday practices shaped by social norms, habits, economic demands, and oth-
er conventions (Shove, Pantzar, and Watson 2012; Shove and Walker 2014). The limita-
tions of the techno-economic approach exemplified by the forms of experimentation dis-
cussed in this chapter explains, however, is that the design and implementation of urban 
living labs –whether for smart grid experiments or other purposes – needs to be ques-
tioned along axes of social and political concern. Who shapes the agenda and vision of a 
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living lab, what are the planned outcomes and impacts, and who benefits? All of these 
questions require further consideration in the study of ULLs.  
4.6 Conclusion: Urban Smart Grids for Whom? 
In this chapter I have highlighted how a specific urban living lab was constructed materi-
ally and discursively as a place of demonstration for public approval and a test-bed for 
smart technologies. Although there are certainly positive benefits from smart grid imple-
mentation and demonstration, the role of citizens in determining or influencing the path-
ways to a smart energy future seem to be limited to very narrow realms of participation 
through consumption. I suggested that the approach of neoliberal governmentality helps 
explain how the actions of users of ULLs are governed – proper forms of conduct that 
adhere to particular governmental rationalities described by techno-economic concerns. 
However, a contradictory trend towards automation and algorithmic, market-minded de-
cision-making – a technological fix – is progressing such that the “empowered” consumer 
no longer needs to act on information provision, they simply adopt technologies and en-
roll in programs, reinstituting a passive consumer role.  
  Therefore, while the current approaches to smart grid experiments rely on re-
shaping the “conduct of conduct,” there is a trend towards automation and a techno-
economic fix which vastly diminishes the potential for democratic engagement with 
planning or shaping energy systems.   Just as smart city strategies that promise safer, 
healthier, more democratic, and sustainable cities, urban smart grid projects promise 
greater roles for consumers and place responsibility on citizens to facilitate change under 
a constrained environment and set of conditions. Yet, the agency of users is limited to 
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consumption habits, preferences, and technology adoption. As ULLs for smart grid pro-
jects serve as demonstrations for particular pathways, there is risk that lock-in will occur 
without engagement of a broader public sphere (Verbong, Beemsterboer, and Sengers 
2013). Experimentation must account for alternative visions to avoid furthering the no-
tion that users and citizens are just barriers to smart grid implementation. 
With the ever greater entrenchment of smart technologies, greater amounts of data 
are also being collected and analyzed. With the smart grid, this offers opportunities for 
the deepening of surveillance in everyday life (F. R. Klauser and Albrechtslund 2014), 
while at the same time strengthening the opportunities for “corporate storytelling” to fur-
ther normalize unequal social relations in the smart grid and the smart city by placing the 
private corporation – with profit motives – at the center of the construction and imple-
mentation smart urban technologies (Söderström, Paasche, and Klauser 2014). The gov-
ernmental rationalities of these projects must also take into account these private interests 
and the prescribed roles for urban citizens – now as smart-users, Resource Men, or ne-
oliberal consumers.  
By highlighting how particular governmental rationalities enable particular tech-
nologies to arise as solutions to urban problems, the problematics of “smart” user subjec-
tivities in smart grid experiments, and the limitations of demonstration and test-bed ap-
proaches to ULLs, this chapter has raised several critical issues for future scholarship on 
ULLs. First, although ULLs promise ways to test-out and experiment with solutions to 
climate change and urban sustainability, they are in large part shaped by existing soci-
otechnical regimes with political economic interests and goals of developing technologi-
 169
cal fixes to urban problems. This also contributes to creating pockets of sustainability in 
the city where only small portions of the population benefit.  
Second, as demonstrations, ULLs are significant opportunities to enroll public 
support for addressing key issues in transitions to urban sustainability or renewable ener-
gy. Yet, these approaches seem to have a limited conception of how users can interact 
with and participate in energy transitions. The Austin case study demonstrates that tech-
no-economic approaches seek to regulate the conduct of individuals through economic 
incentives, but this limited approach fails when people act irrationally. Thus, a less dem-
ocratic option of centralized automation and control is being pursued in smart grid im-
plementation as a technological fix for the barriers of active human and user participa-
tion.  These trends point towards the necessity of reinvigorating experimentation in ULLs 
with a radically democratic agenda. We should take seriously the role that seemingly one-
off experiments have for possible co-production of more sustainable and just urban fu-
tures.   
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5 Chapter 5: Mobile Experiments: Models, Visions, and Politics 
5.1 Introduction 
The smart grid is largely discussed as a national project. The electric grid stretches 
across the entire continental US, linking together parts of generation, transmission, distri-
bution and end-use in what some call the “largest machine ever built.” But the grid is also 
regional in nature. Different regions of the country are linked to different electrical grids, 
managed and coordinated by different grid operators (ISOs or RTOs), individual utilities 
(such as Portland General Electric), or utility holding companies (such as PacifiCorp). 
These grid operators coordinate the supply and demand of electricity on a minute by mi-
nute basis, almost perfectly matching supply and demand to maintain the health and reli-
ability of the grid (its frequency, 60 Hz, and voltage, variable). In some regions, such as 
ERCOT in Texas, PJM in the east, or CAISO in California, the grid operators also oper-
ate a regional electricity market regulated by FERC. With deregulation, as discussed ear-
lier, many generators were able to sell power to the wholesale markets being created in 
single or multi-state transmission networks. The development of ISOs and RTOs were 
central to the development of a competitive wholesale market. RTOs and ISOs are opera-
tors not owners of transmission networks. The mandatory ‘unbundling’ of utility services 
allowed transmission networks to be opened to many independent producers.  Power pro-
ducers sell power to the wholesale market where utilities and distributors sell it to the 
retail market, where eventually customers in residential, commercial, and (sometimes) 
industrial sectors purchase electricity at predetermined (usually) rates. This highly com-
plex, multi-actor, multi-level system was traditionally much more simple: state regulators 
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set rates (retail sales), utilities get guaranteed returns, and investors get promised, low-
risk dividends. This simple model, however, has been reworked in the name of competi-
tion and market-first policy, enabled by decades or deregulation, restructuring, and regu-
latory reforms.    
 
Figure 10: Balancing Authority, RTO, and ISO Regions. Source: eia.gov 
The development of smart grid technologies, growing interest in microgrids, the 
increasing adoption of distributed generation such as solar PV, and the growing need to 
address climate change has cut into the revenue streams of utilities. Even as US electrici-
ty demand is increasing, and projected to continue to increase, the threat of a so-called 
“utility death spiral” has introduced anxiety and incited political conflict between utilities 
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of incumbent regimes and citizens and government actors looking for solutions to climate 
problems.  The utilities trade group, Edison Electric Institute (EEI), released a report in 
January 2013 explaining the financial implications of the changing utility business model 
making analogies to the telephone industry and citing the decline in credit ratings for the 
electric utility industry (Kind 2013).  In particular, smart grid enabled technologies and 
programs such as distributed energy resources and demand side management are consid-
ered threats to utility revenues.  As the report explains (2013, 1): 
While the various disruptive challenges facing the electric utility industry 
may have different implications, they all create adverse impacts on reve-
nues, as well as on investor returns, and require individual solutions as 
part of a comprehensive program to address these disruptive trends. Left 
unaddressed, these financial pressures could have a major impact on real-
ized equity returns, required investor returns, and credit quality. As a re-
sult, the future cost and availability of capital for the electric utility indus-
try would be adversely impacted. This would lead to increasing customer 
rate pressures. 
Adding to this pressure on existing utility regimes is the efforts by cities and states to 
meet greenhouse gas emission reductions and (in some states) renewable portfolio stand-
ards. In Austin, Texas, the municipal utility and its city council leadership has pressures 
from a conservative state legislature to pull back on progressive, local energy action and 
policy, such as the recent procurement of a 300 MW solar power purchase agreement 
(Rockwell 2015; Trabish 2015). In Boulder, Colorado, for example, the contestation be-
tween the City and the utility, Xcel Energy operating locally as PSCO, has incited a near 
decade long, conflictual process of municipalization of the electric utility. In Fort Collins, 
Colorado, the municipal utility has struggled with power purchase agreements for renew-
ables with the Platte River Power Authority who has less than five percent of its portfolio 
from non-hydro renewables and renewable energy credits. In Oak Park, Illinois, the sub-
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urb of Chicago has attempted to work with ComEd, its local utility, on demand manage-
ment and solar PV programs to meet the community’s environmental goals, but has land-
ed short of the partnership desired and support needed. In each of these cases, smart grid 
experiments and demonstrations have captured the attention of city leaders and concerned 
citizen groups, but each has struggled with implementation and realization of broader 
visions due to conflicts with incumbent sociotechnical (or technopolitical) regimes.  
While the smart grid promises made on the national scale have ignited support and vi-
sions for a more efficient and secure energy future, experiences in cities attempting to 
implement these programs have had mixed results.  
Learning from these cities experiences with smart grid implementation and 
demonstration projects – or broadly smart grid experiments –  city officials, non-profits, 
and activists have tried to emulate or re-work bits and pieces of the experiments to see 
how they work in their own urban settings. In particular, Austin’s Pecan Street smart grid 
experiment in the Mueller neighborhood has captured the attention of “vanguard” cities 
like Boulder and Boston. The impacts of smart grid experiments and demonstrations on 
urban energy transitions has remained understudied. And this is likely for good reason – 
its difficult to trace these connections and influences outside formal policy channels. Re-
cent work in urban studies and geography on “policy mobility,” however, offers methods 
for studying these dynamics and insights into how influential projects might spur action 
in other urban domains.  
In this chapter, I discuss the intersections of urban energy transitions, experimen-
tation, and policy mobility which has received little attention in the scholarly literature, 
but has significant potential for building an understanding of innovation and knowledge 
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transfer through processes of learning and adaptation in a relational perspective (McCann 
2011b; Peck 2011; McCann and Ward 2011). The next section details some of the theo-
retical framework advanced in this chapter, and positions it in the existing literature. Sec-
tion 3 presents three case studies of urban smart grid experiments that are interrelated, to 
varying extents, with the networks of actors, technologies, and knowledge of Austin’s 
own smart grid experiment discussed in Chapter 4.  The last section discusses some of the 
conclusions from the case studies and how they contribute to building a better under-
standing of urban energy transitions and embedded governmental logics in smart grid 
experiments.  
5.2 Urban Energy Transitions and Policy Mobilities 
The work in the developing field of “transition studies” has influenced a wide va-
riety of scholars from urban studies, technology studies, political science, sociology and 
geography. At the center of this field is an understanding of sociotechnical change and 
innovation, typically explained with a historical and evolutionary model (Elzen, Geels, 
and Green 2004; Geels 2002; Geels and Raven 2006). The dominant multi-level perspec-
tive (MLP) (Figure 10) is primarily concerned with how sociotechnical regimes interact 
with niches and innovations that result in shifts or replacement of incumbent regimes. 
Sociotechnical regimes are understood as group of actors, institutions, norms, and tech-
nologies. The regime acts as a “rule set” for innovation (Geels and Kemp 2007; Geels 
2007) that guides and orients activities of social groups who maintain and refine soci-
otechnical systems. Rip and Kemp (1998, 340) explain that these technological regimes 
are: 
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... the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of engineering practic-
es, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and 
procedures, ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defin-
ing problems; all of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures.  
While there are numerous iterations of the definitions of sociotechnical regimes, 
and of course the similarly to Hecht’s notion of technopolitical regimes cannot go unstat-
ed, there is a general consensus that regimes are powerful meso-level networks that influ-
ence transition processes and have stakes in the outcomes of sociotechnical change. Re-
gime dynamics are power-laden. Regimes make, shape, and influence, but are hard to 
change.  In the MLP, socio-technical regimes include scientists, users, policy makers and 
societal groups outside technical fields. These social groups interact and form networks 
with mutual dependencies (Geels 2007). These regimes are the meso level of the MLP, 
while niches are the micro level, and the sociotechnical landscape is the macro level (as 
depicted in Figure 11). The sociotechnical landscape is exogenous, outside the direct in-
fluence of actors (Geels 2007).  It is heterogeneous and includes issues such as economic 
growth, cultural and normative values, environmental problems such as climate change, 
and resource scarcities. It is also the large scale “material context of society, e.g. the ma-
terial and spatial arrangement of cities, pervasive technologies, etc.” (Geels 2007: 443). 
Niches may be thought of as the loci of innovation. They are the micro-level phenome-
non, and often are “protected” spaces, or “incubators” for new technologies that protect 
them from market or societal pressures. In contexts such as urban smart grid experiments, 
niches infiltrate the urban fabric and become important sites in urban political economies 
and urban transitions at the same time.   
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Figure 11: Geels (2007) Diagram of Niche-Regime-Landscape Interactions 
Connecting local, place-based “experiments” to broader issues within urban development 
and governance, and even to global concerns of climate change, necessitates careful ex-
amination and analysis of scale, space, and place and the impacts of these analytical cate-
gories on analysis of transitions. The literature on sustainability transitions has recently 
started to acknowledge the importance of spatial considerations and new work has 
emerged on the geographies of transition. These geographical considerations address the 
limitations of transitions scholarship, which has insufficiently accounted for the “the ad-
vantages, conflicts and tensions that are constituted by the economical, institutional, so-
cial and cultural territories in which transitions dynamics and pathways by default are 
embedded, except as passive contexts” (Coenen and Truffer 2012, 367).  
Although many scholars and geographers have addressed the role of the city in 
transition processes (e.g. Bulkeley and Castán Broto 2013; Hodson and Marvin 2010; 
Hodson and Marvin 2012a; Hodson and Marvin 2009b) there are still gaps in understand-
ing that may be bridged by more actively engaging geographers and urban studies schol-
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ars in these issues (Truffer and Coenen 2012; Hansen and Coenen 2015; Truffer, 
Murphy, and Raven 2015). For example, links between transitions processes and uneven 
urban development have seen little explicit attention, although numerous studies tangen-
tially provide connections. Likewise, the connection between “experiments” and particu-
lar pathways has been the subject of recent debates in research on innovations in soci-
otechnical systems, but lacks consideration of the way the materiality of the city might 
prevent particular smart grid configurations from emerging (Rydin et al. 2013; Foxon 
2013; Bai, Roberts, and Chen 2010; Geels and Schot 2007).  Experimental projects can 
(re)present alternative pathways towards urban sustainability, but also may further en-
trench existing regimes. Pathways intersect with multiple scales of governance, aligning 
actors and institutions of various interests along particular networked trajectories.  In 
short, pathways and their projected visions are mechanisms to govern cities and energy 
systems (Späth and Rohracher 2010).   
Urban energy and sustainability transitions, in particular, have been of considera-
ble attention as cities attempt to address climate change through various policy and tech-
nology interventions. Energy infrastructures are critical for the functioning of nearly all 
production, services, and infrastructure sectors in cities, and are vitally important for so-
cial practices such as heating, cooking, and transport (Marvin, Graham, and Guy 1999; 
Graham and Marvin 2001). Energy utilities also are important regional economic actors, 
with significant employment, land ownership, and capital investments. Energy systems 
also structure the environment-society relationship and the “metabolism” of cities, often 
as the largest source of greenhouse gases (Gandy 2004; Newell and Cousins 2014; 
Swyngedouw 2006). In addition to the vital importance of energy systems to urban and 
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regional development and economies, institutional changes - outlined in Chapter 3 - have 
explained how governance of energy systems has become more complicated as new ac-
tors have participated in energy networks in the era of deregulation, restructuring, and 
proliferation of renewable and distributed generation.  
An energy transition, more generally, has been deemed a necessity for addressing 
global sustainability by industry, environmental groups, and governments (e.g. Shell 
2016; Canete 2016; US Department of Energy 2016).  The models of regulated monopo-
lies are no longer as prevalent, and large utilities in general are receiving competition 
from various entities. The failures of large utilities to produce efficiencies, innovate, and 
meet consumer demands (Hirsh 2004), coupled with growing environmental policies for 
energy efficiency and renewable energy, and the development of innovative technologies 
for power generation, distribution, and control of end-use has led to a situation wherein 
cities have become key sites for energy system change (Monstadt 2007). Cities are de-
picted simultaneously as the largest consumers of energy and emitters of greenhouse gas-
es, while also being the source for potential solutions, innovations, and action on energy 
system change, as well as being made up of the infrastructural systems and material envi-
ronment which makes sustainable change possible. But as the growing literature on urban 
energy and sustainability transitions explains, its far from this simple.  
Energy is bound up with the various social, political and economic aspects of our 
communities and livelihoods in various ways. Beyond the primary discourse on energy 
transitions at the national or international scale through lens of technical experts and sec-
toral interests (such as transportation or housing), energy transitions have implications for 
a broad array of social and political issues intersecting in multiple processes of urban life 
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and located in particular places. Urban energy transitions, then, bring together the work 
on urbanism and energy to examine how cities and energy systems are “not just, or even 
mainly, the product of narrow (predominantly technical/technocratic) processes of energy 
production, distribution and consumption, but they are primarily concerned with the ‘ur-
ban’ – i.e. with how infrastructures, buildings, industries, institutions, as well as individu-
als and social groups, their practices and values both shape and are shaped by context-
specific, conflicting energy needs, uses, forms of management, etc. ... the energy question 
is inherently an urban question, and vice versa” (Rutherford and Coutard 2014, 1371). 
Scholarship on urban energy transitions has worked to distinguish itself from disparate 
literatures working on energy transitions, low-carbon transitions, energy and social prac-
tice, resource geographies, or urban studies of large technological transitions towards a 
synthesis of these literatures and concepts. Instead, urban energy transitions, according to 
Rutherford and Coutard (2014, 1362), brings together several elements with “a focus a 
focus on energy materialities through a transversal view of energy systems as articulating 
contexts, infrastructures, flows and practices of production and consumption; a relational 
view of ‘the urban’ which is cognizant of the links between near and far places through 
which urban energy systems work; and a concern for socio-technical change as always 
contested and thoroughly political.”  
Building on urban energy transitions as defined here, the move away from a rather 
apolitical and straightforward view of technological transitions as laid out in the MLP 
(Meadowcroft 2009; Shove and Walker 2007; Scrase and Smith 2009) is matched with a 
particular concern for politics of shaping the ‘urban.’ The focus on cities and the urban 
level, “recognises that policies, processes and practices at work in cities are inherently 
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intertwined with broader pat- terns in the spatial, economic and socio-political organisa-
tion of societies. Yet they also collectively go beyond this and foreground energy transi-
tions as spatially constituted processes, by opening up notions of urban space to include 
the ‘distant’ sites and ‘external’ relational processes through which, in this case, urban 
energy transitions are shaped” (Rutherford and Coutard 2014, 1365). Urban energy tran-
sitions thus take the work of geographers on relational comparison and relational space to 
understand the contingent processes and practices by which energy systems shape and are 
shaped by cities. While this work has seen recent scholarship with implications for under-
standing urban energy governance (Rutherford and Jaglin 2015; Jaglin 2013; Emelianoff 
2014), and relationships between space and low-carbon economies (Bridge et al. 2013), 
there has been surprisingly little consideration of the socio-spatial processes of policy, 
learning, and knowledge production related to energy transitions and inter-urban refer-
encing so characteristic of transnational/global urban climate governance literature 
(Aylett 2013; McGuirk, Dowling, and Bulkeley 2014; Hoffmann 2011; Bulkeley 2010).  
Here, work of geography scholars on policy mobilities is particularly important 
and insightful for understanding the connection between energy transitions and cities, 
especially in the case of innovative technological changes and experimentation with 
smart grid technologies.  The policy mobilities approach brings together work on policy 
transfer with geographical political economy and global-relational concepts of place 
(McCann 2011b). Urban policy mobilities, McCann (2011b, 109) explains, are the “so-
cially produced and circulated forms of knowledge addressing how to design and govern 
cities that develop in, and are conditioned by, travel through, connect, and shape various 
spatial scales, networks, policy communities, and institutional contexts.” Urban policy 
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mobilities, then, can and should be considered in work on the diffusion/mobility and 
adoption/mutation of smart grid experiments and associated policies, models, visions, and 
knowledge.  
Some of the work on policy transfer from political science has tried to explain dif-
fusion of policy innovations through an approach akin the the MLP’s approach to ex-
plaining technological diffusion. Policy experiments, carried out in different “policy la-
boratories” are evaluated and if appropriate, alter policy prescriptions more broadly 
(Karch 2007; Shipan and Volden 2008). This literature provides insights into key actors 
and institutions that shape policies and policy models often focusing on policy mediators, 
or the “supply-side” and not so much on adopters on the “demand-side” (McCann 
2011b). This includes think-tanks, policy entrepreneurs and “transfer agents” who may 
bring not only off the shelf policies or best practices, but norms, ideologies, and attitudes 
that accompany transfer as a form of learning (Stone 2001; Stone 2004; Stone 2000). 
Policy transfer itself is a learning experience that involves different epistemic communi-
ties who provide the substantive knowledge utilized to inform policy objectives shaped 
by policy elites and decision-makers (Dunlop 2009). The vast array of forms of policy 
transfer has led some political science scholars to argue for better models and frame-
works that capture this complexity and the general dynamics of policy transfer and its 
concomitant learning processes (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000).  
The policy mobility approach builds on these approaches to policy transfer schol-
arship, but adds various dimensions. Adding a socio-spatial dimension to traditional 
models of policy transfer brings structural considerations to flows of knowledge, ideas, 
and models, and characterizes this as a power-laden process (Peck and Theodore 2015). 
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The policy mobilities approach takes into account the processes of learning, emulation, 
and making (Peck 2011), while also considering various scales at which policies are 
adapted, implemented, and ultimately shaped by, which includes the local and regional 
(not only the state and federal levels as smart grid policy is currently discussed) (Peck 
and Theodore 2001).  While the smart grid has in large part been pushed forward by fed-
eral legislation with states altering some regulations to accompany the changing electrici-
ty industry, smart grid implementation, especially on the demand/consumer-side is a re-
gional, local, and even bodily process.  At the same time, as the case studies below illus-
trate, smart grid experiments pull ideas and models and consultation from places all over 
the globe.  Some places become privileged sites, or vanguards for a particular way of 
conducting urban smart grid experiments, while others scan the landscape of projects, 
policies, and best practices to incorporate or emulate in their own cities.  
Integrating the analysis of smart grid experiments (see chapter 4) from the per-
spectives of urban energy transitions and urban policy mobilities literatures allows three 
key insights and benefits. Firstly, policy mobilities brings an explicit attention to the so-
cio-spatial aspects of learning, inter-referencing, mutation, and emulation for the rather 
aspatial (and usually national level) transitions perspective.  This allows consideration of 
the way models, ideas, and knowledge travel from city to city, nation to city, region to 
region, state to state, etc. in a global context, the way this travel takes place, who is in-
volved, their practices, the spaces this work is done, and the implications of all of this for 
policymaking and learning.  In general, it adds the dimension of knowledge transfer, not 
just knowledge generation, through processes of learning, adaptation, and mutation 
(Affolderbach and Schulz 2016).  
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Secondly, it brings a critical relational perspective on the inter-urban referencing 
and learning of smart grid experiments and innovations in the context of urban energy 
transitions. Policy mobilities literature builds on economic geography scholars to under-
stand how circuits of policy knowledge are composed of epistemic communities who 
transfer, emplace, and utilize certain forms of knowledge as part of their practice 
(McCann 2011b; McCann 2008).  The economic geography approach here also bring 
consideration of the institutional legacies, ideologies, and frames of reference, and issues 
such as political-economic restructuring so dominant over the past three decades in elec-
tricity networks, which often means that the “easiest, fastest, and most politically feasible 
transfers” are sought (McCann 2011b, 109; Peck and Theodore 2010a; Peck and 
Theodore 2015).  Policy mobilities also considers the connections between knowledge, 
expertise, and governmental rationalities, and the ways in which certain ideas become 
hegemonic or orthodoxy. This builds heavily on the perspectives of governmentality in 
geographical scholarship to various rationalities and technologies of government to study 
the (banal) practices of bureaucrats, consultants, engineers, and others and the way they 
construct narratives of commensurability to make their place (city) comparable to another 
so the policy might take. The practice of making comparable itself is a way to mobilize 
particular knowledges and in the process, normalize or stabilize through particular ration-
alities, logics and discourses, a way of seeing and acting in the world that legitimizes 
action and practice (Larner and Heron 2002; Larner and Heron 2005; McCann 2011b).  
Thirdly, the synergies between mobilities, transitions, and experimentation high-
lights the materiality and technical efficiency of particular policy assemblages. One ele-
ment that transitions approaches adds to mobilities perspective is a focus on the role of 
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technology, its technical efficiency, performativity, social construction, and agency in 
(techno)politics. While policy mobilities uses the concept of assemblage, which “indi-
cates a perspective focused on the detailed qualitative and ethnographic study of the prac-
tice of assembling some form of coherence, such as a policy... [or] a scale like the ‘lo-
cal’” (McCann and Ward 2013, 8; McCann and Ward 2012b), it also considers the mate-
riality of policy including the objects and things that are part of policymaking and im-
plementation (Lovell 2016). The sociotechnical systems approach of transitions meshes 
with the assemblage approach of mobilities to provide some conceptual overlap, at least 
at a general level of considering the various actors, institutions, capacities, forms of ex-
pertise, models, technologies, techniques that are not only local to a particular place, but 
also emerge from elsewhere (McCann and Ward 2012a; McCann and Ward 2011; 
McCann 2011a). 
In the following section I explicate three intertwined case studies of smart grid 
experiments, each of which highlight the contribution that policy mobilities has for our 
understanding of urban energy transitions and the various forms of smart grid experimen-
tation that are cast as opportunities to ignite broader sociotechnical changes and innova-
tion in electricity systems.  
5.3 Mobile Experiments, Failed Experiments, Spectacular Experiments? 
Case studies are useful for drawing out intricacies of particular phenomena.  Rela-
tional comparative approaches (Ward 2008; Ward 2010; Mcfarlane 2010; Robinson 
2014) in case study methodology provides opportunities for greater external validity 
(generalization) and clearer illustration of differences and similarities, and importantly, 
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contingencies in local processes. Explanatory models used to draw these relationships 
between cases reflect theorizations about space, place, and scale, and about the process of 
knowledge production and its relationships with urban development and governance.  
The relational comparative approach advocated by Ward (2010) has three key 
components relevant to this study.  The first suggests that the city should be theorized as 
“open, embedded and relational,” and as important elements of global systems, processes 
and flows that serve as, for example, “the ‘laboratories’ for policy formation and as are-
nas for the practising of state power” (Ward 2010: 482). The second concerns the dynam-
ic and socially constructed nature of the ‘city’ scale. The third relates to the political as-
pect that the relational comparative approach takes in “speaking back” to established the-
ories, and in asserting the context-specificity of theories to question their universalizing 
tendencies.  
With these considerations, I attempt to use comparison not to measure the cases 
developed in this dissertation against a universal ‘yardstick’ that shows difference and 
similarity. Instead, I start with tracing how smart grid experiments are constructed 
through policy and knowledge networks, how they are conceived, and how different ac-
tors interact and shape objectives and outcomes. This allows particularities and specifici-
ties to come through that relate to urban energy transitions, their politics, and the efficacy 
of smart grid experiments in different cities. This helps explicate the complicated rela-
tionships between knowledge production, urban governance, and sociotechnical change.  
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5.3.1 Seductive visions: Oak Park’s SmartCityUSA project 
When I first went to the Village of Oak Park, an inner ring suburb of Chicago, I 
was only eleven years old. On that school field trip, we went to visit several of the turn of 
the century homes that Frank Lloyd Wright designed in the area. It was in Oak Park that 
Wright’s “prairie style” architecture came to be known as a pathbreaking set of artistic 
works. The Frank Lloyd Wright Trust, operating out of The Rookery, a building con-
structed under the direction of Daniel Burnham and John Root, features one of Wright’s 
own interior designs. In Chicago’s Downtown Loop, the Trust serves as the “Internation-
al Gateway to Wright’s Chicago,” offering tours, guided visits, and outreach programs 
for various audiences from students to tourists (“Frank Lloyd Wright Trust” 2016). 
Wright’s architectural works live today through preservation and the work of the Trust 
and others in highlighting his architectural style. Oak Park’s architectural history and 
location has in many ways shaped the environmental commitments of the city today. Oak 
Park, in connection with River Forest, developed a sustainability plan called PlanItGreen, 
which had a tremendous focus on energy and carbon. The Village also approved a com-
munity choice aggregation program in April of 2011, which allows the municipality to 
seek alternate suppliers of electricity as a way to get lower rates and lower-carbon 
sources, which is made possible by state statues that mandate the incumbent utility still 
offer services as a distributor.  
Oak Park emerged in my research on the Pecan Street project in Austin, Texas. I 
first noticed a few stories in 2014 in industry media and in press releases, the Village of 
Oak Park explained how they were working with Pecan Street on a “project to demon-
strate the potential cost savings of electric smart grid technologies” and made progress on 
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the project through “hiring an organization credited with creating the national model for 
smart grid project planning, implementation, and management” (Village of Oak Park 
2014b).  The Village Manager noted that: 
Smart grid technology is new territory for communities such as ours, but 
its promise for energy savings and efficiency is real. Oak Park already has 
made great strides toward setting up a demonstration project. With Pecan 
Street’s help, we can begin the journey from an idea to a working model. 
This is an exciting time for our community.” (Village of Oak Park 2014b) 
In the face of the fast moving smart city, smart grid and internet of things markets, 
this new arena for cities and economic development, the Village of Oak Park was looking 
for models to implement smart grid solutions. The notion of “fast policy” here captures 
this movement by Oak Park’s city officials, where working with Pecan Street would ena-
ble the quick implementation of a perceived “off-the-shelf” smart grid community model 
(Peck and Theodore 2015). The expertise of an organization like Pecan Street, as the Vil-
lage Manager explained to me, is “to really give us sort of the playlist of how we can do 
smart city. ... they have done and exceptional job and delivered to the Village really the 
kind of project ready to go” (Interview, October 2015).  
Oak Park’s desire to implement a “ready to go” project shows how the financially 
constrained city was not only working within the confines of time, but also how policy is 
increasingly influenced by a variety of non-state actors operating outside established, 
“slow” channels of policy. Pecan Street’s work, however, is more about creating the 
technical and social conditions needed to make a smart grid experiment possible. Of 
course, this fits with the broader state and federal smart grid policy landscape, wherein 
“test-beds” and “demonstrations” are written into legislation. Years of discussion and 
debate led to the 2014 Illinois Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act, which had pre-
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viously been vetoed in 2011 by then Governor Pat Quinn calling the Act a “dream come 
true of Commonwealth Edison, but a nightmare for Illinois consumers” and overridden 
by the Illinois legislature (Wernau 2011; Guerrero and Wernau 2013). The Act provides a 
mandate for utilities to create neutral “test-beds” where companies can test-out their solu-
tions in a real-world utility environment. The promise, of course, was for the smart grid 
to be an ecological modernization strategy that would help create jobs, spur growth in the 
tech industry, and at the same time, help lower carbon emissions and meet environmental 
goals.  
The smart grid experiment in Oak Park was in the works for several years before 
the 2014 press release. The Village had actively participated in ComEd’s smart meter 
pilot program in 2010, where over 20,000 meters were installed by the incumbent utility. 
The pilot program led by the utility was implemented in nine different Illinois communi-
ties with the expressed goal of enabling time-of-use pricing and information gathering. 
City officials saw this as a way to bring the smart grid to their citizens, but at first didn’t 
see any customer-side benefits (Village Manager, Interview, October 2015). But Oak 
Park wanted to get involved to bring the possible benefits of the smart grid to their com-
munity. As Oak Park’s sustainability director described it at the 2013 summer meeting of 
the Mayors Innovation Project, 14 
                                                 
14  The Mayors Innovation Project is a learning network among American mayors committed to “high road” 
policy and governance: shared prosperity, environmental sustainability, and efficient democratic govern-
ment. [...] The Mayors Innovation Project exists to help its member participants lead by example, share 
their experiences with peers, and make this argument for cities nationally. See 
http://www.mayorsinnovation.org/ 
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The Village of Oak Park kept putting itself out there as a test-bed, we 
wanted to bring some of these new technologies to Oak Park and we kept 
inviting new companies and utilities to try their projects here in Oak Park, 
and someone finally took us up on it. 
This outward looking strategy that Oak Park took on represents an entrepreneurial 
strategy for attracting new capital for infrastructure improvements, but aimed specifically 
at a green and high-tech solution for environmental problems (Harvey 1989; While, 
Jonas, and Gibbs 2004). While the incumbent utility aimed to upgrade infrastructure for 
its own benefits (reducing operational costs through decreasing meter-reading staff, im-
proving reliability, etc.), Oak Park did not see any immediate benefits for its citizens in 
terms of hands-on smart technology or other visible or tactile technological change. This 
highlights two key issues: (1) the invisibility debate of modern infrastructures (Star 1999; 
Larkin 2013; Carse 2012), and (2) the necessity of visibility for legitimacy of technologi-
cal demonstrations (Elena Simakova 2010; Späth and Rohracher 2012; Ezrahi 1990). 
While Oak Park city officials were arguably looking for a local “sustainability 
fix” in smart grid programs, which always involves an ‘extralocal’ element for construc-
tion and legitimation (Temenos and McCann 2012, 1391), they struggled with these two 
issues.  To circumvent these issues, or at least to address them, Oak Park attempted to 
make electricity infrastructure visible through the development of a customer facing pro-
gram which would not only serve to make the smart grid visible, but would also enroll 
selected participants in a smart grid experiment and a form of low-carbon energy govern-
ance as subjects of learning and education (N. Rose 1999; N. Rose 1993; Temenos and 
McCann 2012).  
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As the project progressed, the Village began to seek international support and col-
laboration. The Illinois Citizen’s Utility Board and other groups had facilitated contact of 
Oak Park City Officials with the Korean Smart Grid Institute who had developed an in-
ternationally recognized smart grid test-bed on Jeju Island. The Jeju Island project was 
implemented by the South Korean state-run transmission operator, Korea Electric Power 
Corporation (KEPCO), and has positioned South Korea as a leader in smart grid technol-
ogy development (Kanellos 2010; Tweed 2011; Kaye 2011; Woods 2014). The State of 
Illinois and South Korea established a partnership in 2010 to facilitate the development 
and testing of smart grid models, with South Korea wanting to take the “island model to 
the city” (Woods 2014). And they also needed to find a place that could work for ad-
vanced testing which involved both a willing municipality and an infrastructure that 
needed minimal updating. As the sustainability director of Oak Park explained,   
I think one of the attractions was not only the progressive mentality of our 
officials and senior staff, but also because we are in an urban area. Jeju is-
land is kind of like a resort area, their Hawaii, so it was a bit more rural, 
and they really wanted to test their model in a compact urban scenario. 
(Presentation at Summer 2013 meeting of the Mayor’s Innovation Project) 
After several meetings with delegations from the Korean Smart Grid Institute, 
Oak Park was eventually chosen, out of 288 surveyed communities, as the place to im-
plement the project. This fit with the ongoing smart grid collaboration, which positioned 
the resources around Oak Park and Chicago in their competitive bid.  The resources of 
the Illinois Institute of Technology and the University of Chicago were involved in smart 
grid activities through testing technologies on campus micro-grids (IIT) or through data 
collection and analysis (UC). ComEd had selected Oak Park as the location for a smart 
substation as apart of the larger ComEd smart grid innovation corridor in northern Illi-
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nois. Together with favorable state funding and state legislation, Oak Park’s project was 
being set up as a community demonstration project that didn’t need to wait for the smart 
grid to come to them, but instead could “showcase the technological, financial, and policy 
investments communities can make right now”(Hamilton et al. 2011, 37).  The economic 
push from the State of Illinois and political pressure to implement the smart grid coupled 
with the utopian smart grid project implemented in Jeju Island provided a model and 
guiding vision for the City of Oak Park’s own smart grid program which came to be 
called the SmartCityUSA project.  
In 2013, Oak Park hosted the Mayors Innovation Project’s summer meeting, 
which brought together city officials from around the Midwest, consultants, and non-
profit organizations to discuss early childhood education, promoting walkable urbanisms, 
promoting diverse communities, and benefiting from smart meters and grids. Oak Park’s 
Sustainability Director discussed the SmartCityUSA project alongside executives of Pe-
can Street, and the Mayor of Tallahassee, Florida.  The plan the city had laid out had still 
lacked specificity in terms of technical project implementation, the Korean Smart Grid 
Institute had stopped actively participating in Oak Park’s plans and did not continue to 
fund the project, and in August 2014, the Village Board had determined they needed out-
side support for successful planning and implementation. As a result of a request for pro-
posals, Pecan Street was brought on board to work with Oak Park to develop and imple-
ment the project, taking their experience in Austin and elsewhere as an example for emu-
lation, applying lessons learned.  In March of 2015, Pecan Street came and presented a 
plan to Oak Park’s board and staff which explained the various parts of the 
SmartCityUSA project collaboration with the Korean Smart Grid Institute.  Pecan Street 
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explained SmartCityUSA as a project is the “creation of a nationally known research test-
bed [...] basically setting up a framework for doing all the smart grid research programs 
you want ” (Village of Oak Park 2015).  The SmartCityUSA project was positioned, 
again, as a way to bring ground-breaking research to Oak Park, which provide opportuni-
ties for broader learning related to the Village’s own attempt to transition towards low-
carbon energy generation and reduce consumption. The Village officials identified the 
benefits of the project in the ability to meet the community’s environmental goals. The 
Village President in 2014 explained: 
Having the demonstrated knowledge, experience and expertise in getting 
smart grid projects up and running is a major step toward achieving our 
goal of keeping Oak Park a leader in environmental initiatives. [...] With 
Pecan Street’s assistance, we can move closer to implementing a project 
that will underscore the Village’s commitment to environmental sustaina-
bility. (Village of Oak Park 2014a) 
However, the impacts of the project beyond the benefits to local goals for sustain-
ability and citizen empowerment to become “prosumers” as the Village Manager ex-
plained,  
Oak Park would like to create a program for homeowners and renters to 
participate so we can analyze the utilization of home energy management 
systems, solar panels, and battery backup systems so we can determine, 
the viability of that type of program within an urban community and how 
that technologies can integrate into the grid, and how we can really make 
homeowners I guess, our new favorite word is prosumers, like producers 
and consumers of electricity. (Interview, October 2015) 
While the logic of providing the ability of citizens to be more active consumers, 
not passive, Oak Park found distributed energy, storage, and smart technologies to be 
essentially technological components for enabling a “smarter” energy consumer and an 
environmentally-minded citizen.  In this respect, the governance of energy seemed to be 
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enacted through the practices of Oak Park’s citizens, and the local government was only a 
facilitator of this more environmentally friendly energy conduct.  As the Village Manager 
explained:  
I think Oak Park continues to play an important role by having the com-
munity awareness of the issue and being part of the conversation. Its eve-
rything from building codes, and how those work, to battery backup and 
solar is not the normal thing to do, so I think we are playing an important 
part of the conversation making sure we have codes that facilitate and al-
low those types of opportunities and we have a lot of residents who are do-
ing it on their own and they just need community support to make it a little 
bit easier, instead of those handful of people who have shear determination 
to kind of go off the grid to some degree. (Interview, October 2015) 
The Village Manager also saw the role of Oak Park as a facilitator, and intermediary in a 
broader energy transition, where local government could be the “community outreach” 
and “community awareness” of the need to bring smart grid solutions to Oak Park’s envi-
ronmental problems. Two key issues relating both to energy transitions and policy mobil-
ities are central here. Firstly, the city serves as an intermediary in a broader energy transi-
tion, itself acting as a laboratory for policy and sociotechnical interventions and a facilita-
tor of partnerships, or to “shape technological transitions through strategic intermediaries 
that mediate relations systemically between technological potentials and local context” 
(Hodson and Marvin 2009d, 516; Hodson and Marvin 2010a; Hodson and Marvin 2012; 
Moss 2009; Guy, Marvin, and Medd 2011). But the city is also shaped by pressures to 
compete locally and globally for innovations, and limited in ability to shape transitions by 
exogenous conditions or social, political and economic positions and institutional path-
dependencies.  Therefore, the city can act to both develop “place-based” visions of tech-
nological change and work to govern that change, as in the case of SmartCityUSA, but 
they do so in the context of a global flow of knowledge (McFarlane 2011). 
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Secondly, this illustrates a point which McCann (2013) describes as policy 
boosterism and extrospection. Policy boosterism plays an important role in the mobiliza-
tion of polices, models, visions, and knowledge from place to place, city to city around 
the world. Similarly, extrospection refers to “the various ways in which policy actors in 
the city are tied to a range of national and global policymaking communities and institu-
tions as well as to various cities elsewhere as they teach and/or learn about innovative 
policies” (McCann 2013, 7). In Oak Park, the Village Manager explained that the 
SmartCityUSA project was explicitly about vision the city projected and opportunities for 
intercity learning: 
I think it might be more about helping other cities understand that there is 
municipal role, possibly, in facilitating this. So I have worked in Iowa, 
Nebraska, and Illinois, and every state has different, both Nebraska and 
Iowa were both public power systems, and each municipality has a differ-
ent perspective on what roles and responsibilities they play in their rela-
tionship to the electrical supplier, and so I think a demonstration project, if 
we can help municipalities understand what the benefits are of being a fa-
cilitator between the resident as an individual and the public power suppli-
er or the private power supplier to facilitate more community based goals, 
its an important role for a municipality to play. (Interview, October 2015) 
Oak Park saw the benefits of the SmartCityUSA project not just for their own cit-
izens, but for a wider policy audience of municipalities across the country and globe. The 
case of Oak Park shows how cities - although only a small municipality of only 52,000 
people, and overshadowed in many ways by the adjacent City of Chicago - engage in 
these practices of policy boosterism and extrospection as a part of urban energy transition 
processes. This indicates that these practices play an important role in the governance of 
urban energy transition.  
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As of 2016, the SmartCityUSA project has still not been implemented. While the 
project has yet to be completed, funding streams are still being considered for the demon-
stration project, and new partnerships are being sought.  
5.3.2 Take the power back? Boulder’s SmartGridCity and municipalization 
The City of Boulder has a long history of environmental activism and energy ac-
tion. From the early green building ordinances and requirements to the groundbreaking 
carbon tax, Boulder has often been at the “vanguard” of municipal climate action.  The 
city has a tremendous amount of experience with new programs and policy, and when 
their electric utility, Xcel Energy, proposed a pilot project for the smart grid, the city ac-
cepted with particular requests from the utility in return: increased renewables, customer-
oriented technology, and no extra costs to ratepayers.  
An ABC News segment from 2008 described Xcel Energy’s SmartGridCity pro-
ject in Boulder as a program that “could change the way we live entirely.”  The segment 
included and an interview with Xcel Energy Executive, Ray Gogel, where he explained 
the desire to integrate the worlds of Thomas Edison and Bill Gates while the news report-
er narrated a video segment showing electric poles and linesman calling the city a “living 
laboratory” for the smart grid. The segment featured the University of Colorado’s Chan-
cellor’s house which served as a demonstration project for Xcel Energy’s project outfitted 
with smart meters, energy management systems, solar systems, electric vehicles, and bat-
tery energy storage systems. Then, they interviewed a local citizen who claimed hanging 
clothes outside to dry was the biggest energy saving activity the smart grid offered him, a 
chance to change his behavior to reduce energy consumption.  
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This news segment highlighted numerous issues that the SmartGridCity project 
would face as the project progressed. The first was the one-off demonstration project’s 
success not followed up by broader implementation. While the Chancellor’s house was 
fully outfitted with smart grid technologies, the rest of the community did not have access 
to these benefits. The second key issue was the lack of insightful or helpful information 
the smart grid technologies provided to the City. While the smart grid project helped Xcel 
fund infrastructure upgrades, which was funded by a rate increase that was approved and 
later overturned, it did little to help Boulder’s citizens. Smart grid technologies were en-
rolled in a broader strategy of low-carbon governance enacted through information provi-
sion, training, and learning activities, but without implementation of technologies, this 
strategy seemed to fail. While the success of changing one citizen’s behavior was high-
lighted in the news segment, it seems difficult to say hang drying clothes was part of the 
city and utility’s smart grid strategy.   
The SmartGridCity project captured attention from numerous policymakers and 
city officials who had their eyes on smart city and smart grid technologies.  The project 
was pitched as a test-bed and a living laboratory to jumpstart an energy transition using 
smart technologies. Xcel described the project as a technology pilot “that allows us to 
explore smart-grid tools in a real-world setting” (XcelEnergy 2016).  Boulder’s city offi-
cials were at first quite enthusiastic about the project as it promised benefits locally and 
regionally. The existing local economy in Boulder has on research and innovation, with a 
diverse set of industries tied to aerospace, bioscience, cleantech, IT, and outdoor recrea-
tion. Significant IT and smart grid related company presences include Siemens, Navigant 
Consulting, Tendril Networks, Cisco, Oracle, Nest, Google Boulder, Qualcomm, Twitter, 
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and IBM (Boulder Economic Council 2016).  IBM included Boulder in its Smarter Cities 
Challenge and worked with city officials on a report to launch its smart grid sector from 
the Xcel project. The report detailed how Boulder could capitalize on the SmartGridCity 
project to help meet goals laid out in the City’s Climate Action Plan (CAP), but upon 
consultation with various groups, IBM’s team noted disagreement about what benefits the 
smart grid could offer, and friction between the utility, the City, and its citizens (IBM 
2011). IBM’s recommendations included both increasing local renewables and develop-
ing pilot projects utilizing the resources of nearby National Renewable Energy Laborato-
ry (NREL) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In a reference 
to the possibilities for these pilots, the report explained examples of a smart city project 
in Manheim, Germany, or the GridSmartCity in Burlington, Ontario, Canada could be 
references for renewable integration, while a host of other pilots offered other programs 
such as automated energy management for different customers, remote control, and grid 
operations.   
Despite the capabilities of the SmartGridCity, Boulder’s efforts with carbon re-
duction were slowed in 2010 when Xcel brought online a new coal power generating fa-
cility in Pueblo, Colorado. This occurred around the same time that the City’s 20-year 
franchise agreement with Xcel was about to expire, and when issues with the Smart-
GridCity project had surfaced.  As the sustainability manager for the city explained:  
Why does that matter, it matters because in our greenhouse gas inventory 
we get the same soup of electrons that everybody else gets. So as we 
looked at our effectiveness on our climate action plan we had turned the 
trajectory and started to go down, just on demand side [interventions] and 
then when they bring the new coal plant online brings the carbon intensity 
of our grid power all the sudden shot our trajectory back up like this. So 
smart grid falling apart, having to go to the commission to fight them on 
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that, and fight on behalf of other customers in the state who are now say-
ing, ‘oh Boulder gets this fancy toy and we have to pay for it,’ and were 
saying ‘No.’ That accompanied with the franchise agreements not going 
anywhere and then realizing that unless we dealt with our supply, we’ll 
never have an impact on our emissions, kind of those three things hap-
pened all at once, and that’s when we went to our council and said, we re-
ally ought to strongly consider municipalization at this point. (Interview, 
November 2015) 
As the City’s long-time commitment to reduce climate change related emissions 
had been compromised with Xcel’s new coal-fired power plant, city officials, and citizens 
had started to consider municipalization as a real strategy to guide their urban energy 
transition towards a pathway they desired.  Three key issues in the movement towards 
municipalization are important here and related to smart grid experiments, urban energy 
transitions, and policy mobilities. Firstly, the political economic context of Boulder’s 
energy system had presented issues for the City’s strategies to reduce carbon and tackle 
climate change goals. While the city had been successful in implementing many demand-
side programs, such as extensive green building codes and solar rebates, they encountered 
the troubles of not having agency over the source of electricity which was solely with 
Xcel and its board and investors. While the smart grid promises more active consumer 
participation, it was apparent that the active element did not include influence of deci-
sion-making over the resource portfolios for the utility. In terms of the energy transitions 
approach, this reflects the spatially explicit, territorial dimensions of energy systems 
wherein the approach of an incumbent sociotechnical regime is structured regionally by 
cheapest resources and by legal frameworks and rules at the state and federal level which 
allow further construction of coal fired power plants, well outside the agency of cities to 
change. It also helps explain the resistance of incumbent sociotechnical regimes to 
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change, indicating a need to understand issues of geographical political economy, soci-
otechnical obduracy, and accompanying and interrelated relations of power in urban en-
ergy transitions (Chandrashekeran 2016; Geels 2014; Hommels 2005).   
Secondly, the Xcel’s SmartGridCity fell short of the societal expectations for the 
project. While the promise of the smart grid resounded with the national attention it had 
received – outlined in Chapter 3, including promises of greater reliability, cleaner elec-
tricity, more efficiency, more customer choice and control, and economic benefits – 
many of these benefits were not visible to Boulder’s residents or city officials. The smart 
grid experiment implemented here lacked the outward, customer-oriented approach need-
ed to gain public trust and legitimation in political processes (Späth and Rohracher 2012; 
Ezrahi 1990). While a critical approach may show the democratic deficit and specta-
cle/speculation-orientation of projects that this view may encourage, it also helps to ex-
plain why Boulder’s smart grid experiment under private utility direction had fallen short 
of public expectations. This coupled with the lack of the City’s ability to serve an inter-
mediary role, seemed to forestall any significant smart grid policy or project innovation 
(Moss 2009). Instead, what emerged was a point of extrospection as the City look to mu-
nicipalities elsewhere who had direct control over their electric utility and in this way had 
a better ability to manage energy system transitions. 
This leads to the third point that the case of Boulder highlights. In the face of a 
lack of agency to control their energy system and their smart grid project, the City of 
Boulder looked to models and policies elsewhere for the development of a municipal 
utility that could operate in concert with the goals and values of the City. This points to-
wards an understudied element of urban energy transitions, a deficit which policy mobili-
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ty approaches can help to overcome. While some scholars in transition studies have 
pointed to the role of places and demonstrations in governing and guiding transitions 
through visions, little has been done to explain how the context of globalized economic 
competition, urban entrepreneurialism, or the “extrospective” gaze might impact how 
transitions occur and are shaped (Späth and Rohracher 2010; Hodson and Marvin 2009d; 
Coenen and Truffer 2012).  Policy mobilities approaches help attend to this problematic 
by focusing on flows of policy models and knowledge and practices of actors who mobi-
lize models and knowledge.  
Boulder’s efforts at municipalization are made possible firstly by Colorado state 
law, which also includes processes for purchasing or condemning the systems at fair 
market value (Briggerman, Costinescu, and Bond 2012). The city initially started to work 
with Xcel on developing a partnership to help meet the city’s climate goals.  But after 
disagreement in negotiations and a lack of common ground, the City chose to forgo fran-
chise renewal with Xcel. This caused a problem because the city gains revenue from a 
franchise fee, but to circumvent this, Boulder opted to use a utility occupation tax that 
would make up for lost franchise revenue. This ballot measure was passed by Boulder 
voters in 2010.   
The sustainability manager of the City explained that this was a position that they 
had to take up because of the different goals and values between Boulder and Xcel. He 
explained the short history leading up to the decision to forgo the franchise, 
We found ourselves in a really unique place saying do we really want to 
sign another 20-year agreement given the priority of climate and the prior-
ity of energy, things are changing so rapidly, should we sign another 20-
year agreement. If so, this is our one chance to negotiate. In terms of ener-
gy policy in states like Colorado, you are really limited on what you can 
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and can’t do. It’s a homogenized system. So even if we want to do some-
thing different in terms of portfolio, we can’t, even if we want to do things 
on the grid in terms of grid modernization, in terms of large scale DG, you 
can’t without the approval of the incumbent utility. And for them, like it or 
not, we know that DG is a threat. It’s just a reality that every utility is fac-
ing now, that are vertically integrated. So we begin negotiating in earnest 
around 2007 and 2008 and we tried to work on site agreements and ways 
to really develop a new type of partnership with the utility to say, ‘let’s go 
to the commission and see if we can do something different, instead of be-
ing the standard white bread franchise, how can we be the test-model for 
the new utility structure’. We weren’t really able to get where we wanted 
to go, but I should say, dropped right in the middle of this was knowing 
that we were moving in that direction. They, and when I say they I mean 
PSCO, operating as Xcel, Xcel operates in 8 states and its PSCO here in 
Colorado, So they came to us and said ‘well you know, we are thinking 
about this new idea of smart grid and we’d love to see if you guys are in-
terested, but quid pro quo, you need to give up on municipalization for the 
time being’.  We said well we can’t tell the future council that they can’t 
go back to it, but we are willing. The direction from our council was work 
with PSCO on franchise negotiations and implementing smart grid. (Inter-
view, November, 2015) 
The SmartGridCity project emerged at a time in 2007-2008 when these negotia-
tions were initially taking place. Used as a sort of ‘bargaining chip’ the utility promised 
several key benefits for the project that would help meet the city’s CAP goals. But the 
project missed, the mark as Boulder’s sustainability manager explained: 
Xcel effectively went dark for over a year, there was a lot of publicity 
around the SmartGridCity project, international publicity, and we had a lot 
of people coming to Boulder, saying ‘we’d like to see the smart grid,’ and 
we would say ‘you need to contact Xcel because we don’t really know 
what you want to see.’ They had a mobile unit that really showed automa-
tion systems and what you could do with it and they kind of toured this lit-
tle thing around to say here, ‘the vision of smart grid.’ It was like a little 
mobile home and you could go in and there were posters, and it was like, 
it was a mobile experience of smart grid. They installed a couple test sites, 
one at the chancellor’s house, one at CU, so there was a lot of positive dis-
cussion around what smart grid was capable of. They spent a bunch of 
time doing a lot of installations at some of the transformers, they tore up a 
lot of streets to lay fiber, and essentially installed a lot infrastructure, in-
stalled 23,000 new meters, residential meters, and a handful of commer-
cial meters (we have 50,000 meters). [...] All of that, okay we said ‘do 
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that, and then we can talk about smart grids’, and we were finally able to 
sit down and talk with Xcel and say ‘Okay, when do we start,’ and they 
said, ‘Start? We’re done.’  (Interview, November 2016) 
SmartGridCity created massive public expectations for the smart grid in Boulder, 
but few customer-facing programs or technologies were implemented. Instead, Boulder 
brought the request to create a municipal utility in 2011 (Ballot Measures 2B and 2C), 
winning by a narrow margin at approximately 51 percent. This was the result of tremen-
dous local activism in the face of a million-dollar campaign from Xcel (Local Activist, 
Interview, April 2016).  Another ballot measure (2E) passed in 2013 refined acquisition 
costs, and in 2014 another ballot measure (2B) passed to allow the city council to hold 
private executive sessions to discuss legal advice for creation of the local utility.  
Although legal precedent was in place, Boulder focused heavily on finding exam-
ples and models from other cities who operate municipal utilities. Local smart grid initia-
tives and systems planning for microgrids have taken place in island settings, on military 
bases, university campuses, and industrial parks. Boulder’s case highlights the smart grid 
tensions that were discussed in Chapter 3 over control and governance of smart grids and 
energy transitions. Tensions over control involve contests over values and goals, and 
technical decisions regarding how to meet energy demand, with what technologies and 
with what sources of electricity. Here, a local technopolitics of energy system design and 
operation, with different business models, planning mechanisms, and roles for citizens, 
industry actors, and the municipality are tied up with questions of technical specificity. In 
this regard, technologies are performative in that they help to enact political goals 
(Çalışkan and Callon 2009; D. MacKenzie 2009; Hecht 2000).  Here, an important issue 
arises that brings questions of urban energy transitions into the structured, power-laden 
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world of policy mobility scholars interested in the way assemblage-thinking allows con-
sideration of technical, material elements of policy in line with the efficacy, mobility, and 
mutability of policy. Several sociotechnical issues are identified in the actions by Boulder 
and Xcel to engage in technopolitics, and at the same time pull from examples and histo-
ries elsewhere to support their positions.  
Table 5: Issues in Boulder's smart grid 
Sociotechnical 
Issue 
Boulder (Challenger) Xcel (Incumbent) 
Ownership Municipal Investor-Owned Utility 
Portfolio 
A transition from 50% on 
day 1 to 100% renewables 
by 2030 
24% renewables by 2037, with 
some transition of reduction in 






generation, smart home 
technologies, EVs, market-
place/testbed for local en-
trepreneurs 
Installed private high-speed fiber 
optic communication system or 
backhaul network, distribution 
transformers, smart meters, volt-
age, current, and temperature sen-
sors, actuators and automation, 
software upgrades 
Carbon Metrics 
Kyoto Protocol goal met 
on day 1 and 80% carbon 
reduction by 2050 
Leadership in Carbon Disclosure 
Project, American Carbon Regis-
try Excellence, public commit-
ment to reduce CO2 levels by 
20% below 2005 levels by 2020 
    
While the smart grid offers up new possibilities for more local and distributed 
generation, the question of control and agency creates an area for contestation, and in 
many ways plays an important part in the shaping of the smart grid. Conversely, the 
smart grid actives and experiments in places like Boulder are also shaping the context and 
possibilities of local energy initiatives and electricity systems planning at the municipal 
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level. One major point of contention in Boulder was the issue of the creation of Xcel’s 
fiber optic backhaul network, which due to the cost of digging and burying cables, was a 
large cost in the SmartGridCity project. The City and local activists contended that other 
solutions, such as wireless connections would have been much cheaper, but Xcel claimed 
this would not be secure or reliable for communications. This highlighted one of many 
issues that resulted in public disapproval of the project. While Xcel made significant up-
grades to the electrical grid in Boulder, they focused on grid- and utility-facing improve-
ments, while the citizens and City desired more demand-side and customer-facing tech-
nologies (see Table 5).  
One part of the City’s attempts to create a smart grid for customers, was to build 
the Community Power Partnership, which is program in partnership with Pecan Street 
that installed eGauge meters in 48 homes and 14 businesses in Boulder. The eGague me-
ters, produced by a local company of the same name, allows data collection and real-time 
energy use information to be accessed by customers so they can track their energy usage. 
The City described the project as a way to harness the power of data: 
We all know that information is power. And that power in the hands of 
community members and businesses can speed up the arrival of a better, 
cleaner future and a vibrant local economy. To this end, the City of Boul-
der, in partnership with the Pecan Street Research Institute of Austin, Tex-
as, is collaborating with residents in the Newlands and Kings Ridge/Noble 
Park neighborhoods as well as local businesses on a research pilot project 
called the Community Power Partnership. The purpose of this project is 
twofold: to understand how electricity is being used in Boulder residences 
and businesses; and to understand what tools and information homeown-
ers, renters and businesses need to better manage their resource use and 
contribute to innovative community solutions. 
Boulder’s program worked to transfer Pecan Street’s Austin-based project to their 
city through the use of the same technology, the eGauge, with the hope that homeowners 
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and businesses would better manage their electricity consumption. The CPP started to 
fulfill this need of customer-facing smart grid and data access, and due to the connections 
of the new Director of Energy Strategy and Electricity Utility Development with Pecan 
Street, the program chose to utilize their expertise from Austin’s smart grid experiment. 
As Boulder’s Sustainability Director explained: 
We had been in contact with them, to try to understand how Pecan Street 
functions as an actual smart grid project and [ask] could we apply some of 
those learnings as we were negotiating with Xcel early on. We started 
communicating with them early on, and then, our director, came form 
Austin. [Boulder’s Director of Energy Strategy and Electricity Utility De-
velopment] came from Austin because of her work with Austin Energy. 
And so she is good colleagues with those guys. So as we were talking 
about where we needed to go next, she I think saw, or I think [Pecan 
Street’s President and CEO] reached out to us and said ‘Hey maybe we 
should talk about trying to do something and maybe we can help.’ (Inter-
view, November 2015) 
The experimentation from Austin was thought to convey a type of “mobile mod-
el” for engaging citizens in the smart grid. Given the context of Austin’s municipal utili-
ty, and the strategic intermediary role that Pecan Street has played in community in-
volvement and technological testing, the knowledge generated in the Austin context was 
thought to be transferable to Boulder. It also helped that political processes and connec-
tions were able to facilitate this movement of policy models and knowledge. As Temenos 
and McCann (2012, 1391) describe the shift towards municipal sustainability programs, 
of which the CPP is exemplar, as “a political process of knowledge translation, discur-
sive framing—including the powerful framing of certain problems and policy responses 
as largely technical rather than political—and the ‘education of attention’ through the 
practical training of a wide range of residents.” The project was seen as strategic for the 
City’s municipalization efforts, as Boulder’s Environmental Action Manager noted,  
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What kind of services do people want? Unless we start now trying to fig-
ure out what people want, on day one of the utility, we won’t know. [...] 
We want to find out what’s useful and what isn’t before we end up invest-
ing $50 million or whatever Xcel invested in SmartGridCity. If it doesn’t 
help people, then it’s not a good investment (Meltzer 2014a).   
The program was also aimed at “empowering” consumers to reduce their electrici-
ty consumption through access to information. But at the same time, the contradictions of 
the behavioral change – discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 – trouble the actual benefits of the 
program to consumers. As Boulder’s Environmental Action Manager explained,  
The primary goal is to provide some tangible benefit to the project partici-
pants. What is the most useful format for customers to receive this usage 
data? We don't know that. We don't really know how resource usage in-
formation helps customers. We want to provide a service that is helpful. 
(Meltzer 2014b) 
While the Community Power Partnership did not conclusively help consumers in 
a direct way, the availability of real-time information, aided by the model and consultan-
cy of Pecan Street, helped address some of Boulder’s smart grid concerns over the lack of 
customer-facing technologies. It seemed that even if the program did little to actually 
enable savings, it included participants in the smart grid more actively than during the 
SmartGridCity project which has proved to produce more favorable public attention.  
This program and partnership with Pecan Street, thus, also helps solidify public approval 
of municipalization. While the CPP included elements of all of knowledge translation, 
similar discourse, and learning process through civic engagement, including looking for 
community ‘ambassadors’ to advocate for participation in smart grid experiments, it also 
seemed to lack the efficacy needed for Boulder’s local energy action. The CPP and work-
ing with Pecan Street, didn’t really get what the city needed in terms of data access or 
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insights for helping implement their own programs as a municipal utility, the Sustainabil-
ity Manager explained,  
Part of that is really understanding how limited we are and how far we 
could actually go with it. So we said can we actually do some of this stuff 
internally versus what they can provide for us, and it all really came down 
to data access.  So I think, it was pretty effective with the residents that 
were in the pilot. But we didn’t really set up a mechanism to say here is 
what we are trying to test, and here is what comes next. So in other words, 
we had neighborhoods selected, which were great, and they did the work 
were we were able to develop strategies for the residential customers and 
really move forward on kind of a collective approach. But ok, it was, they 
have their data, but what is it really telling us? And that’s what we were 
looking for those guys to kind of dissect for use, but it without the ability 
to contrast that to some other neighborhoods, and get that information, it 
wasn’t really helpful. Because it was before and after, so how much of that 
was ‘hey you are in this pilot now and we are going to be monitoring your 
energy consumption,” how much of it is behavior, how much of it is tech-
nology, it was really hard to draw any good conclusions, so that’s where I 
think we could have benefited from Xcel being part of that from the get 
go. And say Ok, can you, can we identify some similar neighborhoods as a 
control group or something like that. Now, they probably wouldn’t have 
agreed to it. Or at least can we use some of the facilities and customers 
that are on eGauge.  
The efforts to gather data, access it, analyze it, and do something useful with it, a 
key strategy for realizing smart grid benefits, did not emerge from the more limited smart 
grid experiment. Xcel’s incumbent sociotechnical regime, and the politics over local con-
trol, limited the City’s ability to extract the necessary lessons for the broader community. 
The small-scale experiment was successful for the few households that participated, but it 
was too limited by the lack of cooperation with the incumbent utility to produce any in-
sights for the planning of the municipal utility.  
Boulder’s case here is presented to illustrate three interweaving tensions pointed 
to before. The first is challenge of cities and municipalities to tackle climate change im-
peratives while operating with limited agency over their electricity systems. For urban 
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energy transitions, this case presents a reminder that the political economic context, vari-
ous forms of power – discursive, instrumental, institutional – impact the ability and 
pathway of an energy transition process and its outcomes (Geels 2014). The case of 
SmartGridCity and the CPP, highlights that even through inter-city learning and referenc-
ing of policies, the local context and power relations shape the efficacy of the mobile 
policy, especially under pressures of time and financing (Peck and Theodore 2010b).  
Secondly, the case highlights issues of public expectations for smart grids and associated 
visions, which presents opportunities for a technopolitics to emerge between incumbent 
regimes and its challengers. The alternative visions offered by Boulder positioned certain 
technologies and benefits of the smart grid (such as increased renewables which align 
with environmental goals) against the incumbent regimes use of particular smart grid 
technologies they saw beneficial for more efficient and reliable operations, which was not 
a key issue for the public. The taken-for-granted nature of infrastructures, where the 
steady flow electricity is assumed, plays an important role in these smart grid technopoli-
tics. The utility saw, for example, the smart grid helping maintain this “taken-for-granted-
ness” while the public expectations envisioned something much more engaging and in-
novative. Lastly, these technopolitical pressures and issues created an opportunity for the 
city to become “extrospective,” searching for smart grid experiments and utility models 
to implement locally. These models and knowledges filtered through the political actors 
of the city, privileging the experiences of Austin as a model for Boulder’s own smart grid 
experiment to boost their municipalization efforts.  By demonstrating the capabilities of 
the consumer-side of the smart grid, Boulder’s work with Pecan Street, although not ul-
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timately very effective, was a strategic act of technopolitics to enable greater support for 
the local control of the electricity system.  
5.3.3 A platform for sociotechnical experimentation: Fort Collins’ FortZED 
Approximately 45 miles north of Boulder is Fort Collins, a city of approximately 
152,000 people in Northern Colorado. The City has received attention for its commit-
ments to sustainability and livable communities. Easy access green spaces and natural 
landscapes coupled with “urban amenities” led Money magazine, for example, to call 
give it the first place ranking. 15 Making the ranks of the “greatest places to live,” it has 
also fostered new growth around research and development in energy and sustainability. 
Colorado State University (CSU) bolsters the City’s research and development industry 
with a focus on clean and renewable energy.  
The FortZED project, Fort Collins leading smart grid project, grows out of this 
context to concentrate activity on energy production and efficiency in the downtown core 
and CSU campus. FortZED was originally formulated as a zero energy district (ZED) 
concept linking the city’s downtown, the CSU campus, and buildings along the city’s 
riverfront in a smart micro-grid. The project, like Austin’s Pecan Street project, benefit-
ted from federal funding for research and development on smart grid technologies. The 
first phase of FortZED was initiated in 2008 with the DOE Renewable and Distributed 
Systems Integration (RDSI) Demonstration Project – Fort Collins was one among a group 
                                                 
15 Much more information about this 2006 ranking and others at Colorado State University’s website: 
http://www.colostate.edu/features/americas-best-place-to-live.aspx. 
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of nine communities selected by DOE with a funding pool of $55 million for the project. 
The aims of the RDSI were primarily to use renewables and distributed generation to 
decrease peak loads by 15 percent or more.   
FortZED as primarily an outcome of three entities: Fort Collins Utilities, Colora-
do Clean Energy Cluster, and UniverCity Connections (and after 2012, only CSU). These 
institutions are working collaboratively through the FortZED project to shape, construct, 
and experiment with smart grid technologies. The city-owned and operated Fort Collins 
Utilities primary interest in FortZED focuses on “transformation” for sustainability and 
protecting the environment and community in their 21st Century Utilities Initiative. As 
they note (FCU, 2014)16: 
Transformation. It's a pretty big word to imagine for an individual life, let 
alone a large, multi-service organization. That's what Fort Collins Utilities 
imagined, though, when we designed our 21st Century Utilities Initiative, 
which closely aligns with a broader community vision of protecting and 
preserving our quality of life in Northern Colorado. 
Similarly future-oriented and visionary statements envelope the discussion from Univer-
City Connections, a partnership between the City, CSU, and the Poudre River (Univer-
City Connections, 2014):  
Fort Collins’ UniverCity Connections focus area, encompassing the CSU 
campus, Old Town, and the downtown river corridor, is uniquely posi-
tioned to be at the forefront of our nation’s new energy economy. We will 
be known as leaders – with many of the nation’s experts on renewable en-
ergy theory and practice living and working in the UniverCity District. 
We’re calling this FortZED for Zero Energy District. 
                                                 
16 The 21st Century Utilities Initiative is linked to the FortZED project through grid modernization. More 
information available here: http://www.fcgov.com/utilities/sustainability-leadership 
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The Colorado Clean Energy Cluster is a group of local cleantech companies dedicated to 
growing the cleantech industry in Colorado. The organization sees FortZED as an initia-
tive that “is deployable and replicable nationally and internationally,” and provides “a 
strong competitive advantage for the many clean technology companies in Colorado par-
ticipating in its signature ‘jump-start’ project” (CEC, 2014).   
After the first phase of the RDSI project, which was highly successful, Fort Col-
lins was able to secure a second round of funding from DOE to conduct a second phase 
of research on microgrids and islanding capacity. As a representative of the City’s elec-
tric utility explained,  
The first part of the project was primarily focused on demonstrating both 
the technical and pragmatic capabilities required to use both distributed 
energy resources like solar and other sorts of generation at the edge of the 
grid instead of internally and also behavior changes to reduce peak de-
mand for electricity on a feeder part of the distribution system. [...] there 
are technical challenges with that, actual control software and systems, 
switching and stuff, necessary to integrate power coming from multiple 
places instead of just one. And the other thing is behavioral change, about 
changing peoples’ attitudes, choosing not to demand power at that peak 
time, its like do it a different time. So both technical issues about com-
municating with them saying, its time to save, and then are they ready to 
sign up and do their part and actually save. The phase 1 was focused on 
that, piloting and setting up the control software. [...] In phase 2 we ad-
dressed microgrid, sort of a continuation of the issue of managing demand 
on the overall grid. The concept of microgrids, about part of the grid, part 
of the community, the campus, and organization being able to be separate 
from the grid and have their own energy source. (Interview, November 
2015) 
Another highly successful project, Fort Collins participation in the RDSI helped position 
the city at the center of attention in the developing area of smart grid technologies. Not 
only did the project spur local success with local companies participating and piloting 
their smart grid technologies such as energy management software, and encourage active 
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participation from the local community, it also attracted attention extralocally, with 
communities from around the country, and internationally, interested in the technical ca-
pabilities of the FortZED project. As one city planning office representative explained: 
They (local companies) were able to modify their technologies, they work 
on control systems, platforms for software, they were able to develop their 
next generation platform based on some of the outcomes of RDSI phase 
one study. [...] The city had a tremendous amount of PR out of it. So that 
part was very successful, however it was very hard to convey to the pub-
lic. It was very engineering-focused, very technical. (Interview, November 
2015) 
While much of the work on FortZED benefitted local companies and demonstrated vari-
ous smart grid technologies and models, it didn’t actively engage with the local commu-
nity who had gained interest in the project. However, these technical demonstrations 
helped the city attract further funding from the Department of Energy with their Smart 
Grid Implementation Grants program which Fort Collins received. As a representative of 
the city planning office explained: 
The RDSI study was the first of the nine DOE projects to be completed 
and in my opinion established a very strong reputation for the City of Fort 
Collins and our municipal utility. [...] It established us with the Depart-
ment of Energy, allowed us to get the second study, and in my opinion 
probably allowed us to get a Smart Grid Investment Grant which allowed 
us to upgrade the entire Fort Collins grid to smart, advanced metering. So 
we got that Smart Grid Investment Grant back in 2011, SGIG was the 
name of it. We got half of or maybe seventeen, of the $36 million, and we 
got I think a little more than half, and bonds, so we paid for it, the utility 
ratepayers paid for it. So it had to go to council, etc. and there was some 
small incremental rate increase for it, and those were all the mechanisms 
for it. So basically everything wrapped up by 2012 -2013 for RDSI, and 
we characterized it as post-project depression, and there was really ques-
tions about what do you do next, there really wont be any more of these 
grants coming out. (Fort Collins City Planning representative, Interview, 
November 2015) 
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The City was able to capitalize on the benefits of the initial RDSI, DOE funded studies to 
leverage the matching funds from the SGIG, which as Chapter 3 discusses, invested ap-
proximately $8 billion in smart grid infrastructure and programs throughout the country. 
17 While the funding required matching funds and rate increases, Fort Collins did not ex-
perience significant customer dissent.  The experimentation with initial FortZED pro-
grams gained support as they “proved” different smart concepts early on. For example, 
they highlight how different parts of the grid system could be “island-ed” or essentially 
operated as an independent microgrid. This demonstration captured the attention from 
many resilience minded city officials, including many east coast communities after Su-
perstorm Sandy and officials from Japan after the Fukushima disaster, many of whom 
visited Fort Collins and attended presentations by utility and city officials. As a planning 
office representative explained to me: 
That one (the microgrid study) generated a lot of interest, particularly from 
Japan after the nuclear meltdown [...] they were really interested in trying 
to advance renewables quickly and were interested in microgrids after 
that. We also got a lot of interest in that study after SuperStorm Sandy, got 
a lot of communities in the northeast, a lot of communities interested in 
how it works. But those aren’t really sexy to the average person in Fort 
Collins. (Interview, November 2015) 
While much attention was gathered extralocally, the FortZED project had lost the 
attention of local citizens who initially supported the zero energy district concept. The 
decrease in local support and excitement for the project translated into difficulties with 
                                                 
17 More information about SGIG and exact funding distribution is available at: 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/overview/smart_grid_investment_grant_program.html.  
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further implementation and political support. This led to a reinvigoration and reinterpreta-
tion of the City’s project. As the City’s lead on FortZED explained: 
Its just, people are very busy and, I think where FortZED kind of lies now 
is, back in March when we adopted the more aggressive greenhouse gas 
mitigation goals for our climate action plan, we tied not only the vision of 
expanding the focus of advancing the energy sector. We modified the vi-
sion of FortZED to really help the city achieve its environmental and eco-
nomic goals. And tied that specifically to the energy sector. (Interview, 
November 2015) 
The malleability of the smart grid experiment in Fort Collins allowed the city to alter the 
discourse and direction of the project to align with community values for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.  The project received a boost from the Rocky Mountain Insti-
tute (RMI) who also gained interest in the project for its ability to test not only new tech-
nologies, but new business models.  RMI conducted a community charrette to rethink the 
FortZED model, which resulted in three major things. First, RMI supported the move-
ment towards reinventing FortZED to support climate and environmental goals of the 
City (Chan et al. 2014; Maurer and Newcomb 2013). Second, this resulted in a reinterpre-
tation of the FortZED project to move beyond the “exclusivity” of the district concept 
(Fort Collins representative, Interview 2015) towards more city-wide strategies that 
would enable more explicit connection with more citizens. This helped avoid the “politi-
cal issue’ of the districting concept (ibid.).  Third, the RMI charrette helped shift the fo-
cus away from zero energy, the other part of the name of FortZED, to focus on broader 
energy sector issues such as business models. Under the influence of RMI’s “own agen-
da” (ibid.), the City shifted towards attempting to develop integrated utility services 
(IUS). Under this model, the City created a pilot program (which had only five partici-
pants in November 2015) where the utility facilitated demand management, energy effi-
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ciency, and distributed generation packages that consumers could choose from and fi-
nance with on-bill financing offered through the City. As RMI’s whitepaper on the issue 
explains (Campbell et al. 2014, 6), “the pilot will provide a model for other utilities and 
cities around the nation interested in providing clean, reliable electricity to their custom-
ers while stabilizing their own utility business models.” So while the smart grid experi-
ment, or pilot with on-bill financing, customer engagement using smart technologies, and 
better integration of sales-to-installation was interested in reinventing the concept of 
FortZED, it also had a direct focus on influencing other cities and the electricity sector 
more generally. RMI played a key role in this broader network.  
Another key network that the City engaged in was the Urban Sustainability Direc-
tor’s Network (USDN) which enables City staff to engage with a broad network of City 
officials across the country. Many of the cities in the USDN were also participating in the 
Georgetown Energy Prize Competition, a competition put on by Georgetown University 
to encourage energy consumption reduction in cities across the country. As a City Plan-
ning representative explained: 
I think that’s what Georgetown is trying to get at, how can some of this 
stuff be translated to the rest of the country and rolled out in a way where 
somebody can learn and just retool it for what works in their community. 
[...] So we do have a lot of communication with cities through PRPA, 
CCEC, and then we have a huge network within our own staff that com-
municates with different cities, Austin has kind of been our BMP city for 
years, we’ve gone out there a number of times to talk to them, some of the 
other cities, Portland, Seattle, we all look too, some of the cities, Sacra-
mento, San Diego, SMUD [Sacramento Municipal Utility District] we all 
have had some different interactions with them. There is a network called 
the Urban Sustainability Directors Network which is a non-profit that a 
number of progressive people working on sustainability issues use, and 
that’s really helpful, but conferences and all that, people come and talk to 
us a lot, like I said with FortZED, I think 30 different countries have 
come, and those involve presentations, and those aren’t fun to do, having 
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to have everything translated, [...] but they are still interested in coming to 
learn. Our CAP goals alone, I mean everybody who cares about this stuff 
are watching. (Interview, November 2015) 
The outward focus of much of Fort Collins work in their FortZED project had 
come at the cost of local interest.  A confluence of factors ranging from the technical na-
ture of the smart grid interventions to the lack of organizational structure for facilitating 
volunteers and participants had resulted in a project less about local energy and climate 
action (at least at first) and more about proving technical smart grid concepts such as is-
landing and peak demand reduction.  
The case of Fort Collins highlights two major issues at the intersection of urban 
energy transitions and policy mobility. The first relates to the politics of local smart grid 
experiments and extralocal audiences who include not only other municipalities, but also 
energy technology companies and federal funders. This led much of the initial FortZED 
project to focus on technological demonstration and proof of concept, and less on com-
municating how these technical benefits would impact or resonate community goals and 
values. Fort Collins volunteers and participants in programs lost interest in FortZED once 
these primary phases were completed, which caused the city to have difficulty in organiz-
ing further smart grid programs with community support. These technical considerations 
and demonstration also have their flaws and shortcomings. In particular, both engineers 
and planners cited the issue of data overload and the problem of finding value in smart 
grid technologies that provided data and information. For example, a city planning repre-
sentative explained:  
The other thing that we are getting a lot of interest in from businesses is a 
potential FortZED project with [software companies] based on the Internet 
of Things, which is basically micro metering on our smart grid system. 
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But there is a laboratory, at CS interested in this and a couple other build-
ings on campus that use a lot of energy. Part of the problem we are having 
with the AMI technology is basically that it’s just a flood of data. And 
there is not a lot of advanced management systems to determine what you 
are supposed to be doing, energy managers don’t know what to do with it, 
and that’s a huge problem. CSU has a huge problem with it. It’s really a 
floodgate of all this data, and they don’t know what— they don’t have a 
way of, I guess, aggregating and disseminating the information to get the 
energy profile of the building, and they can’t optimize. [...] But we have 
had a number of business trying to talk to us because they don’t know 
what to do either. And that’s really one of the biggest challenges related to 
smart grid right now, is this— basically we have this huge investment and 
we don’t have any return on it right now. Because we don’t have any way 
of managing the amount of data we are getting. (Interview, November 
2015) 
This technical issue resulted in more attention to the FortZED project as companies want-
ing to test-out their software approached the City and the University. Although FortZED 
offers a new “platform” for advanced smart grid technologies and applications, the City 
officials I spoke said that they have the ethical responsibility to not privilege certain tech-
nology companies.  They explained that the request for proposals process the City uses is 
mandatory for ensuring fair competition: 
I get approached all the time by individual vendors, but I have no pro-
curement process that I can give individual advantage to. [...] it means if 
you’re Verizon and you come talk to me, I can tell you what our challeng-
es are, but we have an RFP going out, which is a request for proposal for 
services or products, — I don’t want to give you advantage because this is 
a public entity, and those procurement processes are in place to avoid cor-
ruption, and earmarking, and contractor advantage, because that’s just how 
it works and should work frankly, but its challenging when you work with 
businesses for year [...] which [served] on our steering committee and 
helps us do studies, but an RFP goes out and they have no guarantee of 
getting it. So it’s an investment of time. [...] But can they apply what they 
learned from Fort Collins utilities to other customers? Of course, but its 
not a tangible outcome for them always. So that’s part of the challenge of 
having those type[s] of partnerships.  (Interview, November 2015) 
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This quote raises a second point related to urban energy transitions and experimentation 
that this case highlights: the smart grid offers a platform for testing varieties of soci-
otechnical interventions, but these are often shaped by the interests of incumbent regimes. 
While the case of Austin highlighted a similar dilemma, in terms of “opening-up” the city 
to private investors and encouraging entrepreneurial forms of urban governance, Fort 
Collins shows that the commitment of private companies comes with hopeful expecta-
tions for special treatment in public procurement processes.  
5.3.4 Austin as exemplar? Traveling logics, rationalities, techniques 
Chapter 4 highlighted the Pecan Street project in Austin as an “exemplar” for ur-
ban smart grid implementation and testing. Two key elements of the project had inspired 
and traveled, in various ways, to Oak Park, Fort Collins, and Boulder: the test-bed ap-
proach and the related logic of customer engagement through particular energy monitor-
ing and feedback programs.  This section reflects on the concepts and rationalities that 
travelled, and the practices and processes which facilitated that travel. Pulling from the 
cases above, this highlights how inter-city referencing “traveling technocrats” and best 
practices shape and are shaped by the context of the city and infrastructure project.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, I highlighted how Austin’s smart grid experiment was 
conceived and developed as a “test-bed” for new smart grid interventions. These inter-
ventions are sociotechnical and attempt to configure energy governance through the ma-
teriality of the city and the shaping of energy conduct while also positioning the city as an 
entrepreneurial hotspot for startups and venture capitalists. The test-bedding approach 
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was produced as a model in Austin, but this played a significant role in shaping the urban 
smart grid projects in both Oak Park and Fort Collins.  
Oak Park city officials directly engaged the concept of a “test-bed” in their 
SmartCityUSA project suggesting that it would stimulate their sustainability efforts. They 
referenced the Austin and Korean examples, suggesting that “best practices” related to 
smart grid implementation must be included in a test-bed approach; it’s experimental and 
focused on testing and development, aligning the interests of the incumbent utility, a few 
interested and motivated research participants, and technology companies. The test-bed 
approach also is favorable for producing valuable data on energy consumption serving a 
research purpose needed to get state and private funding.  
Similarly, in Fort Collins, the test-bed approach was categorized as an essential 
feature of the project. Influencing their approach was not only Austin as a “peer” city, but 
as a way to attract the matching funds of the DOE. The SGIG funding streams had specif-
ic requirements for testing which influenced the types of smart grid projects a city or util-
ity would implement. Importantly, this suggests that the test-bed approach is not only 
related to urban entrepreneurialism and inter-city referencing, but contingent on the na-
tional level interests in promoting the smart grid as a governmental program.  
This leads to consideration of embedded governmental rationalities that may be 
carried in urban smart grid experiments, but shaped by particular modes of implementa-
tion. This is most apparent in the approach to engaging customers in smart grid projects, 
enabling participation in research field trials, and in the process, shaping relationships 
between consumers and the smart grid. Most notable was the interconnection between 
Austin and Boulder’s smart grid experiments, which used the same home energy moni-
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toring technology and software as a way to engage consumers in field trials. As discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4, the logics of this approach entail shaping of consumer identities and 
conduct through feedback, pricing mechanisms, and normative messaging. While these 
are certainly general approaches, the positive experiences and new knowledge generated 
in Austin served as a “proving ground” for these approaches, allowing city officials in 
Boulder and Oak Park to cite them as a basis for authority and support of their own pro-
jects.  
5.3.5 Experiments, Mobilities, Transitions 
These three case studies elucidate key issues in urban energy transitions, building 
on Rutherford and Coutard's (2014) overview, and help to show why the perspective of 
policy mobilities is useful for further inquiry and explanation.   
(1) The infrastructures, technologies, and material artifacts of the smart grid are 
fundamentally part of the urban. They constitute the material fabric of the city, 
facilitating the flows of electricity into, across, and between cities, enabling the 
everyday activities of lighting, cooling, heating, computing, etc.  As such, recon-
figuration of these urban infrastructures, as in smart grid experiments described 
above, can be a major part of testing and implementing pathways for low-carbon 
transition. At the same time, however, transitions are sociotechnical and include 
the co-production, shaping, or contestation of both technologies and social prac-
tices, norms, and values. This is especially important in consideration of smart 
grid experiments which may re-orient the relationship between producers and 
consumers through technologies of demand-side management, demand response, 
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or distributed generation. However, the existing sociotechnical regimes have con-
siderable power over the ways in which these infrastructures are utilized and con-
trolled, constricting possible pathways emerging from smart grid experiments. 
In Oak Park, the installation of smart meters and smart substations allowed for the in-
cumbent utility to create an “innovation corridor” placing Oak Park at its center. While 
these infrastructural changes did not represent a part of the SmartCityUSA project, they 
created the conditions under which a smart grid experiment could be facilitated by 
providing the necessary background infrastructure. This however, presented the issue of 
working in partnership with the incumbent utility, which has its own sets of interests and 
responsibilities to shareholders and regional electricity markets. Points of intersection 
between the possible integration of distributed renewables and voluntary demand re-
sponse fit with Oak Park’s goals for environmental action, but could create friction with 
ComEd’s desire to manage and dispatch those sources of generation or stored energy. 
The partnership seemed favorable but also necessary from Oak Park’s standpoint.  The 
infrastructural changes that occurred had impacts on the regional economy, and made it 
possible for smart grid experimentation to take-hold in Oak Park locally.   
In Fort Collins, for example, the smart grid experiments already showed some in-
sights and opportunities for alterations in social practice. As a city planning official ex-
plained regarding their “Monitor My Use” web portal: 
... so what do people do on the weekends? [...] They do laundry, wash 
clothes. [...] We actually found that highest energy use in our town is on 
Sunday and lowest on Tuesday. So it tells us how people are using energy. 
(Interview, November 2015) 
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The smart grid enables the tracking and monitoring of not only the quantities of 
electricity demand, but also the temporality and rhythms of consumption. This proposes 
“opportunities,” as many utilities, regulators, and cities consider them, to alter the “when” 
of energy use, not necessarily the “how” or “why.” Smart grid infrastructures make pos-
sible the voluntary or automatic reconfiguration of practices in line with the necessities of 
a reliable grid and least-cost energy supply.  
The case of Boulder, similarly, shows how the reconfiguration of the electric grid 
to make it “smart” was catered towards the incumbent utilities needs and desires. While 
the infrastructure created the opportunities for smart grid technologies to benefit citizens 
and customers, the incumbent utility stopped short of any meaningful implementation on 
the consumer side. While, like in each case examined here, the infrastructure provided a 
platform for possible smart grid applications to help the cities meet their goals (for carbon 
reduction or reducing peak demand), the actual implementation of the projects was 
shaped largely by existing power relations, institutional and regulatory models, and 
norms and values of the dominant sociotechnical regime. In Fort Collins, too, the smart 
grid implemented to facilitate a zero energy district faltered, and instead created a plat-
form for technology companies to test and offer services that, in the eyes of the city 
council, are too risky to fund with public monies. The possible sociotechnical changes 
offered by smart grid experiments in these cities are shaped by the infrastructures in place 
and, critically, by who has control and access to those infrastructures.   
(2) In relation to the first point, urban energy transitions, despite a national vision, 
dominant discourse, similar policies and models, and central funding streams, are 
shaped differently by contingencies and context-specificity of urban processes in 
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each of the cities. This helps elucidate how each city creates the context for soci-
otechnical change and experimentation, and how these spaces are “constructed 
and maintained relationally across space by the flows and circulations of energy, 
of knowledge and expertise, of models and notions of best practice, of norms and 
conventions of energy supply and consumption” (Rutherford and Coutard 2014, 
1364, emphasis added) 
This point connects the “work” of creating smart grid experiments for sociotechnical 
change with the “work” of constructing and maintaining these spaces through networks 
of policy knowledge, models, and expertise.  In a similar manner to which flow of energy 
create the conditions for urban life, making the material environment “come to life” 
(Bennett 2010; Nye 1992), flows of knowledge and policy models for smart grid experi-
mentation help create and maintain these experiments through relational understandings 
of their possibilities to contribute to an energy transition that helps meet the cities goals.  
All three cases expressed relationships with the City of Austin, Austin Energy, or 
Pecan Street. In the case of Oak Park, Pecan Street served as a direct consultant and pro-
ject manager for the smart grid experiment offering “four years of lessons of failures 
from Austin” (paraphrased from Pecan Street’s presentation to the Village of Oak Park in 
March 2015) that would not be repeated in Oak Park. In Boulder, Pecan Street became an 
important part of their Community Power Partnership to reconfigure the urban smart grid 
to make it more palatable for Boulder’s citizens after the relative failure of Xcel’s 
SmartGridCity project. In Fort Collins, Austin was often referenced as a peer city, 
providing insights on how to manage a progressive municipal utility in line with envi-
ronmental goals, knowledge that was gained through direct communication and networks 
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of local sustainability officials (City of Fort Collins representative, Interview, November 
2015). 
These flows of knowledge and policy also contain embedded governmental logics 
that provide a basis and rationale for particular smart grid technology and program im-
plementation. As Chapter 3 and 4 highlighted, the perspective of governmentality cap-
tures the particular logics of regulating the conduct of individual users through various 
“behavior change” programs that are attached and embedded in smart grid projects. This 
is already a power-laden and conscribed view of energy consumption. While social sci-
ence approaches of social practices understand energy use as a social and cultural prac-
tice, the dominant policy models and knowledge try to intervene through the governing of 
individual energy use based on epistemic communities of economists and social psy-
chologists. While these epistemic communities do offer a range of variables to consider, 
they often do not engage with broader structural power relations. The analysis of govern-
ance through governmentality highlights in particular how the alternative understandings 
of electricity consumption, such as that of social practice, are relegated to the minority 
while dominant modes of explanation support and legitimate existing relations of power, 
such as economist and engineering dominated policy prescriptions and models for soci-
otechnical systems change.  
(3) Urban energy transitions entail a diversity of processes, and although they have 
shared and relational networks of knowledge, they touch down differently in dif-
ferent places, often with different outcomes. This perspective can be useful in 
highlighting the variety of social practices in homes, at work, etc. that may influ-
ence processes of sociotechnical change in urban energy transitions. Dominant 
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discourse becomes powerful by privileging some forms of knowledge and sup-
pressing others. One key area in smart grid experiments here, refuted by the sys-
temic view of social practice (Shove, Pantzar, and Watson 2012; Shove and 
Walker 2014), are the “misleading ideas that the social dimension of energy tran-
sitions resides in homogeneously inciting consumers to use less energy and ex-
pecting them to (simply) ‘change behaviours’”(Rutherford and Coutard 2014, 
1365). While Chapter 3 and 4 highlighted these issues, they are important here as 
we analyze the way policies move, mutate, or get appropriated and with what em-
bedded governmental logics and interests.  
Each of the cases presented here represent a diversity of contexts and processes. The out-
comes of smart grid experiments in each of these places are different. For example, in 
Fort Collins, the municipal utility directed the FortZED project from the beginning under 
direction from their city council, but quickly lost control to the engineers and technical 
experts who guided the project resulting in a disconnection between public excitement 
and understanding and project implementation.   Serving as a “vanguard” similar to Aus-
tin, they were evaluating the smart grid in its ability to help meet public goals, but often 
found difficulties in making these connections. The concerted efforts of city staff were 
required to connect environmental goals and values to the technical projects, which had 
gained the attention of numerous urban audiences globally, and this resulted in a new 
round of project promotion. Ultimately, however, these more “social” elements of the 
smart grid experiment simply created frustrations with getting citizens to “change behav-
ior.” As the FortZED project manager explained: 
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It’s really hard to get people’s attention, I never understood it until I did 
this project. There’s just so much noise. People don’t understand, there is 
so many misunderstandings around energy use, it just boggles my mind. 
[...] Leaving things plugged in. Does your coffee pot draw electricity? De-
pends. Probably. Do you have to unplug it? Not necessarily. What are you 
supposed to tell somebody? What about your TV? Turning down your 
thermostat, your water heater. Most water heaters have high or low set-
tings, A through C, is there anything that will tell you where you 120-
degree mark is? No. What do you tell people to do? Turn it down 5 de-
grees?  But how do they do that? [...] How do you convey that to people 
who don’t care about saving energy. Maybe don’t believe in climate 
change. They don’t care about saving money even. I mean I have friends 
who have 7500 square foot houses. Do they care about saving money? No. 
What are you telling me I can’t turn my hot tub on? No. I’m gonna get in 
my Audi and drive away.  [...] So there is just huge divergence in what 
people care about, what resonates with them, and how you do it in a way 
that somebody can understand and can hit on those strings. 
Similarly, in Boulder’s program, the sustainability manager found similar limita-
tions to smart grid programs and policies, ultimately finding that the main benefit wasn’t 
behavior change, but renewable integration to offset “unsustainable practices.” But, even 
then, the excitement around the possibility of entrepreneurial activity for customer-facing 
apps and smart grid technologies enticed a similar governmental logic of behavior 
change, just better suited to the “21st century, active consumer.” Similarly, in Oak Park, 
the Village Manager explained that the SmartCityUSA project was so interested in data 
acquisition because they wanted to understand how to change behavior: 
The project is as equally balanced on the data side, and that’s why Pecan 
Street and University of Chicago are really key partners, because I mean 
us in Oak park want to say yes let’s do this project, but we want to deter-
mine and learn things from the project. I think our perception is that the 
world is going to move this place to having more microgrids and um, but 
it’s a question about of how you do you communicate it and implement it 
between private utility that has to maintain an infrastructure to a commu-
nity that wants to have reliability, wants to have, environmental sustaina-
bility goals achieved. There is a lot of reasons for doing it, and we think 
the data is going to be an important part of understanding does this change 
behavior, does it not change behavior, what does it do? And how do you 
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make it a program that everyone wants to be apart of? [...] the more infor-
mation you have the more they can learn if you can influence behavior. I 
think it’s the connection between what’s energy utilization look like when 
people don’t have information about it, in terms of pricing, and if you give 
people information about pricing, will people change their behavior, or 
will electrical consumption continue to always, peak and spike, and does 
that data help influence manufacturers of refrigerators and washing ma-
chines and clothes dryers to maybe do something different. (Interview, 
October 2015) 
Highlighting the context of different smart grid experiments and the ultimate out-
comes of urban policy mobilities – how they mutate, if they “take” in certain places or 
not, and what they reference or don’t from other places – may contribute to teasing apart 
the ways governmental logics in smart grids also travel.  The variability of context and 
processes also exposes how smart grid programs are designed to be carried out over a 
smooth urban space – a clean slate – that encounters issues with complexity and variabil-
ity. This includes both social issues, such as behavioral change and rationalities, and ma-
terial issues, such as the actual implementation of infrastructure networks.  In Boulder, 
the Xcel SmartGridCity project required the tearing up of streets to lay fiberoptic cables, 
but material changes such as these are always intertwined as sociomaterial or sociotech-
nical issues. In Boulder, the material changes resulted in rate increases and distaste for 
the SmartGridCity project. In many ways, the city itself becomes an object of impove-
ment as it becomes measured, known, and calculated through smart grid infrastructures 
(Bulkeley, McGuirk, and Dowling 2016). Each of these case studies has begun to make 
this notion apparent, that smart grid experiments are not just about shaping the conduct of 
electricity consumers, but also about reshaping the city as a platform, test-bed, etc. for 
experimenting with new sociotechnical configurations often to cater towards the interests 
of incumbent regimes.   
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5.4 Conclusion: Mobile Experiments and the Politics of Urban Energy Transitions 
Urban energy futures are shaped through multiple processes and power relations. 
They are structured by the material environment’s obduracy, the dynamics and needs of 
everyday experiences, and the cultural values and beliefs that support particular soci-
otechnical visions. Through examination of urban smart grid experiments in three US 
cities, this chapter has explicated the role of these projects in the governance of urban 
electricity networks and urban energy transitions. But it also highlighted the relational 
nature of these projects, and how even though they share policy knowledge, models, and 
technologies, each of the experiments actually get configured differently in particular 
places.   
Each case highlighted struggles over urban energy transitions, competing values, 
and even battles of technopolitics, often putting forth the problematic of dislodging or 
remaking sociotechnical regimes. The question of control and governance, for example, 
in these contexts points to the need for further research on the intersection between urban 
energy transitions and policy mobilities. These case studies help chart some of that terri-




6 Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter synthesizes the findings and arguments made in the previous chapters. This 
synthesis explains how the analysis of the material and discursive construction of the 
smart grid, the implementation and testing of urban smart grid experiments, and the mo-
bilities of smart grid policies, models and knowledge fit with the overall conceptual 
framework. I then describe the practical, policy, and intellectual contributions that this 
dissertation makes. I end with a discussion of future research agendas that expand upon 
this dissertation. 
6.1 Review of findings  
The analysis of discourse and cases of smart grid experiments discussed in this 
dissertation tells us several new things about the smart grid and energy governance. First, 
despite the attention and speculation about the technological possibilities of digitizing the 
grid and enabling an “Internet of things” for all our energy consuming devices, the smart 
grid has been rolled out, although unevenly, largely as a governmental program that 
touches down and is shaped by local context, materiality, history, and political economy. 
Second, although an assumption of a blank slate approach is embedded in policy models 
and knowledge, the smart grid confronts the city as a smart grid experiment that must be 
maneuvered and mutated to fit with existing conditions, while also trying to shape the 
city, both materially and discursively. Third, power operates in many ways in sociotech-
nical systems, and if we seek to govern and change these systems towards more sustaina-
ble configurations, we need to confront these forms of power.  
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These broad findings suggest that scholarship on smart grids and transitions in ur-
ban infrastructure should account for wider social and political issues to address how 
energy transitions might not result in changes yield more just or sustainable outcomes, 
and may only serve to reproduce or reconfigure existing regimes. Addressing governance 
of transitions is of central importance to questions about urban sustainability and low-
carbon transitions. Governance regimes – as discussed in this dissertation – combine el-
ements of sociotechnical regimes with conceptions of governmental power utilizing theo-
ries of governmentality to better understand how energy system transitions are governed.   
In Chapter 3, I argued that the smart grid should be understood as governmental 
“program,” as theories of governmentality discuss, and as such, sociotechnical change in 
the electricity systems needs to be understood not only through the concept of a soci-
otechnical regime, but instead through a governance regime that expands on the rationali-
ties, techniques, and subjectivities involved in governing sociotechnical change. I con-
ducted a critical discourse analysis of over 400 documents on smart grid policy, research 
labs, regulators, whitepapers, academic journals, industry journals, professional associa-
tions, advocacy groups, non-profits, and technology companies. The analysis revealed 
three key rationalities for governance: efficiency, security, economy. These rationalities 
are a series of problematizations of the existing infrastructures and its economic, safe-
ty/reliability, and environmental impacts. These rationalities are interlinked with a series 
of techniques that produce subjects and govern them through the operation of norms, en-
couragements, and discouragements. Power here is enabling, not disabling (i.e., it is a 
form of biopower). The purpose is both to govern the conduct of a population of “smart 
consumers,” so as to normalize their energy consumption enabling the sociotechnical 
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system to work according to governmental rationales. Smart grid techniques are primarily 
discussed in terms of techno-economic understandings, and this translates into narrow 
views of energy users, limiting their ability to influence or participate in sustainability 
transitions.  
 In Chapter 4, I argued that urban smart grid experiments, although cast as oppor-
tunities for radical innovations to breakthrough and disrupt sociotechnical regimes, are 
implemented in the context of both dominant governance regimes and urban political 
economies which shape their purpose, goals, type of experimentation, and impacts. Ana-
lyzing the case of Austin, Texas, I found that the smart grid is implemented utilizing a 
“living lab” approach that serves as a demonstration of Austin’s sustainability efforts and 
high-tech exceptionalism, and at the same time, it serves as a “test-bed” for different 
smart grid technologies and programs. While both of these models, demonstration and 
test-beds, have profound socio-spatial implications for urban sustainability and low-
carbon transition, they also have impacts on the imagined role of the energy user. Within 
the governmental program of the smart grid, the imagined subject is a smart consumer, 
who contributes to the sustainability and well-being of a population through “active” par-
ticipation in smart grid programs.  Yet, this is a highly limited, apolitical role that tends to 
reinforce existing sociotechnical regimes, even if change is desirable.  
 Austin’s urban living lab for the smart grid (what I call an urban smart grid exper-
iment), while promising to be the site of a solar revolution, a niche that will alter regimes, 
is situated within a broader governance regime that limits its ability to create significant 
change. The smart grid in Austin’s neighborhood focuses on consumer pricing trials and 
technological integration in a test-bed and demonstration approach, furthering dominant 
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techno-economic perspectives on the smart grid’s abilities and “proving” existing domi-
nant techno-economic perspectives, strengthening governmental rationales, for the most 
part. However, there is a contradiction, which I point to in Chapter 3, that suggests domi-
nant models need to be reworked to account for the lack of customer engagement with 
smart technologies. One answer from the dominant techno-economic approach (regime) 
is to use automation to meet existing goals and designs for smart grid. The economic 
logics would be programmed into devices and consumer would only need to opt-in. The 
primary issues this chapter then highlights are important to the following chapter: the 
test-bed and demonstration approach to experimentation, the possibility of high penetra-
tion of EVs and PVs, and the “consumer empowerment” approach to managing demand. 
These ideas travel in the Austin model of the smart grid experiments, furthering a specific 
form of governmentality in the logics and rationalities, techniques, and (imagined) sub-
jects of the smart grid.  
In Chapter 5, I argued that best practice lessons and models for urban smart grid pro-
jects are carried on the experimental models of Austin, yet these ideas, experiences, and 
models mutate as they “travel” to different cities, Oak Park, Boulder, Fort Collins, with 
differing impacts as they are implemented or influence projects in each of these cities. 
This has implications for the governance of urban infrastructure, energy, and cities ap-
proaches to climate change. I utilized a relational comparative case study approach to 
analyze policy mobilities, following different actors, models, and ideas from Austin’s 
smart grid experiment to others. Data collection included depth interviews with key in-
formants, document reviews, observation of meetings, and review of conference tran-
scripts.  
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The analysis reveals that urban smart grid experiments are created relationally. This 
means there are practices of inter-city referencing, consultation, meetings, and other ex-
changes. These practices enable the movement, through political channels, and uptake of 
particular approaches to the development of urban smart grid experiments. This is not 
purely between cities, but also between the work of a variety of federal government or-
ganizations (DOE especially) and industry groups. Three concepts travel as “models” or 
policy knowledge: (1) the “test-bed” concept for the smart grid and economic develop-
ment suggests a way to frame the experiments as opportunities for economic investment 
and technological testing; (2) ideas for particular technologies, such as particular smart 
meter, software packages, and different PV technologies, and techno-utopian visions of 
what these technologies allow (vast renewable integration, carbon offsetting, etc.); (3) 
processes for engaging customers/citizens in smart grid technologies.  
Yet, different local implementations of these ideas, models, and knowledge depend 
on their contexts. This also shapes, as Chapter 4 suggests, how experiments may influ-
ence sociotechnical regimes.  The implications of this include limitations of energy tran-
sition for realizing possible benefits of smart grid technologies, and the furtherance of 
existing sociotechnical regimes that approach the smart grid with a narrow view of partic-
ipation as consumption, or a desire for a slow pace of transitioning towards renewable 
energy. 
6.1.1 Synthesis and connections to conceptual framework 
Together, construction, experimentation, and mobilities/diffusion all add to a better un-
derstanding of the way urban sociotechnical change may occur. Each of these elements 
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shape and are shaped by governance regimes. Governance regimes are broader than, but 
inclusive of sociotechnical regimes, and explain how more diffuse forms of power shape 
the way sociotechnical systems develop and change.  While existing studies of transition 
dynamics account for social and political dimensions in various ways, this dissertation 
suggests these dynamics are shaped by broader cultural forces and governmental pro-
grams. Thus, the smart grid is both a sociotechnical system with various actors, institu-
tions, and technologies, and a governmental program that solidifies particular configura-
tions of the urban smart grid.   
The conceptual framework provides a valuable way for understanding the role of 
sociotechnical systems, transitions, and governance in assembling urban energy futures, 
whether that be a reproduction or reconfiguration of existing regimes, or a transition to-
wards something different. Here, the analysis of power, in the Foucauldian sense, helps 
us understand how sociotechnical systems are created through and in turn shape power 
relations. This Foucauldian analysis of power relations explains how “power/knowledge 
technologies” mediate practice and enable forms of government and subjectivity serving 
systemic functions. Governing through forms of calculation, measurement, and statistical 
norms, enables governance regimes to emerge that can best respond to a series of prob-
lematics of energy systems (aging infrastructure, energy security, carbon) reducing risks 
through “rational,” self-management techniques. Utilizing this approach, there is norma-
tive ambiguity, meaning that, as Tyfield (2014, 590) explains: 
On the one hand, the flexibility and ‘rationality’ of this system is what af-
fords its undeniable productivity and the power underpinning its emer-
gence and subsequent stability – i.e. the very potential for (low-carbon, 
sustainable) ‘system transition’. But, on the other, this is necessarily at the 
cost of systematic and ‘rationally irrational’ definitions of social exclu-
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sion, their (possibly brutal) enforcement (the more ‘rational’ the exclu-
sions, the more violence is both ‘legitimate’ and rationally organised and 
so ‘effective’) and thus a schizophrenic zeitgeist of a society that fears the 
shadow it itself casts or conjures.  
This places concern on the “shadowy side” of innovation (Shove 2012) and an impetus 
for researchers to identify and confront the possible (and realized) inequalities that inevi-
tably will occur in system transition.  
 Moreover, the Foucauldian concepts of governmentality and “positive” power 
discussed throughout this dissertation highlight how sociotechnical transitions are as 
much about transitions in power as they are in reassembling or reconstituting networks of 
actors, institutions, and technologies with enabling and constraining effects.  This helps 
to reveal a deeper problem with the MLP and its lack of explanation for the “actually 
existing” forms of technological lock-in and momentum so frustrating to sustainability 
transition advocates, especially related to energy systems. Governmentality brings an 
analysis to the ordering of sociotechnical systems, forms of common-sense elaborated in 
discourse and practice, which in turn produce ordering and lock-in effects. These under-
standings of power are different than the forms of juridical and disciplinary power dis-
cussed by MLP scholars (Geels 2014; Geels 2011), and thus bring a useful analytics for 
examining not just an array of factors, but the multiple power relations, rationalities, 
techniques, and subjectivities that reinforce dominant regimes.  
6.1.2 Contributions to scholarship 
In the first instance, this dissertation has provided a much-needed qualitative and empiri-
cal analysis of the US smart grid system, albeit only a part of the system (geographically 
limited study). Social science research on smart grids has primarily focused on soci-
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otechnical imaginaries and visions of policy makers and technology companies without a 
critical analysis of how these are tied to transitions or power relations. Certainly, this re-
search is valuable, but is limited in terms of both explanation of power of existing re-
gimes and governance of sociotechnical systems. This dissertation directly addresses 
these empirical and theoretical limitations. 
Second, and relatedly, this dissertation makes a theoretical contribution to under-
standing power and politics in sociotechnical transitions by utilizing Foucauldian insights 
on governmentality and neoliberalism. The key benefit of this approach is that is more 
thoroughly accounts for the ways in which power/knowledge configures and strengthens 
particular sociotechnical regimes. Therefore, analyzing the smart grid as a governmental 
program places consideration of taken-for-granted dimensions of subjectivity and pow-
er/knowledge (in MLP perspectives) at the center of our understanding of sociotechnical 
transitions. The discourse analysis and cases highlight how these rationalities, techniques, 
and subjectivities are thus key drivers of system transition or lack thereof. 
Another theoretical and empirical contribution relates to understanding the smart grid 
as not a singular, top-down policy mandate and technological transfer program, but in-
stead a multiplicity of experiments that take place in the context of political economy of 
electricity systems and the power relations discussed above. Crucially, learning and poli-
cy “transfer” related to sociotechnical transitions relies on inter-city referencing, travel-
ling consultants, and ephemeral spaces of knowledge production (such as urban experi-
ments) that shape the political and material programs of urban smart grid projects in par-
ticular places. The synergy between transitions and policy mobilities frameworks allows 
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a more nuanced understanding of how urban projects are shaped outside the traditional 
and official institutions of government.  
In summary, this dissertation presents a conceptual framework that advances our un-
derstanding of sociotechnical transitions and addresses several of the limitations of exist-
ing frameworks.  Expanding on existing sociotechnical transitions theory applied to urban 
infrastructures, this dissertation argues that sociotechnical systems are enacted, main-
tained, and reconfigured in a much broader system of power relations than articulated by 
the concept of sociotechnical regimes in the dominant MLP framework. The conceptual 
framework helps explain how sociotechnical systems are reproduced, reconfigured, or 
transitioned by attending to power relations and “technologies of power” that are ena-
bling rather than disabling, relating to Foucault’s understandings of neoliberalism. The 
notion of a governance regime was proposed as way to understand the role of power rela-
tions in the governing of sociotechnical systems, to help explain their apparent (and 
sometimes frustrating) stability or reconfiguration. Electricity networks both shape and 
are shaped by governance regimes, which in turn shapes and governs sociotechnical 
change, materially and discursively. This framework also complicates the MLP because it 
brings “landscape” factors into play [i.e. neoliberal political economy, urban governance, 
broad geographies (inter-city/across sociotechnical regimes’ territories) of learning and 
inter-referencing].  
6.2 Implications for policy and practice 
The findings and conceptual framework above are novel contributions to scholarship, 
however, they also have implications for policy and practice. The first is consideration of 
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transitions as highly political processes involving a variety of actors with differing expec-
tations, values, goals, and positions of power. These forms of “power over” are only one 
form of power, and limit our understanding of how transitions are governed by other 
forms of power, such as cultural norms, and broader political rationalities. For policy and 
practice audiences, this suggests a need to consider the varied possible outcomes of tran-
sition processes and their inevitable forms of exclusion and inequality which can be re-
sisted, or at very least, reduced by prospective engagement with “transitions thinking.” 
 Similarly, and to the second point, if the normative goal is to destabilize unsus-
tainable regimes, radical reconfigurations are necessary, and this means understanding 
power and governance beyond the sociotechnical regime. Practitioners need to be sensi-
tive to how cultural norms come to be, how they contribute to stability and lock-in, and 
how discourse and rhetoric are powerful in this regard.  
Third, attention to cultural models of energy use and social practice approaches 
bring together understandings of political economy with the politics of everyday practice, 
and thus, are perhaps better models for policy. Social practice approaches suggest that the 
dominant techno-economic approaches to smart grid policy, engagement, and practice are 
limited. For example, there is considerable evidence that the practices that contribute to 
energy consumption and peak demand (washing, cooking, heating, cleaning, etc.) will not 
change with more information or time-of-use pricing schemes. Cultural models suggest 
that changes occur, but that these are not always in line with goals of the smart grid (peak 
demand reduction, peak shifting, etc.), and instead result from interactions between social 
and cultural practices and technologies that enable or constrain these practices.  This sug-
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gests that dominant technological interventions may not have the intended impacts on 
energy consumption. 
Fourth, for urban planning practice, the case studies and lessons suggest that en-
trepreneurial extrospection and policy scanning are not always the most appropriate ap-
proaches to developing policy. Local citizens have their own interests and values that 
may be overcome by desires to attract technology companies or other sources of mobile 
capital. One city’s approach to sustainability transitions may be markedly different from 
another’s, and simply adopting best practices may serve to repeat and exacerbate long-
standing urban problems such as gentrification and displacement. Projects, policies, and 
models, while certainly benefitting from lessons elsewhere, should utilize democratic 
processes to see how local communities could benefit, if they see it as acceptable and 
worthwhile in the context of their community’s needs, values, and goals. Projects 
shouldn’t just be a part of an entrepreneurial race to global/sustainable city status. In ad-
dition, experimentation may produce unintended impacts of exclusion and political prob-
lems, with one-off projects providing benefits to already well-off communities. In this 
way, urban experiments can exacerbate existing inequalities while trying to catalyze sus-
tainability transitions.  
Finally, while the smart grid seems to be a simply technical matter, usually orches-
trated through a top-down approach by governments, utilities, and major corporate actors, 
it is also a profoundly social program that is attempting to reconfigure relationships be-
tween utilities and consumers, aligning social practices with new governmental ration-
ales. Acknowledgement of how the “social parts” of a sociotechnical system are expected 
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to change may help facilitate (with planning) technological changes that promote both 
low-carbon and social justice agendas. 
6.3 Limitations and areas for future research 
A number of limitations to this study are important to note. First, the ability to adequately 
capture the breadth of practices, places, and ephemeral spaces influencing the mobilities 
of urban smart grid experiments and associated policy, models, and knowledge was lim-
ited by geography, accessibility, and funding. While this limitation is practically difficult 
to overcome, noted by many scholars working on policy mobilities or “fast policy” re-
search, it presents an opportunity for longer-term, collaborative engagements across mul-
tiple cities. Tracing and following the policy and knowledge could be a project engaging 
multiple researchers across space. This leads to a need for further study, for example, to 
study the ways in which different practices shape local urban energy and sustainability 
policies and a variety of infrastructures (electricity, transport, waste, etc.) more broadly.  
Second, the Foucauldian approach taken in this dissertation entails a reading of 
discourse, power/knowledge, and governmentality, which critics argue privileges dis-
course over materiality. However, the approach taken in this consideration attempts to 
overcome this limitation by explicitly engaging with urban materiality and a sociotech-
nical approach with its emphasis on technologies and artifacts. Instead of limiting, then, I 
think this approach is fruitful for study of other sociotechnical systems. The Foucauldian 
approach, and some version of my framework, could be applied to study a number of 
sociotechnical systems undergoing transition.  
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In sum, energy transitions entail considerable sociotechnical change and shifts in 
power and politics. This study highlights several issues related to these concerns, but 
there is still more work to be done both in terms of activism and research. Energy is an 
existential issue, and, thus, energy transitions will have more than a technological imprint 
on our world; they will involve remaking our world. In my opinion, that requires our at-
tention, thought, and action.    
 242
References 
Abi Ghanem, Dana, and Sarah Mander. 2014. “Designing Consumer Engagement with 
the Smart Grids of the Future: Bringing Active Demand Technology to Everyday 
Life.” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 26 (10): 1163–75. 
doi:10.1080/09537325.2014.974531. 
Affolderbach, Julia, and Christian Schulz. 2016. “Mobile Transitions: Exploring Syner-
gies for Urban Sustainability Research.” Urban Studies 53 (9): 1942–57. 
doi:10.1177/0042098015583784. 
Agamben, Giorgio. 2009. What Is an Apparatus?: And Other Essays. Stanford University 
Press. 
Alahakoon, Damminda, and Xinghuo Yu. 2013. “Advanced Analytics for Harnessing the 
Power of Smart Meter Big Data.” 2013 IEEE International Workshop on Inteli-
gent Energy Systems (IWIES), November. Ieee, 40–45. 
doi:10.1109/IWIES.2013.6698559. 
Alford, Robert R. 1998. The Craft of Inquiry: Theories, Methods, Evidence. Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Allen, Barbara L. 2011. “Laboratorization and the ‘Green’ Rebuilding of New Orleans’s 
Lower Ninth Ward.” In The Neoliberal Deluge:Hurricane Katrina, Late Capital-
ism, and the Remaking of New Orleans, edited by Cedric Johnson. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Allen, John. 2011. “Powerful Assemblages?” Area 43 (2): 154–57. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
4762.2011.01005.x. 
Allen, John, and Allan Cochrane. 2010. “Assemblages of State Power: Topological Shifts 
in the Organization of Government and Politics.” Antipode 42 (5): 1071–89. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2010.00794.x. 
Amin, Massoud. 2001. “Toward Self-Healing Energy Infrastructure Systems.” IEEE 
Computer Applications in Power 14 (1): 20–28. doi:10.1109/67.893351. 
———. 2002. “Toward Secure and Resilient Interdependent Infrastructures.” Journal of 
Infrastructure Systems 8 (3): 67–75. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)1076-
0342(2002)8:3(67). 
———. 2004. “Balancing Market Priorities with Security Issues.” IEEE Power and En-
ergy Magazine 2 (4): 30–38. doi:10.1109/MPAE.2004.1310871. 
———. 2008. “For the Good of the Grid.” IEEE Power and Energy Magazine 6 (6): 48–
59. doi:10.1109/MPE.2008.929745. 
———. 2008. “Challenges in Reliability, Security, Efficiency, and Resilience of Energy 
Infrastructure: Toward Smart Self-Healing Electric Power Grid.” In 2008 IEEE 
Power and Energy Society General Meeting - Conversion and Delivery of Elec-
trical Energy in the 21st Century, 1–5. doi:10.1109/PES.2008.4596791. 
Araújo, Kathleen. 2014. “The Emerging Field of Energy Transitions: Progress, Challeng-
es, and Opportunities.” Energy Research & Social Science 1 (March): 112–21. 
doi:10.1016/j.erss.2014.03.002. 
Ardoin, Phillip J., and Dennis Grady. 2006. “The Politics of Electricity Restructuring 
across the American States: Power Failure and Policy Failure.” State and Local 
Government Review 38 (3): 165–75. doi:10.1177/0160323X0603800304. 
 243
ARUP. 2013. “Smart City Market: UK Opportunities - Publications - GOV.UK.” BIS 
Research Paper No. 136. Department of Business Innovation & Skills,. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/smart-city-market-uk-opportunities. 
Avelino, Flor, and Julia M. Wittmayer. 2015. “Shifting Power Relations in Sustainability 
Transitions: A Multi-Actor Perspective.” Journal of Environmental Policy & 
Planning, November, 1–22. doi:10.1080/1523908X.2015.1112259. 
Aylett, Alex. 2013. “Networked Urban Climate Governance: Neighborhood-Scale Resi-
dential Solar Energy Systems and the Example of Solarize Portland.” Environ-
ment and Planning C: Government and Policy 31 (5): 858–75. 
doi:10.1068/c11304. 
Bacchi, Carol. 2000. “Policy as Discourse: What Does It Mean? Where Does It Get Us?” 
Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 21 (1): 45–57. 
doi:10.1080/01596300050005493. 
Bai, Xuemei, Brian Roberts, and Jing Chen. 2010. “Urban Sustainability Experiments in 
Asia: Patterns and Pathways.” Environmental Science & Policy, Socio-technical 
experiments in Asia – a driver for sustainability transition?, 13 (4): 312–25. 
doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2010.03.011. 
Ballo, Ingrid Foss. 2015. “Imagining Energy Futures: Sociotechnical Imaginaries of the 
Future Smart Grid in Norway.” Energy Research & Social Science, Special Issue 
on Smart Grids and the Social Sciences, 9 (September): 9–20. 
doi:10.1016/j.erss.2015.08.015. 
Barry, Andrew. 2006. “Technological Zones.” European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2): 
239–53. doi:10.1177/1368431006063343. 
Barry, Andrew, and Thomas Osborne. 1996. Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, 
Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government. University of Chicago Press. 
Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke Uni-
versity Press. 
Benson, David, and Andrew Jordan. 2011. “What Have We Learned from Policy Trans-
fer Research? Dolowitz and Marsh Revisited.” Political Studies Review 9 (3): 
366–78. doi:10.1111/j.1478-9302.2011.00240.x. 
Berkhout, Peter H. G., Jos C. Muskens, and Jan W. Velthuijsen. 2000. “Defining the Re-
bound Effect.” Energy Policy 28 (6–7): 425–32. doi:10.1016/S0301-
4215(00)00022-7. 
Biegel, Benjamin, Lars Henrik Hansen, Jakob Stoustrup, Palle Andersen, and Silas Har-
bo. 2014. “Value of Flexible Consumption in the Electricity Markets.” Energy 66 
(March): 354–62. doi:10.1016/j.energy.2013.12.041. 
Bijker, Wiebe E., Thomas P. Hughes, Trevor Pinch, and Deborah G. Douglas. 2012 
[1987]. The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the 
Sociology and History of Technology. MIT Press. 
Blanchet, Thomas. 2015. “Struggle over Energy Transition in Berlin: How Do Grassroots 
Initiatives Affect Local Energy Policy-Making?” Energy Policy 78 (March): 246–
54. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.11.001. 
Blanco, Ismael. 2013. “Analysing Urban Governance Networks: Bringing Regime Theo-
ry Back in.” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 31 (2): 276–
91. doi:10.1068/c11174. 
 244
Bleything, Sean, Seth Blumsack, Paul Hines, and Lisa Morris. 2015. “Vermont Electric 
Cooperative Consumer Behavior Study Year 2 Final Report.” DOE Consumer 
Behavior Studies. Vermont Energy Investment Corporation. 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/Vermont-Electric-Cooperative-Consumer-
Behavior-Study-Year-2-Final-Report.pdf. 
Blumsack, Seth A., Jay Apt, and Lester B. Lave. 2006. “Lessons from the Failure of US 
Electricity Restructuring.” The Electricity Journal 19 (2): 15–32. 
Bolton, Ronan, and Timothy J. Foxon. 2015. “Infrastructure Transformation as a Socio-
Technical Process — Implications for the Governance of Energy Distribution 
Networks in the UK.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 90, Part B 
(January): 538–50. doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2014.02.017. 
Borenstein, Severin. 2002. “The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding Cali-
fornia’s Restructuring Disaster.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (1): 
191–211. 
Boulder Economic Council. 2016. “Boulder Market Profile: April 2016.” Boulder, CO: 
Boulder Economc Council. 
http://bouldereconomiccouncil.org/bec_publications/market-profile-april-2016/. 
Boyer, Dominic. 2011. “Energopolitics and the Anthropology of Energy.” Anthropology 
News 52 (5): 5–7. doi:10.1111/j.1556-3502.2011.52505.x. 
Brady, Michelle. 2014. “Ethnographies of Neoliberal Governmentalities: From the Ne-
oliberal Apparatus to Neoliberalism and Governmental Assemblages.” Foucault 
Studies 0 (18): 11–33. 
Brenner, Neil. 2004. “Urban Governance and the Production of New State Spaces in 
Western Europe, 1960–2000.” Review of International Political Economy 11 (3): 
447–88. doi:10.1080/0969229042000282864. 
Breslau, Daniel. 2013. “Designing a Market-like Entity: Economics in the Politics of 
Market Formation.” Social Studies of Science 43 (6): 829–51. 
doi:10.1177/0306312713493962. 
Bridge, Gavin, Stefan Bouzarovski, Michael Bradshaw, and Nick Eyre. 2013. “Geogra-
phies of Energy Transition: Space, Place and the Low-Carbon Economy.” Energy 
Policy 53 (February): 331–40. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.066. 
Briggerman, Abby, Radu Costinescu, and Ashley Bond. 2012. “Survey of State Munici-
palization Laws.” Washington, D.C: American Public Power Association. 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/Survey%20of%20Municipalization%20L
aws%20-%20Duncan%20and%20Allen%20_FINAL_%20_00027359_.pdf. 
Bröckling, Ulrich, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke. 2010. Governmentality: Cur-
rent Issues and Future Challenges. Routledge. 
Brown, Marilyn A. 2001. “Market Failures and Barriers as a Basis for Clean Energy Pol-
icies.” Energy Policy, Scenarios for a clean energy future, 29 (14): 1197–1207. 
doi:10.1016/S0301-4215(01)00067-2. 
Brown, Wendy. 2015. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. MIT 
Press. 
Bues, Andrea, and Ludger Gailing. 2016. “Energy Transitions and Power: Between Gov-
ernmentality and Depoliticization.” In Conceptualizing Germany’s Energy Tran-




Bulkeley, Harriet. 2010. “Cities and the Governing of Climate Change.” Annual Review 
of Environment and Resources 35 (1): 229–53. doi:10.1146/annurev-environ-
072809-101747. 
Bulkeley, Harriet, and Vanesa Castán Broto. 2012. “Urban Experiments and Climate 
Change: Securing Zero Carbon Development in Bangalore.” Contemporary So-
cial Science, no. May 2014 (July): 1–22. doi:10.1080/21582041.2012.692483. 
———. 2013a. “A Survey of Urban Climate Change Experiments in 100 Cities” 23: 92–
102. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.07.005. 
———. 2013b. “Government by Experiment? Global Cities and the Governing of Cli-
mate Change.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 38 (3): 361–
75. doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00535.x. 
Bulkeley, Harriet, Vanesa Castán Broto, and Gareth A. S. Edwards. 2014. An Urban 
Politics of Climate Change: Experimentation and the Governing of Socio-
Technical Transitions. Routledge. 
Bulkeley, Harriet, Vanesa Castán Broto, and Anne Maassen. 2014. “Low-Carbon Transi-
tions and the Reconfiguration of Urban Infrastructure.” Urban Studies 51 (7): 
1471–86. doi:10.1177/0042098013500089. 
Bulkeley, Harriet, Andrés Luque-Ayala, and Jonathan Silver. 2014. “Housing and the 
(Re)configuration of Energy Provision in Cape Town and São Paulo: Making 
Space for a Progressive Urban Climate Politics?” Political Geography 40 (May): 
25–34. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.02.003. 
Bulkeley, Harriet, Pauline M. McGuirk, and Robyn Dowling. 2016. “Making a Smart 
City for the Smart Grid? The Urban Material Politics of Actualising Smart Elec-
tricity Networks.” Environment and Planning A, May, 0308518X16648152. 
doi:10.1177/0308518X16648152. 
Bulkeley, Harriet, Gareth Powells, and Sandra Bell. 2016. “Smart Grids and the Constitu-
tion of Solar Electricity Conduct.” Environment and Planning A 48 (1): 7–23. 
doi:10.1177/0308518X15596748. 
Burawoy, Michael. 2009. The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, 
Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition. University of Cali-
fornia Press. 
Burnett, John. 2015a. “With Porches And Parks, A Texas Community Aims For Urban 
Utopia.” Cities Project: NPR’s Series on Urban Life in the 21st Century. National 
Public Radio. http://www.npr.org/2015/02/12/385474414/with-porches-and-
parks-a-texas-community-aims-for-urban-utopia. 
———. 2015b. “With Porches And Parks, A Texas Community Aims For Urban Uto-
pia.” Cities Project: NPR’s Series on Urban Life in the 21st Century. National 
Public Radio. http://www.npr.org/2015/02/12/385474414/with-porches-and-
parks-a-texas-community-aims-for-urban-utopia. 
Çalışkan, Koray, and Michel Callon. 2009. “Economization, Part 1: Shifting Attention 
from the Economy towards Processes of Economization.” Economy and Society 
38 (3): 369–98. doi:10.1080/03085140903020580. 
 246
Calvert, Kirby. 2015. “From ‘energy Geography’ to ‘energy Geographies’ Perspectives 
on a Fertile Academic Borderland.” Progress in Human Geography, January, 
309132514566343. doi:10.1177/0309132514566343. 
Campbell, Martha, Duncan Lawrence, Jamie Mandel, James Newcomb, Eric Wanless, 
and Dan Wetzel. 2014. “Integrated Utility Services: A New Business Model for 
Fort Collins Utilities.” Boulder, CO: Rocky Mountain Institute. 
http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/2014-
36_eLabFortCollinsIUS+Report-FINAL-20141219. 
Canete, Miguel Arias. 2016. “Renewable Energy: Catalyst for a Clean Energy Transition 
- OECD.” OECD.org. http://www.oecd.org/environment/renewable-energy-
catalyst-clean-energy-transition.htm. 
Caprotti, Federico. 2012. “The Cultural Economy of Cleantech: Environmental Discourse 
and the Emergence of a New Technology Sector.” Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers 37 (3): 370–85. doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2011.00485.x. 
Carse, Ashley. 2012. “Nature as Infrastructure: Making and Managing the Panama Canal 
Watershed.” Social Studies of Science 42 (4): 539–63. 
doi:10.1177/0306312712440166. 
Carvallo, Andres, and John Cooper. 2015. The Advanced Smart Grid: Edge Power Driv-
ing Sustainability, Second Edition. Artech House. 
Casey, Christopher, and Kevin B. Jones. 2013. “Customer-Centric Leadership in Smart 
Grid Implementation: Empowering Customers to Make Intelligent Energy Choic-
es.” The Electricity Journal 26 (7): 98–110. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2013.07.004. 
Castán Broto, Vanesa, and Harriet Bulkeley. 2013a. “A Survey of Urban Climate Change 
Experiments in 100 Cities.” Global Environmental Change 23 (1): 92–102. 
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.07.005. 
———. 2013b. “Maintaining Climate Change Experiments: Urban Political Ecology and 
the Everyday Reconfiguration of Urban Infrastructure.” International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 37 (6): 1934–48. doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12050. 
Chan, Coreina, Lena Hansen, James Newcomb, Greg Rucks, and Joshua Agenbroad. 
2014. “Stepping Up: Benefits and Cost of Accelerating Fort Collins’ Energy and 
Climate Goals.” Boulder, Co: Rocky Mountain Institute. 
http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/80FortCollinsReport-WEB_2014-
02. 
Chandrashekeran, Sangeetha. 2016. “Multidimensionality and the Multilevel Perspective: 
Territory, Scale, and Networks in a Failed Demand-Side Energy Transition in 
Australia.” Environment and Planning A, April, 0308518X16643728. 
doi:10.1177/0308518X16643728. 
Chassin, David P. 2010. “What Can the Smart Grid Do for You? And What Can You Do 
for the Smart Grid?” The Electricity Journal 23 (5): 57–63. 
doi:10.1016/j.tej.2010.05.001. 
Chopra, Aneesh, Vivek Kundra, and Phil Weiser. 2011. “A Policy Framework for the 
21st Century Grid: Enabling Our Secure Energy Future.” Washington, D.C: Ex-




Clark-Madison, Mike. 2002. “Who Will Rule Mueller?,” January 25. 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2002-01-25/84459/. 
Clastres, Cédric. 2011. “Smart Grids: Another Step towards Competition, Energy Securi-
ty and Climate Change Objectives.” Energy Policy 39 (9): 5399–5408. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.05.024. 
Cochrane, Allan, and Kevin Ward. 2012. “Researching the Geographies of Policy Mo-
bility: Confronting the Methodological Challenges.” Environment and Planning A 
44 (1): 5–12. doi:10.1068/a44176. 
Coenen, Lars, Paul Benneworth, and Bernhard Truffer. 2012. “Toward a Spatial Perspec-
tive on Sustainability Transitions.” Research Policy, Special Section on Sustaina-
bility Transitions, 41 (6): 968–79. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2012.02.014. 
Coenen, Lars, and Bernhard Truffer. 2012. “Places and Spaces of Sustainability Transi-
tions: Geographical Contributions to an Emerging Research and Policy Field.” 
European Planning Studies 20 (3): 367–74. doi:10.1080/09654313.2012.651802. 
Cook, Ian R., and Kevin Ward. 2012. “Relational Comparisons: The Assembling of 
Cleveland’s Waterfront Plan.” Urban Geography 33 (6): 774–95. 
doi:10.2747/0272-3638.33.6.774. 
Cotton, Matthew, and Patrick Devine-Wright. 2011. “Discourses of Energy Infrastructure 
Development: A Q-Method Study of Electricity Transmission Line Siting in the 
UK.” Environment and Planning A 43 (4): 942–60. doi:10.1068/a43401. 
Council of Economic Advisers, and US Department of Energy. 2013. “Economic Bene-
fits of Increasing Electric Grid Resilience to Weather Outages.” Washington, 
D.C: Executive Office of the President of the United States. 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report_FIN
AL.pdf. 
Coutard, Olivier. 2008. “Placing Splintering Urbanism: Introduction.” Geoforum, Placing 
Splintering Urbanism, 39 (6): 1815–20. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2008.10.008. 
Coutard, Olivier, and Jonathan Rutherford. 2015. Beyond the Networked City : Infra-
structure Reconfigurations and Urban Change in the North and South. Florence: 
Taylor and Francis. 
Davidson, Kathryn, and Brendan Gleeson. 2014. “The Sustainability of an Entrepreneuri-
al City?” International Planning Studies, no. April 2014 (March): 1–19. 
doi:10.1080/13563475.2014.880334. 
Davis, Michelle, and Steve Clemmer. 2014. “Power Failure: How Climate Change Puts 
Our Electricity at Risk -- and What We Can Do.” Union of Concerned Scientists. 
https://www.cakex.org/sites/default/files/documents/Power-Failure-How-Climate-
Change-Puts-Our-Electricity-at-Risk-and-What-We-Can-Do.pdf. 
Dean, Mitchell. 2010. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. SAGE Pub-
lications. 
Denholm, Paul, Matthew O’Connell, Gregory Brinkman, and Jennie Jorgenson. 2015. 
“Overgeneration from Solar Energy in California: A Field Guide to the Duck 
Chart.” National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Tech. Rep. NREL/TP-6A20-
65023, Nov. http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/65023.pdf. 
Denny, F. I. 1988. “Future Computer Applications in Power.” IEEE Computer Applica-
tions in Power 1 (1): 11–14. doi:10.1109/67.896. 
 248
Denzin, Norman K., and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds. 2011. The SAGE Handbook of Qualita-
tive Research. SAGE Publications. 
Dolowitz, David P., and David Marsh. 2000. “Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy 
Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making.” Governance 13 (1): 5–23. 
doi:10.1111/0952-1895.00121. 
Dowling, Robyn. 2010. “Geographies of Identity: Climate Change, Governmentality and 
Activism.” Progress in Human Geography 34 (4): 488–95. 
doi:10.1177/0309132509348427. 
Dunlop, Claire A. 2009. “Policy Transfer as Learning: Capturing Variation in What De-
cision-Makers Learn from Epistemic Communities.” Policy Studies 30 (3): 289–
311. doi:10.1080/01442870902863869. 
Dunn, Bruce, Haresh Kamath, and Jean-Marie Tarascon. 2011. “Electrical Energy Stor-
age for the Grid: A Battery of Choices.” Science 334 (6058): 928–35. 
doi:10.1126/science.1212741. 
Durand, Patty. 2013. “Accentuate the Positive.” Public Utilities Fortnightly, August. 
Dyson, Mark E. H., Samuel D. Borgeson, Michaelangelo D. Tabone, and Duncan S. 
Callaway. 2014. “Using Smart Meter Data to Estimate Demand Response Poten-
tial, with Application to Solar Energy Integration.” Energy Policy 73 (October): 
607–19. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.053. 
EDF. 2014. “What Is Demand Response?” Environmental Defense Fund. 
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/demand_response_-_july_2014.pdf. 
———. 2016a. “Accelerating the Clean Energy Revolution.” Environmental Defense 
Fund. Accessed August 9. http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Smart-Grid-
Fact-Sheet-051712.pdf. 
———. 2016b. “What Consumers Need to Know about the Smart Grid and Smart Me-
ters.” Environmental Defense Fund. Accessed August 9. 
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-smart-grid-benefits-fact-sheet_0.pdf. 
Elden, Stuart. 2007. “Governmentality, Calculation, Territory.” Environment and Plan-
ning D: Society and Space 25 (3): 562–80. doi:10.1068/d428t. 
Elzen, Boelie, Frank W. Geels, and Kenneth Green. 2004. System Innovation and the 
Transition to Sustainability: Theory, Evidence and Policy. Edward Elgar Publish-
ing. 
Emelianoff, Cyria. 2014. “Local Energy Transition and Multilevel Climate Governance: 
The Contrasted Experiences of Two Pioneer Cities (Hanover, Germany, and 
Växjö, Sweden).” Urban Studies 51 (7): 1378–93. 
doi:10.1177/0042098013500087. 
Emerson, Robert M., Rachel I. Fretz, and Linda L. Shaw. 2001. “Participant Observation 
and Fieldnotes.” In Handbook of Ethnography, edited by Paul Atkinson, Amanda 
Coffey, Sara Delamont, John Lofland, and Lyn Lofland, 352–68. London: SAGE 
Publications. 
Engels, Franziska, and Anna Verena Münch. 2015. “The Micro Smart Grid as a Material-
ised Imaginary within the German Energy Transition.” Energy Research & Social 
Science, Special Issue on Smart Grids and the Social Sciences, 9 (September): 
35–42. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2015.08.024. 
 249
Evans, James. 2011. “Resilience, Ecology and Adaptation in the Experimental City.” 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 36 (2): 223–37. 
doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00420.x. 
Evans, James, and Andrew Karvonen. 2013. “‘Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Lower 
Your Carbon Footprint!’ - Urban Laboratories and the Governance of Low-
Carbon Futures.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, De-
cember, n/a-n/a. doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12077. 
Ezrahi, Yaron. 1990. The Descent of Icarus : Science and the Transformation of Contem-
porary Democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Fairclough, Norman. 2013. Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. 
Routledge. 
Farhangi, H. 2010. “The Path of the Smart Grid.” IEEE Power and Energy Magazine 8 
(1): 18–28. doi:10.1109/MPE.2009.934876. 
Faruqui, Ahmad, and J. Robert Malko. 1983. “The Residential Demand for Electricity by 
Time-of-Use: A Survey of Twelve Experiments with Peak Load Pricing.” Energy 
8 (10): 781–95. doi:10.1016/0360-5442(83)90052-X. 
Faruqui, Ahmad, and Sanem Sergici. 2010. “Household Response to Dynamic Pricing of 
Electricity: A Survey of 15 Experiments.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 38 
(2): 193–225. doi:10.1007/s11149-010-9127-y. 
Flatow, Ira. 2011. “Adding Smarts To The Electrical Grid.” Science Friday. National 
Public Radio. http://www.npr.org/2011/01/14/132934014/adding-smarts-to-the-
electrical-grid. 
Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2006. “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research.” Qualita-
tive Inquiry 12 (2): 219–45. doi:10.1177/1077800405284363. 
Flyvbjerg, Bent, Todd Landman, and Sanford Schram. 2012. Real Social Science: Ap-
plied Phronesis. Cambridge University Press. 
Forth, B., and T. Tobin. 2002. “Right Power, Right Price [Enterprise Energy Manage-
ment Systems].” IEEE Computer Applications in Power 15 (2): 22–27. 
doi:10.1109/67.993756. 
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage Books. 
———. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. 
Pantheon Books. 
———. 1981. “The Order of Discourse.” In Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Read-
er, edited by Robert Young, 49–78. Boston, Mass: Routledge. 
https://www.kit.ntnu.no/sites/www.kit.ntnu.no/files/Foucault_The%20Order%20o
f%20Discourse.pdf. 
———. 1990. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Knopf Doubleday Publishing 
Group. 
———. 2002. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Psychology 
Press. 
———. 2009. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977--
1978. Macmillan. 
———. 2010. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978--1979. 
Picador. 
 250
Foucault, Michel, Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana, François Ewald, and David 
Macey. 2003. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975-1976. Macmillan. 
Foucault, Michel, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. 1991. The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality. University of Chicago Press. 
Foxon, Timothy J. 2013. “Transition Pathways for a UK Low Carbon Electricity Future.” 
Energy Policy 52 (January): 10–24. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.04.001. 
Fox-Penner, Peter. 2014. Smart Power Anniversary Edition: Climate Change, the Smart 
Grid, and the Future of Electric Utilities. Island Press. 
Frangoul, Anmar. 2015. “Pecan Street Inc. | Is This the World’s Most Innovative Neigh-
borhood?” http://www.pecanstreet.org/2015/03/is-this-the-worlds-most-
innovative-neighborhood/. 
“Frank Lloyd Wright Trust.” 2016. Accessed August 21. http://www.flwright.org/. 
Fuchs, Gerhard, and Nele Hinderer. 2016. “One or Many Transitions: Local Electricity 
Experiments in Germany.” Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science 
Research 0 (0): 1–17. doi:10.1080/13511610.2016.1188683. 
Gabrys, Jennifer. 2014. “Programming Environments: Environmentality and Citizen 
Sensing in the Smart City.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 32 
(1): 30 – 48. doi:10.1068/d16812. 
Gandy, Matthew. 2004. “Rethinking Urban Metabolism: Water, Space and the Modern 
City.” City 8 (3): 363–79. doi:10.1080/1360481042000313509. 
Gangale, Flavia, Anna Mengolini, and Ijeoma Onyeji. 2013. “Consumer Engagement: An 
Insight from Smart Grid Projects in Europe.” Energy Policy 60 (September): 621–
28. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.031. 
Geels, Frank W. 2002. “Technological Transitions as Evolutionary Reconfiguration Pro-
cesses: A Multi-Level Perspective and a Case-Study.” Research Policy, NELSON 
+ WINTER + 20, 31 (8–9): 1257–74. doi:10.1016/S0048-7333(02)00062-8. 
———. 2004. “From Sectoral Systems of Innovation to Socio-Technical Systems: In-
sights about Dynamics and Change from Sociology and Institutional Theory.” Re-
search Policy 33 (6–7): 897–920. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2004.01.015. 
———. 2005. Technological Transitions and System Innovations: A Co-Evolutionary 
and Socio-Technical Analysis. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
———. 2007. “Transformations of Large Technical Systems: A Multilevel Analysis of 
the Dutch Highway System (1950-2000).” Science, Technology & Human Values 
32 (2): 123–49. doi:10.1177/0162243906293883. 
———. 2011. “The Multi-Level Perspective on Sustainability Transitions: Responses to 
Seven Criticisms.” Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1 (1): 24–
40. doi:10.1016/j.eist.2011.02.002. 
———. 2014. “Regime Resistance against Low-Carbon Transitions: Introducing Politics 
and Power into the Multi-Level Perspective.” Theory, Culture & Society 31 (5): 
21–40. doi:10.1177/0263276414531627. 
Geels, Frank W., and René Kemp. 2007. “Dynamics in Socio-Technical Systems: Typol-
ogy of Change Processes and Contrasting Case Studies.” Technology in Society 
29 (4): 441–55. doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2007.08.009. 
 251
Geels, Frank W., and Rob Raven. 2006. “Non-Linearity and Expectations in Niche-
Development Trajectories: Ups and Downs in Dutch Biogas Development (1973–
2003).” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 18 (3–4): 375–92. 
doi:10.1080/09537320600777143. 
Geels, Frank W., and Johan Schot. 2007. “Typology of Sociotechnical Transition Path-
ways.” Research Policy 36 (3): 399–417. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2007.01.003. 
Geller, Howard, Philip Harrington, Arthur H. Rosenfeld, Satoshi Tanishima, and Fridtjof 
Unander. 2006. “Polices for Increasing Energy Efficiency: Thirty Years of Expe-
rience in OECD Countries.” Energy Policy, Hong Kong Editorial Board meeting 
presentationsHong Kong Editorial Board meeting presentations, 34 (5): 556–73. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2005.11.010. 
Geller, Howard, and S. Nadel. 1994. “Market Transformation Strategies to Promote End-
Use Efficiency.” Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 19 (1): 301–46. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.eg.19.110194.001505. 
Gellings, C. W. 1985. “The Concept of Demand-Side Management for Electric Utilities.” 
Proceedings of the IEEE 73 (10): 1468–70. doi:10.1109/PROC.1985.13318. 
———. 2009. The Smart Grid: Enabling Energy Efficiency and Demand Response. The 
Fairmont Press, Inc. 
Gellings, C. W., M. Samotyj, and B. Howe. 2004. “The Future’s Smart Delivery System 
[Electric Power Supply].” IEEE Power and Energy Magazine 2 (5): 40–48. 
doi:10.1109/MPAE.2004.1338121. 
Genus, Audley, and Anne-Marie Coles. 2008. “Rethinking the Multi-Level Perspective of 
Technological Transitions.” Research Policy 37 (9): 1436–45. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2008.05.006. 
Gerring, John. 2007. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 
Gieryn, Thomas F. 2006. “City as Truth-Spot Laboratories and Field-Sites in Urban Stud-
ies.” Social Studies of Science 36 (1): 5–38. doi:10.1177/0306312705054526. 
Goldman, Michael. 2001. “Constructing an Environmental State: Eco-Governmentality 
and Other Transnational Practices of a ‘Green’ World Bank.” Social Problems 48 
(4): 499–523. doi:10.1525/sp.2001.48.4.499. 
Goode, William J. 1997. “Rational Choice Theory.” The American Sociologist 28 (2): 
22–41. doi:10.1007/s12108-997-1004-5. 
Gopakumar, Govind. 2014. “Experiments and Counter-Experiments in the Urban Labora-
tory of Water- Supply Partnerships in India.” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research in press (January). doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12076. 
Gordon, Colin. 1991. “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction.” In The Foucault Ef-
fect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with 
Michel Foucault, edited by Michel Foucault, Graham Burchell, and Peter Miller, 
1–51. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Goulden, Murray, Ben Bedwell, Stefan Rennick-Egglestone, Tom Rodden, and Alexa 
Spence. 2014. “Smart Grids, Smart Users? The Role of the User in Demand Side 
Management.” Energy Research & Social Science 2 (June): 21–29. 
doi:10.1016/j.erss.2014.04.008. 
 252
Graham, Stephen, and Simon Marvin. 2001. Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infra-
structures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition. London ; New 
York: Routledge. 
Gram-Hanssen, Kirsten. 2008. “Consuming Technologies – Developing Routines.” Jour-
nal of Cleaner Production, The Governance and Practice of Change of Sustaina-
ble Consumption and Production, 16 (11): 1181–89. 
doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2007.08.006. 
———. 2010. “Residential Heat Comfort Practices: Understanding Users.” Building Re-
search & Information 38 (2): 175–86. doi:10.1080/09613210903541527. 
Greening, Lorna A., David L. Greene, and Carmen Difiglio. 2000. “Energy Efficiency 
and Consumption — the Rebound Effect — a Survey.” Energy Policy 28 (6–7): 
389–401. doi:10.1016/S0301-4215(00)00021-5. 
Groves, Christopher, Karen Henwood, Fiona Shirani, Catherine Butler, Karen Parkhill, 
and Nick Pidgeon. 2016. “The Grit in the Oyster: Using Energy Biographies to 
Question Socio-Technical Imaginaries of ‘smartness.’” Journal of Responsible 
Innovation 0 (0): 1–22. doi:10.1080/23299460.2016.1178897. 
Guba, Egon G., and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1994. “Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Re-
search.” Handbook of Qualitative Research 2 (163–194): 105. 
Guerrero, Rafael, and Julie Wernau. 2013. “Illinois Senate Overrides Quinn Veto of 
Smart Grid Rate Hike.” Chicago Tribune, May 21. 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-21/business/chi-comed-smart-grid-
revenue-20130521_1_smart-grid-bill-comed-quinn-veto. 
Guy, Simon, Simon Marvin, and Will Medd. 2011. Shaping Urban Infrastructures: In-
termediaries and the Governance of Socio-Technical Networks. Routledge. 
Hackworth, Jason. 2008. The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development 
in American Urbanism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Hajer, Maarten A. 1995. The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Moderni-
zation and the Policy Process. Clarendon Press. 
Hajer, Maarten A., and Wytske Versteeg. 2005. “A Decade of Discourse Analysis of En-
vironmental Politics: Achievements, Challenges, Perspectives.” Journal of Envi-
ronmental Policy & Planning 7 (3): 175–84. 
Hall, Stuart. 1997. Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. 
Vol. 2. Sage.  
Hall, T., and P. Hubbard. 1996. “The Entrepreneurial City: New Urban Politics, New 
Urban Geographies?” Progress in Human Geography 20 (2): 153–74. 
doi:10.1177/030913259602000201. 
Hamilton, B., Y. J. Chae, M. Summy, J. Cutler, and D. Kolata. 2011. “Illinois and South 
Korea: A Model Partnership for Smart Grid Collaboration.” IEEE Power and En-
ergy Magazine 9 (1): 1–1. doi:10.1109/MPE.2010.939563. 
Hammerstrom, D. J. 2007. “Pacific Northwest GridWise Testbed Demonstration Pro-





Hansen, Teis, and Lars Coenen. 2015. “The Geography of Sustainability Transitions: 
Review, Synthesis and Reflections on an Emergent Research Field.” Environmen-
tal Innovation and Societal Transitions 17 (December): 92–109. 
doi:10.1016/j.eist.2014.11.001. 
Hargreaves, Tom. 2011. “Practice-Ing Behaviour Change: Applying Social Practice The-
ory to pro-Environmental Behaviour Change.” Journal of Consumer Culture 11 
(1): 79–99. doi:10.1177/1469540510390500. 
Hargreaves, Tom, Michael Nye, and Jacquelin Burgess. 2010. “Making Energy Visible: 
A Qualitative Field Study of How Householders Interact with Feedback from 
Smart Energy Monitors.” Energy Policy, The socio-economic transition towards a 
hydrogen economy - findings from European research, with regular papers, 38 
(10): 6111–19. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.05.068. 
———. 2013. “Keeping Energy Visible? Exploring How Householders Interact with 
Feedback from Smart Energy Monitors in the Longer Term.” Energy Policy, Spe-
cial Section: Transition Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy, 52 (January): 126–
34. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.027. 
Harris, Chioke, Jeremy P. Meyers, and Michael E. Webber. 2012. “A Unit Commitment 
Study of the Application of Energy Storage toward the Integration of Renewable 
Generation.” Journal of Renewable and Sustainable Energy 4 (1): 13120. 
doi:10.1063/1.3683529. 
Harvey, David. 1989. “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation 
in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism.” Geografiska Annaler 71 (1): 3–17. 
———. 2007. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. OUP Oxford. 
Hastings, Annette. 1999. “Discourse and Urban Change: Introduction to the Special Is-
sue.” Urban Studies 36 (1): 7. 
Hausman, William J., and John L. Neufeld. 1984. “Time-of-Day Pricing in the U.S. Elec-
tric Power Industry at the Turn of the Century.” The RAND Journal of Economics 
15 (1): 116–26. doi:10.2307/3003674. 
Heathcott, J. 2005. “‘The Whole City Is Our Laboratory’: Harland Bartholomew and the 
Production of Urban Knowledge.” Journal of Planning History 4 (4): 322–55. 
doi:10.1177/1538513205282131. 
Hecht, Gabrielle. 2000. The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity 
After World War II. MIT Press. 
Hecht, Gabrielle, and Michael Thad Allen. 2001. “Introduction: Authority, Political Ma-
chines, and Technology’s History.” In Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of 
Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes, edited by Michael Thad Al-
len and Gabrielle Hecht. MIT Press. 
Hertzog, Christine. 2013. “Smart Grid: American Energy Independence.” The Energy 
Collective. July 9. http://www.theenergycollective.com/christine-
hertzog/246916/american-energy-independence. 
Hess, David J. 2015. “The Politics of Niche-Regime Conflicts: Distributed Solar Energy 
in the United States.” Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, Na-
tional Academy of Engineering, . doi:10.1016/j.eist.2015.09.002. 
 254
Higginson, Sarah, Murray Thomson, and Tracy Bhamra. 2014. “‘For the Times They Are 
a-Changin’: The Impact of Shifting Energy-Use Practices in Time and Space.” 
Local Environment 19 (5): 520–38. doi:10.1080/13549839.2013.802459. 
Hirsh, Richard F. 1999. “PURPA: The Spur to Competition and Utility Restructuring.” 
The Electricity Journal 12 (7): 60–72. doi:10.1016/S1040-6190(99)00060-3. 
———. 2002. Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the Ameri-
can Electric Utility System. MIT Press. 
———. 2003. Technology and Transformation in the American Electric Utility Industry. 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2004. “Power Struggle: Changing Momentum in the Restructured American 
Electric Utility System.” Annales Historiques de L’électricité N° 2 (1): 107–23. 
Hledik, Ryan. 2014. “Rediscovering Residential Demand Charges.” The Electricity Jour-
nal 27 (7): 82–96. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2014.07.003. 
Hodson, Mike, and Simon Marvin. 2009a. “‘Urban Ecological Security’: A New Urban 
Paradigm?” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33 (1): 193–
215. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2009.00832.x. 
———. 2009b. “Cities Mediating Technological Transitions: Understanding Visions, 
Intermediation and Consequences.” Technology Analysis & Strategic Manage-
ment 21 (4): 515–34. doi:10.1080/09537320902819213. 
———. 2010a. “Can Cities Shape Socio-Technical Transitions and How Would We 
Know If They Were?” Research Policy, Special Section on Innovation and Sus-
tainability Transitions, 39 (4): 477–85. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.01.020. 
———. 2010b. “Urbanism in the Anthropocene: Ecological Urbanism or Premium Eco-
logical Enclaves?” City 14 (3): 298–313. doi:10.1080/13604813.2010.482277. 
———. 2012. “Mediating Low-Carbon Urban Transitions? Forms of Organization, 
Knowledge and Action.” European Planning Studies 20 (3): 421–39. 
doi:10.1080/09654313.2012.651804. 
Hoffmann, Matthew J. 2011. Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with 
a Global Response after Kyoto. Oxford University Press. 
Hommels, Anique. 2005. “Studying Obduracy in the City: Toward a Productive Fusion 
between Technology Studies and Urban Studies.” Science, Technology, & Human 
Values 30 (3): 323–51. 
Hommels, Anique, Peter Peters, and Wiebe E. Bijker. 2007. “Techno Therapy or Nur-
tured Niches? Technology Studies and the Evaluation of Radical Innovations.” 
Research Policy 36 (7): 1088–99. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2007.04.002. 
Huber, Matthew. 2015. “Theorizing Energy Geographies.” Geography Compass 9 (6): 
327–38. doi:10.1111/gec3.12214. 
Huber, Matthew T. 2013. Lifeblood: Oil, Freedom, and the Forces of Capital. University 
of Minnesota Press. 
Hughes, Thomas P. 1983. Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-
1930. JHU Press. 
Hughes, Thomas P., and Olivier Coutard. 1996. “Fifteen years of social and historical 
research on large technical systems. An interview with Thomas Hughes.” Flux 12 
(25): 44–47. 
 255
IBM. 2011. “IBM’s Smarter Cities Challenge Boulder Report.” https://www-
static.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/IBM_SmrtCity_SGC_Report-1-
201306171551.pdf. 
infomisa. 2016. President Obama Explains the Smart Grid and Economic Recovery. Ac-
cessed August 3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7kOWu5MeRWk. 
Isser, Steve. 2015. Electricity Restructuring in the United States: Markets and Policy 
from the 1978 Energy Act to the Present. Cambridge University Press. 
Jacobs, Keith. 2006. “Discourse Analysis and Its Utility for Urban Policy Research.” Ur-
ban Policy and Research 24 (1): 39–52. doi:10.1080/08111140600590817. 
Jager, Siegfried. 2001. “Discourse and Knowledge: Theoretical and Methodological As-
pects of a Critical Discourse and Dispositive Analysis.” In Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 32–62. SAGE. 
Jaglin, Sylvy. 2013. “Urban Energy Policies and the Governance of Multilevel Issues in 
Cape Town.” Urban Studies, September, 42098013500091. 
doi:10.1177/0042098013500091. 
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2004a. Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Govern-
ance. MIT Press. 
———. 2004b. States of Knowledge. Edited by Sheila Jasanoff. Abingdon, UK: Taylor 
& Francis. doi:10.4324/9780203413845. 
Jasanoff, Sheila, and Sang-Hyun Kim. 2009. “Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Im-
aginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea.” Minerva 47 
(2): 119–46. doi:10.1007/s11024-009-9124-4. 
Jessop, Bob. 2007. “From Micro-Powers to Governmentality: Foucault’s Work on State-
hood, State Formation, Statecraft and State Power.” Political Geography 26 (1): 
34–40. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.08.002. 
Jonas, a. E. G., D. Gibbs, and a. While. 2011. “The New Urban Politics as a Politics of 
Carbon Control.” Urban Studies 48 (12): 2537–54. 
doi:10.1177/0042098011411951. 
Jørgensen, Marianne W., and Louise J. Phillips. 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and 
Method. Sage.  
Joseph, Jonathan. 2013. “Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmentality 
Approach.” Resilience 1 (1): 38–52. doi:10.1080/21693293.2013.765741. 
Joskow, Paul L. 2001. “California’s Electricity Crisis.” Oxford Review of Economic Poli-
cy 17 (3): 365–88. doi:10.1093/oxrep/17.3.365. 
Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics.” The American Economic Review 93 (5): 1449–75. 
Kanellos, Katherine Tweed, Michael. 2010. “South Korea Guns for Smart Grid Finish 
Line.” March 16. http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/south-korea-guns-
for-smart-grid-finish-line. 
Karch, Andrew. 2007. Democratic Laboratories: Policy Diffusion Among the American 
States. University of Michigan Press. 
Karvonen, Andrew, and Bas van Heur. 2014. “Urban Laboratories: Experiments in Re-
working Cities.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38 (2): 
379–92. doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12075. 
 256
Kaye, Leon. 2011. “Pushing the Low Carbon Boundaries: South Korea’s Smart Grid Ini-
tiative.” The Guardian, September 5, sec. Guardian Sustainable Business. 
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/south-korea-smart-grid-low-
carbon. 
Kemp, René. 1994. “Technology and the Transition to Environmental Sustainability.” 
Futures 26 (10): 1023–46. doi:10.1016/0016-3287(94)90071-X. 
Kemp, René, Derk Loorbach, and Jan Rotmans. 2007. “Transition Management as a 
Model for Managing Processes of Co-Evolution towards Sustainable Develop-
ment.” International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 14 
(1): 78–91. doi:10.1080/13504500709469709. 
Kemp, René, Johan Schot, and Remco Hoogma. 1998. “Regime Shifts to Sustainability 
through Processes of Niche Formation: The Approach of Strategic Niche Man-
agement.” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 10 (2): 175–98. 
doi:10.1080/09537329808524310. 
Kind, Peter. 2013. “Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications and Strategic Respons-
es to a Changing Retail Electric Business.” Washington, D.C: Edison Electric In-
stitute. 
http://ceem.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/event/documents/Passeyeceee2013.pdf. 
King, Michael. 2015. “Mueller vs. TCAD: No Room for Affordability?,” November 6. 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2015-11-06/mueller-vs-tcad-no-room-for-
affordability/. 
Kirschen, D. S. 2003. “Demand-Side View of Electricity Markets.” IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems 18 (2): 520–27. doi:10.1109/TPWRS.2003.810692. 
Klauser, Francisco, Till Paasche, and Ola Söderström. 2014. “Michel Foucault and the 
Smart City: Power Dynamics Inherent in Contemporary Governing through 
Code.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 32 (5): 869 – 885. 
doi:10.1068/d13041p. 
Klauser, Francisco R., and Anders Albrechtslund. 2014. “From Self-Tracking to Smart 
Urban Infrastructures: Towards an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda on Big Da-
ta.” Surveillance & Society 12 (2): 273–86. 
Knorr-Cetina, Karin. 1995. “Laboratory Studies: The Cultural Approach to the Study of 
Science.” In Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, edited by Sheila Jasa-
noff, Gerald E Markle, James C Peterson, and Trevor Pinch, 141–66. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc. 
König, Ariane, and James Evans. 2012. “Introduction : Experimenting for Sustainable 
Development ? Living Laboratories , Social Learning and the Role of the Univer-
sity,” 1–24. 
Kurada, Naresh, A. Alex Dhanhal, and Bala Venkatesh. 2014. “Evolving Perimeter In-
formation Security Models in Smart Grids and Utilities.” ISACA Journal 4. 
http://www.isaca.org/Journal/archives/2013/Volume-4/Pages/JOnline-Evolving-
Perimeter-Information-Security-Models-in-Smart-Grids-and-Utilities.aspx. 
Lacey, Stephen. 2015. “Move Over Mandates: Can a New ‘Personal Energy Independ-




Langheim, Ria, Melissa Skubel, Xiao Chen, William Maxwell, Tarla Rai Peterson, Eliza-
beth Wilson, and Jennie C. Stephens. 2014. “Smart Grid Coverage in U.S. News-
papers: Characterizing Public Conversations.” The Electricity Journal 27 (5): 77–
87. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2014.05.008. 
Larkin, Brian. 2013. “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure.” Annual Review of An-
thropology 42 (1): 327–43. doi:10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155522. 
Larner, Wendy, and Richard Le Heron. 2002. “The Spaces and Subjects of a Globalising 
Economy: A Situated Exploration of Method.” Environment and Planning D: So-
ciety and Space 20 (6): 753–74. doi:10.1068/d284t. 
———. 2005. “Neo-Liberalizing Spaces and Subjectivities: Reinventing New Zealand 
Universities.” Organization 12 (6): 843–62. doi:10.1177/1350508405057473. 
Laurent, Brice. 2011. “Technologies of Democracy: Experiments and Demonstrations.” 
Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (4): 649–66. doi:10.1007/s11948-011-9303-1. 
Lawhon, Mary, and James T. Murphy. 2012. “Socio-Technical Regimes and Sustainabil-
ity Transitions Insights from Political Ecology.” Progress in Human Geography 
36 (3): 354–78. doi:10.1177/0309132511427960. 
Lemke, Thomas. 2001. “‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the 
Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality.” Economy and Society 30 
(2): 190–207. doi:10.1080/03085140120042271. 
———. 2002. “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique.” Rethinking Marxism 14 (3): 
49–64. doi:10.1080/089356902101242288. 
Levenda, Anthony, Dillon Mahmoudi, and Gerald Sussman. 2015. “The Neoliberal Poli-
tics of ‘Smart’: Electricity Consumption, Household Monitoring, and the Enter-
prise Form.” Canadian Journal of Communication 40 (4). http://www.cjc-
online.ca/index.php/journal/article/view/2928. 
Li, Tania Murray. 2007a. “Governmentality.” Anthropologica 49 (2): 275–81. 
———. 2007b. The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of 
Politics. Duke University Press. 
Livingstone, David N. 2010. Putting Science in Its Place: Geographies of Scientific 
Knowledge. University of Chicago Press. 
Long, Joshua. 2016. “Constructing the Narrative of the Sustainability Fix: Sustainability, 
Social Justice and Representation in Austin, TX.” Urban Studies 53 (1): 149–72. 
doi:10.1177/0042098014560501. 
Loorbach, Derk. 2010. “Transition Management for Sustainable Development: A Pre-
scriptive, Complexity-Based Governance Framework.” Governance 23 (1): 161–
83. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2009.01471.x. 
López, M. A., S. de la Torre, S. Martín, and J. A. Aguado. 2015. “Demand-Side Man-
agement in Smart Grid Operation Considering Electric Vehicles Load Shifting 
and Vehicle-to-Grid Support.” International Journal of Electrical Power & Ener-
gy Systems 64 (January): 689–98. doi:10.1016/j.ijepes.2014.07.065. 
Loughran, David S., and Jonathan Kulick. 2004. “Demand-Side Management and Energy 
Efficiency in the United States.” The Energy Journal 25 (1): 19–43. 
Lovell, Heather. 2007. “The Governance of Innovation in Socio-Technical Systems: The 
Difficulties of Strategic Niche Management in Practice.” Science and Public Pol-
icy 34 (1): 35–44. doi:10.3152/030234207X190540. 
 258
———. 2016. “The Role of International Policy Transfer Within the Multiple Streams 
Approach: The Case of Smart Electricity Metering in Australia.” Public Admin-
istration, April, n/a-n/a. doi:10.1111/padm.12259. 
Luque, Andrés. 2014. “The Smart Grid and the Interface between Energy, ICT, and the 
City.” In Urban Retrofitting for Sustainability : Mapping the Transition to 2050, 
edited by Tim Dixon, Malcolm Eames, Miriam Hunt, and Simon Lannon. New 
York: Routledge. 
Luque-Ayala, Andrés, and Simon Marvin. 2015. “Developing a Critical Understanding of 
Smart Urbanism?” Urban Studies 52 (12): 2105–16. 
doi:10.1177/0042098015577319. 
Lutzenhiser, Loren. 1992. “A Cultural Model of Household Energy Consumption.” Ener-
gy 17 (1): 47–60. doi:10.1016/0360-5442(92)90032-U. 
———. 1993. “Social and Behavioral Aspects of Energy Use.” Annual Review of Energy 
and the Environment 18 (1): 247–89. doi:10.1146/annurev.eg.18.110193.001335. 
———. 2014. “Through the Energy Efficiency Looking Glass.” Energy Research & So-
cial Science 1 (March): 141–51. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2014.03.011. 
M D Levine, J G Koomey, J E McMahon, A H Sanstad, and and E. Hirst. 1995. “Energy 
Efficiency Policy and Market Failures.” Annual Review of Energy and the Envi-
ronment 20 (1): 535–55. doi:10.1146/annurev.eg.20.110195.002535. 
MacKenzie, Donald. 2009. “Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and the 
Politics of Carbon Markets.” Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (3–4): 
440–55. doi:10.1016/j.aos.2008.02.004. 
MacKenzie, Donald A. 1993. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear 
Missile Guidance. MIT Press. 
MacLeod, Gordon. 2002. “From Urban Entrepreneurialism to a ‘Revanchist City’? On 
the Spatial Injustices of Glasgow’s Renaissance.” Antipode 34 (3): 602–24. 
doi:10.1111/1467-8330.00256. 
Markard, Jochen, Rob Raven, and Bernhard Truffer. 2012. “Sustainability Transitions: 
An Emerging Field of Research and Its Prospects.” Research Policy, Special Sec-
tion on Sustainability Transitions, 41 (6): 955–67. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2012.02.013. 
Marres, Noortje. 2011. “The Costs of Public Involvement: Everyday Devices of Carbon 
Accounting and the Materialization of Participation.” Economy and Society 40 
(4): 510–33. doi:10.1080/03085147.2011.602294. 
Marres, Noortje, and Javier Lezaun. 2011. “Materials and Devices of the Public: An In-
troduction.” Economy and Society 40 (4): 489–509. 
doi:10.1080/03085147.2011.602293. 
Marvin, Simon, Stephen Graham, and Simon Guy. 1999. “Cities, Regions and Privatised 
Utilities.” Progress in Planning 51 (2): 91–165. doi:10.1016/S0305-
9006(98)00028-2. 
Marvin, Simon, Andrés Luque-Ayala, and Colin McFarlane. 2015. Smart Urbanism: 
Utopian Vision or False Dawn? Routledge. 
Maurer, Eric, and James Newcomb. 2013. “Building the Electricity System of the Future: 




McCann, Eugene. 2008. “Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities: Global Circuits 
of Knowledge in the Development of Vancouver, Canada’s ‘four Pillar’ Drug 
Strategy.” Environment and Planning A 40 (4): 885–904. doi:10.1068/a38456. 
———. 2011a. “Veritable Inventions: Cities, Policies and Assemblage.” Area 43 (2): 
143–147. 
———. 2011b. “Urban Policy Mobilities and Global Circuits of Knowledge: Toward a 
Research Agenda.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 101 (1): 
107–30. doi:10.1080/00045608.2010.520219. 
———. 2013. “Policy Boosterism, Policy Mobilities, and the Extrospective City.” Urban 
Geography 34 (1): 5–29. doi:10.1080/02723638.2013.778627. 
McCann, Eugene, Ananya Roy, and Kevin Ward. 2013. “Assembling/Worlding Cities.” 
Urban Geography 34 (5): 581–89. doi:10.1080/02723638.2013.793905. 
McCann, Eugene, and Kevin Ward. 2011. Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in 
the Global Age. U of Minnesota Press. 
———. 2012a. “Assembling Urbanism: Following Policies and ‘studying Through’ the 
Sites and Situations of Policy Making.” Environment and Planning A 44 (1): 42–
51. doi:10.1068/a44178. 
———. 2012b. “Policy Assemblages, Mobilities and Mutations: Toward a Multidiscipli-
nary Conversation.” Political Studies Review 10 (3): 325–32. doi:10.1111/j.1478-
9302.2012.00276.x. 
———. 2013. “A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Policy Transfer Research: Geogra-
phies, Assemblages, Mobilities and Mutations.” Policy Studies 34 (1): 2–18. 
doi:10.1080/01442872.2012.748563. 
McFarlane, Colin. 2010. “The Comparative City: Knowledge, Learning, Urbanism.” In-
ternational Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34 (4): 725–42. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2010.00917.x. 
———. 2011. Learning the City: Knowledge and Translocal Assemblage. John Wiley & 
Sons. 
McGuirk, Pauline, Robyn Dowling, and Harriet Bulkeley. 2014. “Repositioning Urban 
Governments? Energy Efficiency and Australia’s Changing Climate and Energy 
Governance Regimes.” Urban Studies 51 (13): 2717–34. 
doi:10.1177/0042098014533732. 
McLean, Anthony, Harriet Bulkeley, and Mike Crang. 2015. “Negotiating the Urban 
Smart Grid: Socio-Technical Experimentation in the City of Austin.” Urban Stud-
ies, November, 42098015612984. doi:10.1177/0042098015612984. 
McNay, Lois. 2009. “Self as Enterprise Dilemmas of Control and Resistance in Fou-
cault’s The Birth of Biopolitics.” Theory, Culture & Society 26 (6): 55–77. 
doi:10.1177/0263276409347697. 
Meadowcroft, James. 2009. “What about the Politics? Sustainable Development, Transi-
tion Management, and Long Term Energy Transitions.” Policy Sciences 42 (4): 
323–40. doi:10.1007/s11077-009-9097-z. 
———. 2011. “Engaging with the Politics of Sustainability Transitions.” Environmental 
Innovation and Societal Transitions 1 (1): 70–75. doi:10.1016/j.eist.2011.02.003. 
 260
Meltzer, Erica. 2014a. “Boulder to Track Energy Use in 50 Homes, 25 Businesses over 
next 2 Years.” Daily Camera, January 25. 
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder/ci_24992390/boulder-seeks-energy-
monitor-volunteers. 
———. 2014b. “Boulder Rolls out Real-Time Home Energy Monitoring Pilot Program.” 
Daily Camera, March 21. 
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder/ci_25393378/boulder-energy-
monitoring-pilot-program. 
Merriam, Sharan B. 2009. Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation. 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Mirowski, Philip. 1991. More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as 
Nature’s Economics. Cambridge University Press. 
Mitchell, Timothy. 1998. “Fixing the Economy.” Cultural Studies 12 (1): 82–101. 
doi:10.1080/095023898335627. 
———. 2008. “Rethinking Economy.” Geoforum, Rethinking EconomyAgro-food activ-
ism in California and the politics of the possibleCulture, nature and landscape in 
the Australian region, 39 (3): 1116–21. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2006.11.022. 
Moezzi, Mithra, and Kathryn B. Janda. 2014. “From ‘if Only’ to ‘social Potential’ in 
Schemes to Reduce Building Energy Use.” Energy Research & Social Science 1 
(March): 30–40. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2014.03.014. 
Monstadt, Jochen. 2007. “Urban Governance and the Transition of Energy Systems: In-
stitutional Change and Shifting Energy and Climate Policies in Berlin.” Interna-
tional Journal of Urban and Regional Research 31 (2): 326–43. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2007.00725.x. 
Moore, Sharelynn. 2012. “Itron Technology Energizes Energy Efficiency with White 
House Green Button Functionality (NASDAQ:ITRI).” Itron.com. March 22. 
http://investors.itron.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=658870. 
Moore, Steven A. 2007. Alternative Routes to the Sustainable City: Austin, Curitiba, and 
Frankfurt. Lexington Books. 
Morozov, Evgeny. 2015. “Where Uber and Amazon Rule: Welcome to the World of the 
Platform.” The Guardian, June 6, sec. Technology. 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/07/facebook-uber-amazon-
platform-economy. 
Moss, Timothy. 2009. “Intermediaries and the Governance of Sociotechnical Networks in 
Transition.” Environment and Planning A 41 (6): 1480–95. doi:10.1068/a4116. 
———. 2014. “Socio-Technical Change and the Politics of Urban Infrastructure: Manag-
ing Energy in Berlin between Dictatorship and Democracy.” Urban Studies 51 
(7): 1432–48. doi:10.1177/0042098013500086. 
Muratori, Matteo, Beth-Anne Schuelke-Leech, and Giorgio Rizzoni. 2014. “Role of Res-
idential Demand Response in Modern Electricity Markets.” Renewable and Sus-
tainable Energy Reviews 33 (May): 546–53. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2014.02.027. 
Murphy, James T. 2015. “Human Geography and Socio-Technical Transition Studies: 
Promising Intersections.” Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 17 
(December): 73–91. doi:10.1016/j.eist.2015.03.002. 
 261
Murray, David. 2014. “Protecting Us Abroad, Ensuring Energy Independence at Home.” 
The Energy Collective. September 27. 
http://www.theenergycollective.com/nrdcswitchboard/545401/protecting-us-
abroad-ensuring-energy-independence-home. 
Nadesan, Majia Holmer. 2010. Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life. 
Routledge. 
Nasiri, A. 2008. “Integrating Energy Storage with Renewable Energy Systems.” In 34th 
Annual Conference of IEEE Industrial Electronics, 2008. IECON 2008, 17–18. 
doi:10.1109/IECON.2008.4757918. 
Naus, Joeri, Gert Spaargaren, Bas J.M. van Vliet, and Hilje M. van der Horst. 2014. 
“Smart Grids, Information Flows and Emerging Domestic Energy Practices.” En-
ergy Policy 68 (May). Elsevier: 436–46. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.01.038. 
Naus, Joeri, Bas J. M. van Vliet, and Astrid Hendriksen. 2015. “Households as Change 
Agents in a Dutch Smart Energy Transition: On Power, Privacy and Participa-
tion.” Energy Research & Social Science, Special Issue on Smart Grids and the 
Social Sciences, 9 (September): 125–36. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2015.08.025. 
Neenan, Bernard. 2013. “FirstEnergy’s Consumer Behavior Study Preliminary Evalua-
tion of the Summer 2012.” DOE Consumer Behavior Studies. 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/FirstEnergy_Consumer_Behavior_Study_Prelimi
nary_Evaluation_of_the_Summer_2012_Final_PDF_R_May_13_copy.pdf. 
Newell, J. P., and J. J. Cousins. 2014. “The Boundaries of Urban Metabolism: Towards a 
Political-Industrial Ecology.” Progress in Human Geography, December. 
doi:10.1177/0309132514558442. 
NIST. 2014. “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.” National 
Insititute of Standards and Technology. 
http://www.cslawreport.com/files/2015/04/07/nist-combined-file.pdf. 
Nyborg, Sophie. 2015. “Pilot Users and Their Families: Inventing Flexible Practices in 
the Smart Grid.” Science & Technology Studies 28 (3). 
http://ojs.tsv.fi/index.php/sts/article/view/55342. 
Nye, David E. 1992. Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-
1940. MIT Press. 
Ockwell, Gary. 2016. “Activating the Human Grid.” Public Utilities Fortnightly, Febru-
ary. 
Office of the Press Secretary. 2005. “President Signs Energy Policy Act.” August 8. 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050808-
6.html. 
Oregon Senate Bill 1149. 1999. http://energytrust.org/About/PDF/sb1149.pdf. 
Oudshoorn, Nelly, and Trevor J. Pinch. 2005. How Users Matter: The Co-Construction 
of Users and Technology. MIT Press. 
Payne, G. 2005. “Generalization in Qualitative Research.” Sociology 39 (2): 295–314. 
doi:10.1177/0038038505050540. 




Peck, Jamie. 2011. “Geographies of Policy From Transfer-Diffusion to Mobility-
Mutation.” Progress in Human Geography 35 (6): 773–97. 
doi:10.1177/0309132510394010. 
Peck, Jamie, and Nik Theodore. 2001. “Exporting Workfare/Importing Welfare-to-Work: 
Exploring the Politics of Third Way Policy Transfer.” Political Geography 20 (4): 
427–60. doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(00)00069-X. 
———. 2010a. “Mobilizing Policy: Models, Methods, and Mutations.” Geoforum, 
Themed Issue: Mobilizing Policy, 41 (2): 169–74. 
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.01.002. 
———. 2010b. “Recombinant Workfare, across the Americas: Transnationalizing ‘fast’ 
Social Policy.” Geoforum, Themed Issue: Mobilizing Policy, 41 (2): 195–208. 
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.01.001. 
———. 2012. “Follow the Policy: A Distended Case Approach.” Environment and Plan-
ning A 44 (1): 21–30. doi:10.1068/a44179. 
Peck, Jamie, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner. 2009. “Neoliberal Urbanism: Models, 
Moments, Mutations.” SAIS Review 29 (1): 49–66. doi:10.1353/sais.0.0028. 
Peck, Jamie, and Nikolas Theodore. 2015. Fast Policy: Experimental Statecraft at the 
Thresholds of Neoliberalism. University of Minnesota Press. 
Pedersen, Marc, B. C. Hydro, and Power Authority. 2008. “Segmenting Residential Cus-
tomers: Energy and Conservation Behaviors.” Proceedings of the ACEEE Sum-
mer Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings 7: 229–41. 
Powells, Gareth, Harriet Bulkeley, Sandra Bell, and Ellis Judson. 2014. “Peak Electricity 
Demand and the Flexibility of Everyday Life.” Geoforum 55 (August): 43–52. 
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.04.014. 
Price, Michael. 2010. “Bringing Customers On Board, Part II.” Public Utilities Fortnight-
ly, August. 
Price, Michael Henry, and Jim Thomson. 2009. “Bringing Customers On Board.” Public 
Utilities Fortnightly, September. 
Rahimi, F., and A. Ipakchi. 2010. “Demand Response as a Market Resource Under the 
Smart Grid Paradigm.” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 1 (1): 82–88. 
doi:10.1109/TSG.2010.2045906. 
Ranganathan, Prakash, and Kendall Nygard. 2011. “Smart Grid Data Analytics for Deci-
sion Support.” 2011 IEEE Electrical Power and Energy Conference, October. 
Ieee, 315–21. doi:10.1109/EPEC.2011.6070218. 
Reeves, Kimberly. 2008. “Mueller Revisits Affordability and Density,” October 3. 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2008-10-03/681440/. 
Reimer, Maria Hellström, Kes Mccormick, Elisabet Nilsson, and Nicholas Arsenault. 
2012. “Advancing Sustainable Urban Transformation through Living Labs : 
Looking to the Öresund Region,” no. August. 
Rhodes, Joshua D., Charles R. Upshaw, Chioke B. Harris, Colin M. Meehan, David A. 
Walling, Paul A. Navrátil, Ariane L. Beck, et al. 2014. “Experimental and Data 
Collection Methods for a Large-Scale Smart Grid Deployment: Methods and First 
Results.” Energy 65 (February): 462–71. doi:10.1016/j.energy.2013.11.004. 
 263
Rip, Arie, and René Kemp. 1998. “Technological Change.” In Human Choice and Cli-
mate Change, edited by S. Rayner and E.L. Malone, 327–99. Columbus, OH: Bat-
telle Press. http://doc.utwente.nl/34706/1/K356.pdf. 
Robinson, Jennifer. 2014. “Introduction to a Virtual Issue on Comparative Urbanism: 
Introduction.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, May, n/a-
n/a. doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12171. 
Rockwell, Lilly. 2015. “Austin Energy Poised to Secure Its Biggest Solar Power...” Aus-
tin Statesman, October 1. http://www.mystatesman.com/news/news/local/austin-
energy-poised-to-secure-biggest-solar-power/nnsJ3/. 
Rose, Nikolas. 1993. “Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism.” 
Economy and Society 22 (3): 283–99. doi:10.1080/03085149300000019. 
———. 1998. Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood. Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. 1999. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge University 
Press. 
———. 2001. “Biopolitics in the Twenty First Century—Notes For a Research Agenda.” 
Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory 2 (3): 25–44. 
doi:10.1080/1600910X.2001.9672798. 
Rose, Nikolas S. 1999. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge, 
United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Rosental, C. 2014. “Toward a Sociology of Public Demonstrations.” Sociological Theory 
31 (4): 343–65. doi:10.1177/0735275113513454. 
Rozek, Richard P. 1989. “Competitive Bidding In Electricity Markets: A Survey.” The 
Energy Journal 10 (4): 117–38. 
Rudolph, Richard, and Scott Ridley. 1986. Power Struggle: The Hundred-Year War Over 
Electricity. Harper & Row. 
Rutherford, Jonathan, and Olivier Coutard. 2014. “Urban Energy Transitions: Places, 
Processes and Politics of Socio-Technical Change.” Urban Studies 51 (7): 1353–
77. doi:10.1177/0042098013500090. 
Rutherford, Jonathan, and Sylvy Jaglin. 2015. “Introduction to the Special Issue – Urban 
Energy Governance: Local Actions, Capacities and Politics.” Energy Policy 78 
(March): 173–78. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.11.033. 
Rutherford, Stephanie. 2007. “Green Governmentality: Insights and Opportunities in the 
Study of Nature’s Rule.” Progress in Human Geography 31 (3): 291–307. 
doi:10.1177/0309132507077080. 
Rutland, Ted, and Alex Aylett. 2008. “The Work of Policy: Actor Networks, Govern-
mentality, and Local Action on Climate Change in Portland, Oregon.” Environ-
ment and Planning D: Society and Space 26 (4): 627 – 646. doi:10.1068/d6907. 
Rydin, Yvonne, Catalina Turcu, Simon Guy, and Patrick Austin. 2013. “Mapping the 
Coevolution of Urban Energy Systems: Pathways of Change.” Environment and 
Planning A 45 (3): 634–49. doi:10.1068/a45199. 
Saunders, Harry D. 2013. “Historical Evidence for Energy Efficiency Rebound in 30 US 
Sectors and a Toolkit for Rebound Analysts.” Technological Forecasting and So-
cial Change 80 (7): 1317–30. doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2012.12.007. 
 264
Schatzki, Theodore R., Karin Knorr-Cetina, and Eike von Savigny. 2001. The Practice 
Turn in Contemporary Theory. Psychology Press. 
Scrase, Ivan, and Adrian Smith. 2009. “The (Non-)Politics of Managing Low Carbon 
Socio-Technical Transitions.” Environmental Politics 18 (5): 707–26. 
doi:10.1080/09644010903157008. 
Seyfang, Gill, and Alex Haxeltine. 2012. “Growing Grassroots Innovations: Exploring 
the Role of Community-Based Initiatives in Governing Sustainable Energy Tran-
sitions.” Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy 30 (3): 381–400. 
doi:10.1068/c10222. 
Sheldrick, Alistair, James Evans, and Gabriele Schliwa. 2016. “Policy Learning and Sus-
tainable Urban Transitions: Mobilising Berlin’s Cycling Renaissance.” Urban 
Studies, July, 42098016653889. doi:10.1177/0042098016653889. 
Shell. 2016. “Climate Change and Energy Transitions.” 
http://www.shell.com/sustainability/environment/climate-change.html. 
Shipan, Charles R., and Craig Volden. 2008. “The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion.” 
American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 840–57. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
5907.2008.00346.x. 
Shirilau, M. S. 1988. “Computerized Data Collection for End-Use Experiments.” IEEE 
Computer Applications in Power 1 (1): 19–20. doi:10.1109/67.898. 
Short, John Rennie. 2016. “A Perfect Storm: Climate Change, the Power Grid, and Regu-
latory Regime Change after Network Failure.” Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy 34 (2): 244–61. doi:10.1177/0263774X15614185. 
Shove, Elizabeth. 2004. “Efficiency and Consumption: Technology and Practice.” Ener-
gy & Environment 15 (6): 1053–65. doi:10.1260/0958305043026555. 
———. 2010. “Beyond the ABC: Climate Change Policy and Theories of Social 
Change.” Environment and Planning A 42 (6): 1273–85. doi:10.1068/a42282. 
———. 2012. “The Shadowy Side of Innovation: Unmaking and Sustainability.” Tech-
nology Analysis & Strategic Management 24 (4): 363–75. 
doi:10.1080/09537325.2012.663961. 
———. 2014. “Putting Practice into Policy: Reconfiguring Questions of Consumption 
and Climate Change.” Contemporary Social Science 9 (4): 415–29. 
doi:10.1080/21582041.2012.692484. 
Shove, Elizabeth, Mika Pantzar, and Matt Watson. 2012. The Dynamics of Social Prac-
tice: Everyday Life and How It Changes. SAGE Publications. 
Shove, Elizabeth, and Gordon Walker. 2007. “CAUTION! Transitions Ahead: Politics, 
Practice, and Sustainable Transition Management.” Environment and Planning A 
39 (4): 763–770. 
———. 2008. “Transition Management and the Politics of Shape Shifting.” Environment 
and Planning A 40 (4): 1012–14. 
———. 2010. “Governing Transitions in the Sustainability of Everyday Life.” Research 
Policy, Special Section on Innovation and Sustainability Transitions, 39 (4): 471–
76. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.01.019. 
———. 2014. “What Is Energy for? Social Practice and Energy Demand.” Theory, Cul-
ture & Society 31 (5): 41–58. 
 265
Shove, Elizabeth, Matt Watson, and Nicola Spurling. 2015. “Conceptualizing Connec-
tions Energy Demand, Infrastructures and Social Practices.” European Journal of 
Social Theory, April, 1368431015579964. doi:10.1177/1368431015579964. 
Siano, Pierluigi. 2014. “Demand Response and Smart grids—A Survey.” Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 30 (February): 461–78. 
doi:10.1016/j.rser.2013.10.022. 
Simakova, E. 2010. “RFID ‘Theatre of the Proof’: Product Launch and Technology 
Demonstration as Corporate Practices.” Social Studies of Science 40 (4): 549–76. 
doi:10.1177/0306312710365587. 
Simakova, Elena. 2010. “RFID ‘Theatre of the Proof’: Product Launch and Technology 
Demonstration as Corporate Practices.” Social Studies of Science 40 (4): 549–76. 
doi:10.1177/0306312710365587. 
Simon, Herbert A. 1986. “Rationality in Psychology and Economics.” The Journal of 
Business 59 (4): S209–24. 
Slayton, Rebecca. 2013. “Efficient, Secure Green: Digital Utopianism and the Challenge 
of Making the Electrical Grid ‘Smart.’” Information & Culture 48 (4): 448–78. 
doi:10.7560/IC48403. 
Slocum, Rachel. 2004a. “Polar Bears and Energy-Efficient Lightbulbs: Strategies to 
Bring Climate Change Home.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
22 (3): 413 – 438. doi:10.1068/d378. 
———. 2004b. “Consumer Citizens and the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign.” 
Environment and Planning A 36 (5): 763–82. doi:10.1068/a36139. 
Slocum, Tyson. 2001. “Electric Utility Deregulation and the Myths of the Energy Crisis.” 
Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 21 (6): 473–481. 
Slovic, Paul, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G MacGregor. 2002. “Rational 
Actors or Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioral 
Economics.” The Journal of Socio-Economics 31 (4): 329–42. 
doi:10.1016/S1053-5357(02)00174-9. 
Smith, Adrian, Tom Hargreaves, Sabine Hielscher, Mari Martiskainen, and Gill Seyfang. 
2016. “Making the Most of Community Energies: Three Perspectives on Grass-
roots Innovation.” Environment and Planning A 48 (2): 407–32. 
doi:10.1177/0308518X15597908. 
Smith, Adrian, Andy Stirling, and Frans Berkhout. 2005. “The Governance of Sustaina-
ble Socio-Technical Transitions.” Research Policy 34 (10): 1491–1510. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2005.07.005. 
Smith, Adrian, Jan-Peter Voß, and John Grin. 2010. “Innovation Studies and Sustainabil-
ity Transitions: The Allure of the Multi-Level Perspective and Its Challenges.” 
Research Policy 39 (4): 435–48. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.01.023. 
Smith, Vernon L. 1991. “Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psy-
chology.” Journal of Political Economy 99 (4): 877–97. 
Smith, W. 2009. “Theatre of Use: A Frame Analysis of Information Technology Demon-
strations.” Social Studies of Science 39 (3): 449–80. 
doi:10.1177/0306312708101978. 
Söderström, Ola, Till Paasche, and Francisco Klauser. 2014. “Smart Cities as Corporate 
Storytelling.” City 18 (3): 307–20. doi:10.1080/13604813.2014.906716. 
 266
Sovacool, Benjamin K. 2014. “What Are We Doing Here? Analyzing Fifteen Years of 
Energy Scholarship and Proposing a Social Science Research Agenda.” Energy 
Research & Social Science 1 (March): 1–29. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2014.02.003. 
Späth, Philipp, and Harald Rohracher. 2010. “‘Energy Regions’: The Transformative 
Power of Regional Discourses on Socio-Technical Futures.” Research Policy 39 
(4): 449–58. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2010.01.017. 
———. 2012. “Local Demonstrations for Global Transitions—Dynamics across Govern-
ance Levels Fostering Socio-Technical Regime Change Towards Sustainability.” 
European Planning Studies 20 (3): 461–79. doi:10.1080/09654313.2012.651800. 
Spencer, Robert, and Mani Vadari. 2009. “Smart Grid: A Customer Challenge.” Public 
Utilities Fortnightly, October. 
Stake, Robert E. 1995. The Art of Case Study Research. Sage Publications, Inc. 
Star, Susan Leigh. 1999. “The Ethnography of Infrastructure.” American Behavioral Sci-
entist 43 (3): 377–91. doi:10.1177/00027649921955326. 
Stephens, Jennie C., Elizabeth J. Wilson, Tarla R. Peterson, and James Meadowcroft. 
2013. “Getting Smart? Climate Change and the Electric Grid.” Challenges 4 (2): 
201–16. doi:10.3390/challe4020201. 
Stephens, Jennie C., Elizabeth J. Wilson, and Tarla Rai Peterson. 2015. Smart Grid 
(R)Evolution. Cambridge University Press. 
Stirling, Andy. 2014. “Transforming Power: Social Science and the Politics of Energy 
Choices.” Energy Research & Social Science 1 (March): 83–95. 
doi:10.1016/j.erss.2014.02.001. 
Stone, Diane. 2000. “Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of Independent 
Policy Institutes.” Governance 13 (1): 45–70. doi:10.1111/0952-1895.00123. 
———. 2001. “Learning Lessons, Policy Transfer and the International Diffusion of Pol-
icy Ideas.” Working or Discussion Paper. April. 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2001/wp6901.p
df. 
———. 2004. “Transfer Agents and Global Networks  in the ‘transnationalization’ of 
Policy.” Journal of European Public Policy 11 (3): 545–66. 
doi:10.1080/13501760410001694291. 
Strebel, Ignaz, and Jane M. Jacobs. 2014. “Houses of Experiment: Modern Housing and 
the Will to Laboratorization.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Re-
search, January, n/a-n/a. doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12079. 
Strengers, Yolande. 2012. “Peak Electricity Demand and Social Practice Theories: Re-
framing the Role of Change Agents in the Energy Sector.” Energy Policy 44 
(May): 226–34. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.01.046. 
———. 2013. Smart Energy Technologies in Everyday Life: Smart Utopia? Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Stripple, Johannes, and Harriet Bulkeley. 2013. Governing the Climate: New Approaches 
to Rationality, Power and Politics. Cambridge University Press. 
Succar, Samir, and Ralph Cavanagh. 2012. “The Promise of the Smart Grid: Goals, Poli-
cies, and Measurement Must Support Sustainability Benefits.” NRDC ISSUE 
BRIEF. https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/smart-grid-IB.pdf. 
 267
Sweeney, James L. 2002. “The California Electricity Crisis: Lessons for the Future.” The 
Bridge, National Academy of Engineering, 32 (2): 23–31. 
Swyngedouw, Erik. 2004. “Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? Networks, Territories and 
Rescaling.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17 (1): 25–48. 
doi:10.1080/0955757042000203632. 
———. 2006. “Circulations and Metabolisms: (Hybrid) Natures and (Cyborg) Cities.” 
Science as Culture 15 (2): 105–21. doi:10.1080/09505430600707970. 
———. 2011. “The Non-Political Politics of Climate Change,” 1–8. 
Temenos, Cristina, and Eugene McCann. 2012. “The Local Politics of Policy Mobility: 
Learning, Persuasion, and the Production of a Municipal Sustainability Fix.” En-
vironment and Planning A 44 (6): 1389–1406. doi:10.1068/a44314. 
———. 2013. “Geographies of Policy Mobilities.” Geography Compass 7 (5): 344–57. 
doi:10.1111/gec3.12063. 
Tendril. 2016. “Welcome to Tendril My Home: The Mobile-First Application That Wil 
Revolutionize Your Customer Communications.” //www.tendrilinc.com/. 
The Economist. 2004. “Building the Energy Internet,” March 11. 
http://www.economist.com/node/2476988. 
The White House Office of the Press Secretary. 2016. “FACT SHEET: Obama Admin-
istration Announces Federal and Private Sector Actions on Scaling Renewable 
Energy and Storage with Smart Markets.” Whitehouse.gov. June 16. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/16/fact-sheet-obama-
administration-announces-federal-and-private-sector. 
Thomas, Gary. 2010. “Doing Case Study: Abduction Not Induction, Phronesis Not Theo-
ry.” Qualitative Inquiry 16 (7): 575–82. doi:10.1177/1077800410372601. 
———. 2011. “A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of 
Definition, Discourse, and Structure.” Qualitative Inquiry 17 (6): 511–21. 
doi:10.1177/1077800411409884. 
Torrance, Morag I. 2008. “Forging Glocal Governance? Urban Infrastructures as Net-
worked Financial Products.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Re-
search 32 (1): 1–21. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2007.00756.x. 
Torriti, Jacopo. 2012. “Price-Based Demand Side Management: Assessing the Impacts of 
Time-of-Use Tariffs on Residential Electricity Demand and Peak Shifting in 
Northern Italy.” Energy, Integration and Energy System Engineering, European 
Symposium on Computer-Aided Process Engineering 2011, 44 (1): 576–83. 
doi:10.1016/j.energy.2012.05.043. 
Trabish, Herman K. 2015. “Austin Energy Approved for 300 MW Utility Solar Buy un-
der 4¢/kWh.” Utility Dive. October 5. http://www.utilitydive.com/news/austin-
energy-approved-for-300-mw-utility-solar-buy-under-4kwh/406752/. 
Tricoire, Aurélie. 2015. “Uncertainty, Vision, and the Vitality of the Emerging Smart 
Grid.” Energy Research & Social Science, Special Issue on Smart Grids and the 
Social Sciences, 9 (September): 21–34. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2015.08.028. 
Truffer, Bernhard, and Lars Coenen. 2012. “Environmental Innovation and Sustainability 
Transitions in Regional Studies.” Regional Studies 46 (1): 1–21. 
doi:10.1080/00343404.2012.646164. 
 268
Truffer, Bernhard, James T. Murphy, and Rob Raven. 2015. “The Geography of Sustain-
ability Transitions: Contours of an Emerging Theme.” Environmental Innovation 
and Societal Transitions 17 (December): 63–72. doi:10.1016/j.eist.2015.07.004. 
Tweed, Katherine. 2011. “IBM Coordinates Smart Grid Data in South Korea.” June 29. 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ibm-coordinates-smart-grid-data-in-
korea. 
Tyfield, David. 2014. “Putting the Power in ‘Socio-Technical Regimes’ – E-Mobility 
Transition in China as Political Process.” Mobilities 9 (4): 585–603. 
doi:10.1080/17450101.2014.961262. 
Undrill, J. 1988. “Where We Stand (Power System Computer Applications).” IEEE 
Computer Applications in Power 1 (1): 9–10. doi:10.1109/67.895. 
US Department of Energy. 2011. “U.S. Department of Energys Approach for Conducting 




———. 2014. “Customer Participation in the Smart Grid: Lessons Learned.” smart-
grid.gov. http://energy.gov/oe/downloads/customer-participation-smart-grid-
lessons-learned-september-2014. 
———. 2016a. “Energy Transition Initiative | Department of Energy.” Energy.gov. 
http://energy.gov/eere/technology-to-market/energy-transition-initiative. 
———. 2016b. “What Is the Smart Grid?” Smartgrid.gov. 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid/smart_grid.html. 
———. 2016a. “Green Button Gives Millions of Consumers Access to Electricity Usage 
Information.” Smartgrid.gov. Accessed August 10. 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/featured_initiatives/green_button_gives_millions_con
sumers_access_electricity.html. 
———. 2016b. “The Smart Grid: An Introduction.” Accessed August 9. 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_SG_Book_S
ingle_Pages%281%29.pdf. 
US EPA, OAR. 2011. “Smart Grid and Clean Energy for Local Governments.” Back-
ground and Resources. Local Government Climate and Energy Strategy Series. 
US Environmental Protection Agency. 
https://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/local-government-climate-and-energy-
strategy-series. 
Vadari, Mani. 2009. “Active Demand Management.” Public Utilities Fortnightly, No-
vember. 
Vanolo, Alberto. 2013. “Smartmentality: The Smart City as Disciplinary Strategy.” Ur-
ban Studies, July, 42098013494427. doi:10.1177/0042098013494427. 
Verbong, Geert P.J., Sjouke Beemsterboer, and Frans Sengers. 2013. “Smart Grids or 
Smart Users? Involving Users in Developing a Low Carbon Electricity Econo-
my.” Energy Policy 52 (January): 117–25. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.05.003. 
Vesnic-Alujevic, Lucia, Melina Breitegger, and Ângela Guimarães Pereira. 2016. “What 
Smart Grids Tell about Innovation Narratives in the European Union: Hopes, Im-
 269
aginaries and Policy.” Energy Research & Social Science 12 (February): 16–26. 
doi:10.1016/j.erss.2015.11.011. 
Village of Oak Park. 2014a. “Screenings Begin for Smart City USA Participants.” Vil-
lage of Oak Park. April 25. http://www.oak-park.us/news/screenings-begin-smart-
city-usa-participants. 
———. 2014b. “Pecan Street Inc. | Smart Grid Project Moves Closer toward Implemen-
tation.” September 18. http://www.pecanstreet.org/2014/09/oak-park-il-smart-
grid-project-moves-closer-toward-implementation/. 
———. 2015. “Meeting of Village of Oak Park President and Board of Trustees on 
2015-03-09 7:00 PM.” March 9. http://oak-
park.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=588. 
Vliet, Bas Van, Elizabeth Shove, and Heather Chappells. 2012. Infrastructures of Con-
sumption: Environmental Innovation in the Utility Industries. Earthscan. 
Voytenko, Yuliya, Kes McCormick, James Evans, and Gabriele Schliwa. 2016. “Urban 
Living Labs for Sustainability and Low Carbon Cities in Europe: Towards a Re-
search Agenda.” Journal of Cleaner Production, Advancing Sustainable Solu-
tions: An Interdisciplinary and Collaborative Research Agenda, 123 (June): 45–
54. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.08.053. 
Vu, K., M. M. Begouic, and D. Novosel. 1997. “Grids Get Smart Protection and Con-
trol.” IEEE Computer Applications in Power 10 (4): 40–44. 
doi:10.1109/67.625373. 
Waitt, Gordon. 2005. “Doing Foucauldian Discourse Analysis: Revealing Social Reali-
ties.” In Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography, edited by Iain Hay, 
217–40. Oxford University Press. 
Walker, Gordon. 2014. “The Dynamics of Energy Demand: Change, Rhythm and Syn-
chronicity.” Energy Research & Social Science 1 (March): 49–55. 
doi:10.1016/j.erss.2014.03.012. 
Walker, Gordon, and Elizabeth Shove. 2007. “Ambivalence, Sustainability and the Gov-
ernance of Socio-Technical Transitions.” Journal of Environmental Policy & 
Planning 9 (3–4): 213–25. doi:10.1080/15239080701622840. 
Ward, Kevin. 2008. “Editorial—Toward a Comparative (Re)turn in Urban Studies? Some 
Reflections.” Urban Geography 29 (5): 405–10. doi:10.2747/0272-3638.29.5.405. 
———. 2010. “Towards a Relational Comparative Approach to the Study of Cities.” 
Progress in Human Geography 34 (4): 471–87. doi:10.1177/0309132509350239. 
Warwick, W.M. 2002. “A Primer on Electric Utilities, Deregulation, and Restructuring of 
US Electricity Markets.” PNNL. 
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-
13906.pdf. 
Wernau, Julie. 2011. “ComEd Bill: Clock Ticking for Smart-Grid Bill after Quinn Veto.” 
Chicago Tribune, September 13. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-09-
13/business/ct-biz-0913-quinn-legislation-20110913_1_smart-grid-comed-veto. 
While, Aidan, Andrew E G Jonas, and David Gibbs. 2004. “The Environment and the 
Entrepreneurial City    : Searching for the Urban  ̀Sustainability Fix â  in Man-
chester and Leeds *.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28 
(3): 549–69. 
 270
While, Aidan, Andrew E G Jonas, and David Gibbs. 2010. “From Sustainable Develop-
ment to Carbon Control: Eco-State Restructuring and the Politics of Urban and 
Regional Development.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 35 
(1): 76–93. doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2009.00362.x. 
Wiig, Alan. 2015. “IBM’s Smart City as Techno-Utopian Policy Mobility.” City 19 (2–
3): 258–73. doi:10.1080/13604813.2015.1016275. 
Wilhite, Harold, and Loren Lutzenhiser. 1999. “Social Loading and Sustainable Con-
sumption.” Advances in Consumer Research 26 (1): 281–87. 
Wilhite, Harold, Elizabeth Shove, Loren Lutzenhiser, and Willett Kempton. 2000. “The 
Legacy of Twenty Years of Energy Demand Management: We Know More about 
Individual Behaviour but next to Nothing about Demand.” In Society, Behaviour, 
and Climate Change Mitigation, edited by Eberhard Jochem, Jayant Sathaye, and 
Daniel Bouille, 109–26. Advances in Global Change Research 8. Springer Neth-
erlands. http://link.springer.com.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/chapter/10.1007/0-306-48160-
X_4. 
Winner, Langdon. 2010. The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of 
High Technology. University of Chicago Press. 
Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer. 2001. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. SAGE. 
Woo, Chi-Keung, Debra Lloyd, and Asher Tishler. 2003. “Electricity Market Reform 
Failures: UK, Norway, Alberta and California.” Energy Policy, Themes in current 
Asian energy, 31 (11): 1103–15. doi:10.1016/S0301-4215(02)00211-2. 
Woods, Eric. 2014. “South Korea Draws an Ambitious Roadmap for Smart Grids and 
Smart Cities.” Navigant Research. November 12. 
https://www.navigantresearch.com/blog/south-korea-draws-an-ambitious-
roadmap-for-smart-grids-and-smart-cities. 
XcelEnergy. 2016. “SmartGridCity.” SmartGridCity. 
http://smartgridcity.xcelenergy.com/. 
Yin, Robert K. 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. SAGE. 
Zamuda, Craig, Bryan Mignone, Dan Bilello, K. C. Hallett, Courtney Lee, Jordan 
Macknick, Robin Newmark, and Daniel Steinberg. 2013. “US Energy Sector Vul-
nerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather.” DTIC Document. 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD
A583709. 





Appendix A: Sample Recruitment Letter 
From: Anthony Levenda <anthonylevenda@pdx.edu> 
Sent: 27 October 2014 XX:XX 
To: [Interviewee] 
Subject: Interview request for urban energy research project 
 
Dear Mr/s. [], 
 
I am a researcher at Portland State University, currently undertaking research on 
the integration and demonstration of smart grid technologies in North American cities. 
I will be conducting field research in [your city] from [March 10th until March 
28th, 2015] where I hope to interview several people in key organizations that are strate-
gic to the deployment and demonstration of urban energy technologies in [city’s living 
lab project] ‐ specifically, [the particular project]. Of particular interest to me is the urban 
planning and larger visioning process in which [the particular project] demonstrates what 
cities may need to do to become sustainable in the future. 
I was hoping to arrange an approximately 1 hour‐long meeting at your conven-
ience to find out more about your work in [city/living lab]. I appreciate that as a busy 
[organization] you have many competing demands on your time and I am grateful for 
your time and assistance with this research. 
Attached is a brief outline of the project for your information.  Also, feel free to 
circulate the details of this research project to any interested parties. Within this project 
there is scope for eventually sharing some key research findings with you. 











Appendix B: Sample Interview Protocol 
Introduction 
 
Hi ______, as you know, my name is Anthony Levenda. First, thanks for volun-
teering to talk with me today. Our talk should only take between 30 and 45 minutes. Do 
you still have time available to talk today? 
 
Great, thanks again. As you know, I’m a doctoral candidate in the Urban Studies 
and Planning department at Portland State and am working on a project about innovation 
and governance in smart grid and smart city sectors. As a part of this project, we’re inter-
ested in understanding your experiences with the Pecan Street Project and the Mueller 
Development. 
 
That’s where you come in. I’m hoping we can start from how you got started in 
Pecan Street Project.  
 




1. First, could you please tell me about your role in Pecan Street, and with the PSP? 
2. What is the Pecan Street Project? 
2.1. Can you briefly describe the history of the project? When was it discussed for the 
first time? Who were the key stakeholders involved in its development? What 
were the defining moments in the process of developing it? How did you get par-
ticipants to enroll in the program? Were there any barriers or concerns to enroll-
ment? 
3. What do you think are the most important achievements of this project?   
4. Who would you say are the major actors or institutions in the project? 
4.1. Why? What is their role? 
4.2. What is the role of Mueller Development in this project? 
4.3. What is the role of the Austin Energy? 
4.4. What are the key aspects of your support?   
4.5. Do you feel the City has played a key role in supporting innovation in this pro-
ject? 
4.5.1. How so? 
5. How does this project benefit the city/consumers? 
5.1. How do you think that the project responds to the specific needs of the 
city/consumers? How does it connect with the specific goals of Pecan Street? 
Specific goals of the city? 
5.2. What do you think has been the impact of the project so far? What could be its 
impact in the future?   
6. How do you see the project playing a role in changing the way in which the city ap-
proaches issues of energy?   
 273
7. What barriers are yet to be overcome to further promote the use of smart technology 
(as used in Pecan Street Participants homes/neighborhoods)?   
8. Do you see opportunities for this project to be replicated in other parts of the city or 
in other cities? Where and how?   
9. What has been learned from this project? What would you tell other cit-
ies/utilities/consumers trying to implement similar projects? 
9.1. What other places have learned from Austin’s experience? 
10. How do you define the “smart grid”? Do you hear this concept come up much around 
the office? If so, could you describe a few examples of how people bring up the idea 
around here? How do you think the smart grid will shape/change Austin? 
11. Do you think smart grid and smart city projects are highly related? 
11.1. How so? 
12. Data seems to be a really important element of the smart grid and smart city. Can you 
tell me about the data you collect and how it’s used?  
12.1. What is the role of data in smart energy? 
12.1.1. Is this important to innovation? 
12.2. How does data get used? 
12.3. Have you ever heard of the term big data?  
12.3.1. What is the connection between big data and energy? 
12.4. What does data say about consumers’ energy use?  
12.5. Do consumers use data about their energy consumption? 
12.5.1. How? 
13. What is the connection between smart energy technologies and energy efficiency, or 
environmental initiatives in the city? 
14. Tell me about how you think the smart grids and energy affects cities… 
15. Thanks again for your time. 
15.1. Are there any questions you think I should have asked regarding innova-
tion in the smart grid, city, neighborhood, home sector? 
15.2. Is there anything else you’d like to mention? 
15.3. Who else do you think I should talk to? 
15.4. Do you have any questions for me before we conclude? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
